The Lindsay Clancy Jury Dispute: When Massachusetts Law Permits Removal of a Deliberating Juror

Massachusetts law does not permit a trial judge to remove a deliberating juror merely because the other eleven jurors believe that person is wrong. Once deliberations begin, the judge may discharge a juror only after a hearing establishes an emergency, another compelling reason, or a demonstrated inability to perform the duties of a juror. Disagreement about the evidence, reasonable doubt, or the proper verdict does not meet that standard.

That distinction now controls the dispute unfolding in the Lindsay Clancy murder trial in Plymouth Superior Court. After six days of deliberations, the foreperson sent the judge a note concerning one juror. According to defense attorney Kevin Reddington’s public account, the note said the juror was not following the court’s reasonable-doubt instruction. Reddington asked Judge William Sullivan to remove the juror and seat an alternate. Judge Sullivan did not remove the juror immediately. He questioned the jurors individually, repeated the reasonable-doubt instruction, and directed the jurors and alternates to return on Friday, September 4. Reddington told reporters that the judge would then question the identified juror. The day’s events are described in the BBC’s live coverage and an Associated Press report.

The foreperson’s report presents a legitimate question for the judge. It does not answer that question. The court must determine whether the juror has refused to perform the duties required by law or instead remains unpersuaded after participating in the deliberations. The difference determines whether removal is lawful.

The Legal Standard for Removing a Deliberating Juror

General Laws c. 234A, § 39 permits a judge to discharge a juror after deliberations have begun only after a hearing establishes an emergency or another compelling reason. The judge must identify the reason on the record. The statute does not permit removal based solely on suspicion, frustration, or another juror’s characterization of the disagreement.

The Supreme Judicial Court described the inquiry as a particularly sensitive undertaking in Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838, 843 to 847 (1984). The hearing must establish a demonstrable inability to perform the duties of a juror. The reason must be personal to the juror and unrelated to the juror’s view of the merits, relationship with the other jurors, or position in the deliberations.

If that demanding standard is met, Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 20(d)(3) permits an alternate to be seated. The rule does not allow the judge or either party to select a preferred alternate. The clerk places the available alternates’ names in a box and draws one at random.

Disagreement Is Not Misconduct

A Massachusetts criminal verdict must represent the independent judgment of every juror. The Supreme Judicial Court’s deadlock instruction requires jurors to consult with one another, reconsider their views, and remain open to persuasion. It also provides that no juror should surrender an honest conviction solely because other jurors disagree or simply to produce a verdict. Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87, 101 to 102 (1973).

An eleven-to-one division is therefore not a majority verdict. It is no verdict. The lone juror has the same duty to listen and deliberate as the other eleven, but the lone juror has no duty to agree with them.

The Supreme Judicial Court applied that distinction directly in Commonwealth v. Tiscione, 482 Mass. 485, 489 to 493 (2019). The Court held that Massachusetts law does not allow the removal of a dissenting juror to resolve an impasse. A juror may be discharged for an inability to serve, but not because the juror’s assessment of the evidence prevents unanimity.

The same distinction applies in the Clancy trial. A juror who refuses to listen, discuss the evidence, or apply the judge’s instructions presents a different problem from a juror who listens but applies the reasonable-doubt standard differently. A foreperson may describe either situation as a refusal to follow the law. The judge cannot accept that description without conducting an independent and carefully limited inquiry.

What the Judge May Ask

The court may ask whether the juror can follow the instructions, remain impartial, and continue to participate in good-faith deliberations. The inquiry should not reveal the juror’s vote, the reasons for the juror’s view, which evidence the juror accepts, or whether the juror agrees with the other eleven.

Those limits protect both the secrecy of deliberations and the juror’s independence. In Commonwealth v. Torres, 453 Mass. 722, 728 to 732 (2009), the Supreme Judicial Court emphasized that judicial questioning must avoid intruding into the substance of deliberations or pressuring a juror to abandon an honestly held view.

The reported inquiry on Friday should therefore be narrow. The controlling question is not whether the juror’s interpretation of reasonable doubt is correct in the view of the foreperson or the other jurors. It is whether the juror is willing and able to apply the court’s legal instructions and participate meaningfully in deliberations.

The Limited Role of Alternate Jurors

The presence of six alternates does not make replacement routine. Alternates are retained to address death, illness, incapacity, or another legally sufficient inability to serve. They are not a reserve pool for replacing a juror who is difficult to persuade. The firm’s guide to jury selection in Massachusetts criminal trials explains the broader role of jurors and alternates.

If Judge Sullivan lawfully discharges a juror and an alternate is drawn, the reconstituted jury must begin deliberations again. The judge must instruct the jurors to set aside the prior deliberations and consider the case anew with the alternate participating from the beginning. Commonwealth v. Carnes, 457 Mass. 812, 829 to 831 (2010). That requirement has practical importance after six days of deliberations.

The Possible Outcomes in the Clancy Trial

Judge Sullivan has three principal paths. He may find that the juror remains able to serve, remind the panel of its duties, and allow deliberations to continue. He may find a compelling, legally sufficient reason for discharge, seat a randomly selected alternate, and order the jury to begin deliberations anew. Or, if the juror remains able to serve but the jury ultimately cannot reach a unanimous verdict after full and fair deliberations, the court may declare a mistrial.

A mistrial based on a genuinely deadlocked jury is not an acquittal. It returns the prosecution to an earlier point in the Massachusetts criminal process, and the Commonwealth ordinarily may retry the case. Neither the defense request nor the availability of alternates lowers the legal standard for removing a deliberating juror.

Why the Inquiry Matters

The procedure protects two equally important principles. Every juror must obey the judge’s instructions and engage in genuine deliberation. Every juror must also remain free to exercise independent judgment without being removed because the juror is outnumbered.

The court cannot resolve the present dispute by counting votes or accepting the majority’s assessment of the dissenting juror. It must determine ability to serve without probing the merits or coercing a verdict. Massachusetts law permits an alternate to replace a juror who is legally unable to continue. It does not permit an alternate to replace a juror whom the other jurors cannot persuade.

This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It is based solely on public court proceedings, public reporting, and published decisions and does not reflect any non-public information. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. This may constitute attorney advertising.