Chatrie v. United States: The Supreme Court Brings Geofence Warrants Under the Fourth Amendment

Attorney Joe Serpa

By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center | Massachusetts Criminal Defense Since 1995

On June 29, 2026, the United States Supreme Court held in Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112, 609 U.S. ___ (2026), that police conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired a suspect’s Google Location History data. The Court reasoned that a person keeps a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone location information. The vote on the judgment was 6 to 3. Justice Kagan wrote the opinion of the Court for five Justices, and Justice Gorsuch supplied the sixth vote for the judgment on a separate property theory.

The decision extends Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018), the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling on cell phone location data. Massachusetts courts adopted similar protections under the state constitution years earlier.

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Chatrie, 136 F.4th 100 (4th Cir. 2025) (en banc), and remanded the case. The Court decided that the Fourth Amendment applies. The Court did not decide whether this warrant, or any geofence warrant, is valid, and no court has yet suppressed any evidence in Mr. Chatrie’s case.

What a Geofence Warrant Is

A geofence warrant starts with a place rather than a person. In an ordinary investigation, police identify a suspect and then ask where the suspect’s phone was. With a geofence warrant, police draw a boundary around a crime scene and ask a provider, usually Google, to identify every device inside the boundary during a period of time.

The warrant searches the location histories of everyone who passed through the area, almost all of them innocent, in the hope that one of them is the suspect. The Chatrie case began with a Virginia bank robbery and a warrant that collected the location data of every Google user near the bank during a two-hour period.

What the Court Held

The majority held that people keep a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone location data. A government demand for that data intrudes on a constitutionally protected interest, even when the period is short and a third party holds the data. The Fourth Amendment has no exception for short periods. The Court wrote that Fourth Amendment protections do not begin to apply only after an intrusion goes too far. The Amendment applies regardless of the quality or quantity of information the government obtains.

The Court also rejected the government’s argument that users voluntarily share this data with Google. The Court described the exposure of the information as what happens when a user avails himself of the services on his phone. The third-party doctrine did not apply in Carpenter, and the Court held that the doctrine does not apply to Location History either. This reasoning extends Carpenter, where the Court came to the same conclusion for historical cell site location information. The decision also further limits the old third-party doctrine in digital cases.

What the Court Left Open

The Court sent back to the Fourth Circuit every question about the validity of this warrant, including probable cause, particularity, and the lawfulness of the second and third steps, in which officers widened the time period and de-anonymized selected devices. The Fourth Circuit must evaluate the warrant at each step of the search process. The question of the good faith exception was not part of the grant of certiorari, and the Court expressly left the Fourth Circuit free to consider that question again.

Two Justices would have gone further. Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, wrote separately that she would have held this search unconstitutional. Her concurrence criticizes the discretion that the warrant left to officers at the second and third steps. A two-Justice concurrence is not the holding of the Court, and the concurrence reads as the argument the defense will make on remand rather than as a rule.

Under federal law, acquiring Location History requires a warrant that satisfies probable cause and particularity at each step, and no court has yet decided how narrow those warrants must be. In federal court, the government will argue that officers who relied on earlier law acted in good faith. The dissent read the majority opinion as leaving the Fourth Circuit’s good faith ruling in place. The remaining federal litigation will focus on that good faith question.

Massachusetts Law Before Chatrie

For Massachusetts defendants, Chatrie confirms protections that Massachusetts courts recognized first. The Supreme Judicial Court held in Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 (2015) and 472 Mass. 448 (2015), four years before Carpenter, that police generally need a warrant for historical cell site location data under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

In Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852 (2015), the Supreme Judicial Court then set a limit. A request for up to six hours of historical telephone-call CSLI needs no warrant, and the six hours is measured by what the Commonwealth requests, not by the portion that the Commonwealth later offers at trial.

The Supreme Judicial Court decided the remaining questions case by case. In Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 35 (2019), the court held under art. 14 that police conduct a search when they cause a phone to reveal its real-time location, and the court then reversed the suppression order because of exigent circumstances. In Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 484 Mass. 493 (2020), the court adopted mosaic reasoning for automatic license plate readers. The court held that four fixed cameras on two bridges did not invade the defendant’s expectation of privacy, and the court affirmed the denial of suppression.

In Commonwealth v. Mora, 485 Mass. 360 (2020), the court held that months of pole camera surveillance of a home is a search under art. 14, and the court remanded for a probable cause determination rather than ordering suppression.

In 2025, the court came to the opposite conclusion for a short period of surveillance. In Commonwealth v. Govan, SJC-13600 (Mass. June 4, 2025), the court held that the warrantless review of roughly twenty minutes to an hour of historical GPS data from a pretrial monitoring bracelet was not a search. The court reasoned that surveillance that short reveals details from isolated incidents rather than a pattern of life, and the court affirmed the denial of suppression.

A defense argument under the mosaic theory against a short geofence period must address Govan. After Chatrie, the defense can instead argue, as the Supreme Court held, that the acquisition of the location data itself, for any duration, is a search.

The firm’s pages on phone, computer, and digital device searches and illegal searches and seizures explain how Article 14 often protects more than the Fourth Amendment does. Chatrie raises the minimum protection that the Fourth Amendment guarantees in every state.

No Good Faith Exception in Massachusetts

No Massachusetts appellate court has yet decided a geofence warrant case. The question is open, and the courts will decide the question under the cases described above.

Massachusetts recognizes no good faith exception under art. 14. Evidence from a search warrant issued without probable cause is excluded even if the officer relied on the warrant in objectively reasonable good faith. Commonwealth v. Fredericq, 482 Mass. 70 (2019), and Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 (1985).

In federal court, the good faith exception has kept the geofence evidence in Chatrie admissible at every stage of the case, and the Fourth Circuit may rely on the good faith exception again on remand. Massachusetts has no such exception. A Massachusetts court does not admit evidence from a geofence warrant that lacks probable cause or particularity under art. 14 merely because the officer relied on the warrant. For a defendant charged in a Massachusetts court, the absence of a good faith exception can lead to the suppression of geofence evidence that a federal court would admit.

Fredericq gives the defense a second argument. Evidence may be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree even if the police find the evidence in a place where the defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy. In a geofence case, the return may identify the client, and the police may later find physical evidence somewhere else. The Fredericq rule allows the defense to seek suppression of that later evidence as well.

What the Chatrie Decision Means for Massachusetts Cases

Any Massachusetts case that depends on a geofence return presents a suppression issue that the defense should litigate. After Chatrie, the acquisition of the data is a search, so police need a warrant, and the warrant must rest on probable cause and describe the search with particularity at each step. A warrant that covers a busy block for an open-ended period is open to challenge on both grounds.

The second and third steps, where officers widen the time period and choose the devices to de-anonymize, can be challenged separately. For that reason, the Supreme Court directed review of the warrant at each step.

Reverse keyword warrants and tower dumps raise the same objection, because each technique searches the data of many people to find one person. The defense can argue that Chatrie extends to these techniques, but no controlling court has yet extended Chatrie to them. A federal appellate decision on geofence warrants, United States v. Smith, 110 F.4th 817 (5th Cir. 2024), held that geofence warrants are unconstitutional general warrants but still applied the good faith exception. The Fifth Circuit decision is persuasive authority only. The defense presents these points as arguments, not as settled rules.

The Commonwealth will respond with three doctrines about derivative evidence, and the defense should brief all three doctrines in advance. The first is the independent source doctrine. Evidence first found through an unlawful search is admissible if the police later obtained the evidence independently by lawful means. The Commonwealth must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the later discovery was free of taint. Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852 (2015).

The second is inevitable discovery. Massachusetts requires proof that lawful discovery was certain as a practical matter, measured at the time of the unlawful seizure. The Massachusetts test is demanding and stricter than the federal rule. Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 406 Mass. 112 (1989), and Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1 (2002).

The third is attenuation. A court weighs the time that elapsed, any intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct. Consent obtained by confronting the client with the tainted return does not break the connection to the unlawful search. Commonwealth v. Fredericq, 482 Mass. 70 (2019).

Discovery requests should follow each step of the search rather than ask generally for the warrant package. Counsel demands the complete affidavit and every attachment, the coordinates, the radius, and the time period. Counsel also demands what the magistrate was told about how many uninvolved people the search would include. Counsel demands the warrant’s own terms for the second and third steps. Counsel also asks whether any judge reviewed the narrowing of the search, or whether officers applied their own criteria, which is the discretion that the Jackson concurrence criticized.

Counsel demands Google’s native productions at each step, with device counts, the de-anonymization request, every investigative step between the anonymized return and the client’s name, and every later warrant whose probable cause depends on the return. Counsel sends preservation letters immediately, before the provider purges the underlying data.

The firm’s post on digital search warrants in Massachusetts and the firm’s digital search FAQs explain the rules for these warrants. The firm’s guide to the modern Massachusetts traffic stop covers questions about location data in car cases.

Timing of the Fourth Amendment Ruling

Chatrie is the fourth in a series of Supreme Court decisions over fifteen years. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), held that attaching a GPS tracker to a car is a search. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), required a warrant to search a phone seized at arrest and recognized that digital devices hold the privacies of life.

In Carpenter, 585 U.S. 296 (2018), the Court then refused to let the government use the old third-party doctrine of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), to obtain week-long location histories without a warrant. Chatrie applies the same reasoning to geofence warrants. The government cannot demand one person’s location history by name without a warrant. The government therefore cannot avoid the warrant requirement by demanding everyone’s location history by place.

A new Fourth Amendment rule applies to cases still pending on direct review when the issue has been preserved. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). Massachusetts applies the same rule, with the same preservation condition, to its own new search rules. Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 (2014). Counsel should therefore raise Chatrie in writing in every pending case that involves a geofence return, a tower dump, or a reverse keyword demand.

Retroactive application of the search holding does not guarantee suppression. In federal court, the good faith exception can still prevent exclusion of the evidence, so a Massachusetts defendant should also raise the art. 14 claim.

Massachusetts already requires a warrant when police cause a phone to reveal its real-time location. Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 35 (2019). Together, Chatrie and Article 14 give Massachusetts defendants two independent bodies of law on which to challenge location searches.

Who a Geofence Warrant Identifies

A geofence return identifies the phones that were near a location. The return does not show who committed a crime. In Boston and Cambridge, the people near a late-night incident are often students and young professionals.

The return from a geofence that police draw around a late-night incident near a campus, a stadium, or a nightlife area can identify every phone in the crowd. Weeks later, the police may contact a college or university student who has no idea why the police are calling. A person who receives such a call should decline to answer questions and should contact a lawyer, as the firm’s guides on the right to remain silent and the first 24 hours after an arrest explain.

For a licensed professional, or for anyone whose career depends on background checks, the arraignment itself causes harm, because the arraignment creates a CORI entry that employers and licensing boards can see. For a case that begins with a complaint application instead of an arrest, the defense can challenge a weak geofence identification at the clerk-magistrate hearing, before any record exists.

Serpa Law Office litigates digital search issues across Massachusetts. A person whose case involves location data, a device search, or a warrant that the person has not seen can contact Serpa Law Office at 617.936.0201 for a confidential consultation.

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