Defense Lawyer
Phone, Computer, and Digital Device Searches in Massachusetts
Police seize phones, laptops, and tablets in ordinary Massachusetts criminal cases, including drug cases, firearms cases, fraud cases, harassment cases, and domestic violence cases. This page explains how police take a device, how they get permission to search it, what that permission covers, and what the defense can challenge at each step.
The four distinct actions that police must justify are taking the device, holding it while seeking a warrant, obtaining the warrant, and searching within the warrant’s limits. A violation at any stage can support a motion to suppress even if the officers complied with the rules at the other stages.
Attorney Joe Serpa has practiced Massachusetts criminal defense since 1995 and litigates digital suppression motions in the District Courts, the Boston Municipal Court, and the Superior Court. Serpa Law Office can be reached at 617.936.0201.
A separate page on digital evidence in Massachusetts criminal cases covers what happens later, at trial, including authentication, authorship, hearsay, and admissibility. This page addresses how the Commonwealth obtained the digital evidence in the first place.
Seizure of the Device
Police may take a device from a person, a car, or a home on the same authority that governs any other seizure. A seizure requires probable cause to believe the device contains evidence of a crime, or a recognized exception. Officers often seize a phone during an arrest, during the execution of a search warrant for a location, or after a stop.
Defense counsel asks two questions about every seizure.
The first question is whether the encounter in which police seized the device was lawful. A phone seized after an unlawful stop, exit order, patfrisk, or entry is subject to the same challenge as any other item taken in that encounter. See illegal searches and seizures in Massachusetts.
The second question is whether the police had probable cause connecting the device to the offense. In Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583 (2016), the Supreme Judicial Court held that the fact of a charge plus the fact that the defendant owned a phone did not establish probable cause to seize it. The affidavit must state particular facts connecting the device to the alleged crime.
Seizing a device is not the same as searching it. A lawful seizure permits police to hold the device. A lawful seizure does not permit police to open the device.
Retention While Police Seek a Warrant
Police frequently hold a device for weeks or months before applying for a search warrant. The defense can separately challenge the length of time police held the device before applying for a warrant. The judge decides whether the delay was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, weighing the strength of the government’s interest against the possessory interest of the person whose device it is.
On August 12, 2026, the Supreme Judicial Court applied the reasonableness standard in Commonwealth v. Solis and Commonwealth v. Diaz. The Court upheld delays of 109 and 123 days based on a specific combination of factors that included probable cause, the independent evidentiary value of the device, the seriousness of the alleged offenses, and a reduced possessory interest. The phone seizure and warrant delay analysis covers the Solis and Diaz decisions and what a defense challenge to a delay has to address.
For a person whose phone was taken, the delay begins on the seizure date. The Commonwealth must explain the delay. A request for return of the device documents the possessory interest that the court weighs when deciding whether the delay was reasonable.
Exigent Circumstances
Police sometimes search a device without a warrant and later claim an emergency justified it. A judge decides an emergency claim on the specific facts of the case. The judge can accept an emergency claim even when the device is already in police custody.
In Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), the United States Supreme Court held that police generally may not search digital information on a phone seized incident to arrest without a warrant. The Court also preserved exigency as a case-specific exception. The Court wrote that if “the police are truly confronted with a ‘now or never’ situation,” for example circumstances suggesting that a phone will be the target of an imminent remote-wipe attempt, “they may be able to rely on exigent circumstances to search the phone immediately.”
The Court also identified less intrusive responses available to police, including disabling a phone’s locking mechanism to secure the scene and responding in a targeted way to a specific wiping threat. The claimed emergency is weaker when officers had a practical alternative to an immediate search and did not use it. Defense counsel should test the emergency claim at an evidentiary hearing when the Commonwealth offers only a general statement that digital evidence can be deleted, without facts showing an actual and immediate threat to the device.
The defense investigates what the officers knew at the moment of the search, what they did with the device before and after, and whether the department had radio-isolating equipment available.
The Search Warrant: Probable Cause and Particularity
A search of a device ordinarily requires a warrant supported by probable cause and describing with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be seized. The United States Supreme Court established the rule for phones in Riley. In Commonwealth v. Mauricio, 477 Mass. 588 (2017), the Supreme Judicial Court applied the warrant rule to other digital devices.
Three requirements govern the warrant application.
Nexus. The affidavit must connect the particular device to the particular offense. In White, the Supreme Judicial Court held that ownership of a phone plus a criminal charge is not enough to connect the phone to the offense. Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508 (2017), illustrates the kind of particularized information that does establish nexus, including facts showing that participants used phones in connection with the offense.
Particularity. The warrant must state what may be searched and seized. Defense counsel can challenge a warrant that authorizes examination of an entire device without limitation.
Truthfulness. A defendant who makes a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant knowingly or recklessly included a false statement, or omitted material information, may seek an evidentiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
Scope and Execution of the Search
A valid warrant permits police to search the device, but only within the limits that the warrant states. Two limits arise repeatedly in device-warrant cases.
Subject matter. In Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496 (2016), the Court addressed which areas of a phone a warrant for particular communications permitted examiners to open. The question in any case is whether the file type and location searched were within the categories the warrant described.
Time. A device-warrant affidavit must connect the requested categories of information and date range to the alleged offense. Commonwealth v. Snow, 486 Mass. 582 (2021), addresses nexus and staleness in a digital-warrant application.
The defense can also challenge the way police executed the warrant. The Commonwealth typically extracts the device with forensic software that produces a complete image, then reviews the extraction. The defense examines whether the examiner searched categories the warrant did not authorize, whether the examiner reviewed data from outside the authorized period, and what search protocol, if any, the warrant imposed.
Consent
Voluntary consent is an exception to the warrant requirement. The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that the person consented voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances.
A judge reviewing a consent search considers three questions.
Voluntariness. A judge deciding whether consent was voluntary considers whether the person understood a refusal was possible and whether officers made statements suggesting a search would occur regardless. The judge also considers how many officers were present, how long the encounter lasted, and whether the person was in custody.
Scope. A person who agrees to let an officer look at one text thread has not authorized a full forensic extraction. What the person agreed to, and what the officers then did, are separate facts.
Authority. A person who shares a device or an account may be able to consent to a search of areas over which that person has common authority. The defense should develop, rather than concede, the factual question whether the consenting person had authority over the particular device, account, folder, or files searched.
A person asked for consent may refuse. See the right to remain silent.
Passcodes and Compelled Access
Voluntarily telling an officer a passcode and being ordered by a judge to enter one are different events with different rules.
Voluntary disclosure. A person who voluntarily gives police a passcode may allow them to access the device, but the scope of any consent remains a separate question. The defense may challenge both the voluntariness of the disclosure and whether the subsequent search exceeded what the person authorized.
Compelled entry. The Commonwealth may move for an order compelling a defendant to enter a passcode. In Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512 (2014), the Supreme Judicial Court held that the act of entering a decryption key is testimonial. The Court also held that compulsion is permissible only where the act communicates nothing the Commonwealth does not already know.
In Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass. 540 (2019), the Court addressed the foregone conclusion exception under Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Court held that Article 12 requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knows the password before the exception applies. In Jones, the Court also held that the Commonwealth must prove knowledge of the password, not ownership or exclusive control of the device. The Court further held that evidence that other people used the device does not by itself require a judge to deny the motion.
Statements about the passcode. The defense examines whether a judge should suppress the passcode and the evidence derived from it when police obtained the passcode through custodial questioning without the required warnings, or after the person asked for counsel. The suppression analysis depends on the circumstances of the questioning and the relationship between the violation and the evidence.
See refusing to give police an iPhone passcode in Massachusetts.
Cloud Accounts, Provider Records, and Location Data
Much of what looks like phone evidence is held by a company rather than on the device.
Provider content and subscriber records. Investigators may obtain email, messaging, social media, and cloud-storage records from providers under the federal Stored Communications Act and related legal process. Different requirements govern subscriber information, transactional records, and stored content. Defense counsel should obtain the legal process, the provider’s return, and the dates covered.
Historical location data. In Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 (2014), the Supreme Judicial Court held that obtaining historical cell-site location information is a search under Article 14 requiring a warrant. The Supreme Court adopted the same rule nationally in Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018). In Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852 (2015), the Supreme Judicial Court held that obtaining no more than six hours of historical cell-site location information does not require a search warrant under Article 14.
Real-time location. In Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 35 (2019), the Supreme Judicial Court held that causing a phone to reveal its real-time location is a search requiring a warrant.
Tower dumps and bulk techniques. In Commonwealth v. Perry, 489 Mass. 436 (2022), the Supreme Judicial Court addressed a tower dump as a search affecting every person whose data was collected, and addressed the protocols required to protect uninvolved people. Related decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court apply to automatic license plate readers, Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 484 Mass. 493 (2020), and long-term pole camera surveillance, Commonwealth v. Mora, 485 Mass. 360 (2020).
Messages on Someone Else’s Phone
A person who sent a message frequently wants to suppress it when police find it on the recipient’s device. In Commonwealth v. Delgado-Rivera, 487 Mass. 551 (2021), the Supreme Judicial Court held that the sender had no reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages he sent that were stored on a phone belonging to and possessed by another person. The Court’s holding applies under the Fourth Amendment and Article 14 alike. The Court reasoned that once a message is delivered, the recipient controls whether to share it.
The Court expressly reserved the question of messages sent through encrypted or ephemeral messaging applications. Defense counsel should brief the reserved question when the communications at issue were sent through an encrypted or ephemeral messaging application, because the question remains open.
Border and Other Special Settings
The border. In Alasaad v. Wolf, 988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2021), the First Circuit held that border searches of electronic devices require neither a warrant nor probable cause. The First Circuit further held that officers may conduct basic searches without reasonable suspicion and may search for evidence of a border-related crime, not only for contraband.
The opinion described agency policies that required reasonable suspicion for advanced searches using external equipment to review or copy a device’s contents. The court also held that officers may detain a device for a reasonable period and declined to impose a fixed time limit.
Campuses. A student may face a university investigation under the school’s disciplinary policy while the criminal case proceeds separately. The school’s authority to obtain or inspect a device depends on the institution, its policy, and the circumstances of the search. See student criminal defense.
Probation and pretrial conditions. A person subject to a search condition may face a different analysis, which depends on the exact terms of the condition.
Booking Inventories and Property Held for Safekeeping
After an arrest, the booking officer removes what the person carries, records it, and stores it. The booking officer lists a phone in the property record with wallets, keys, and everything else. The booking process is an inventory, not an investigative search.
Article 14 permits an inventory only when officers follow the department’s standard written inventory procedure. The purposes of an inventory are limited to safeguarding the property, protecting the department against claims of loss or theft, and keeping weapons and contraband out of the holding area. The person ordinarily receives an itemized receipt under the same written procedure. The booking property record documents the date the device entered police custody, which is the date from which a court measures any later delay in applying for a warrant.
Officers also conduct inventories away from the booking desk. Officers who impound a car may record its contents at the scene while the tow truck is on the way. The officers list a phone found in the car in the same way. In Commonwealth v. Torres, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 51 (2014), the Appeals Court upheld a roadside inventory conducted under the department’s written policy before the vehicle was towed. The same limits apply at the roadside as at the station. Officers may list and secure a device but may not examine its contents without a warrant.
Booking staff may hold a phone. Booking staff may not open the phone. In Commonwealth v. Mauricio, 477 Mass. 588 (2017), an officer suspected that a digital camera taken from an arrestee’s backpack was stolen, powered it on, and looked through the stored images to identify the owner. The Supreme Judicial Court suppressed the images because the examination was investigatory. An inventory is not an occasion to look for information. Recording the make, model, and condition of a device serves an inventory purpose. Activating the device to view its contents serves no inventory purpose.
The limit on investigative examination during an inventory also applies to closer inspection of anything taken at booking. In Commonwealth v. White, 469 Mass. 96 (2014), an officer ran the number imprinted on pills that had been seized in an inventory through an identification website. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the investigative use of the pills transformed a lawful inventory seizure into an unlawful investigatory search. The Court also held that police needed a search warrant to examine the pills for investigative purposes.
An officer conducting an inventory may note what is obvious from the outside of an item, but may not study it to extract information that serves no inventory purpose. For a phone, an officer conducting an inventory may list the device and describe its visible condition, but may not activate the screen, enter a passcode, or open files.
An inventoried item becomes evidence in one of two lawful ways. Officers who see an openly incriminating item while following the written inventory routine may seize the item, because its incriminating character is immediately apparent without further examination. A phone is almost never openly incriminating on sight. The Commonwealth therefore needs probable cause connecting the device to an offense and a search warrant for its contents. M.G.L. c. 276, § 1 confines a search incident to arrest to seizing evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made and removing weapons. Property seized in violation of the statute’s limit is not admissible in evidence.
An inventory does not enlarge the authority to search incident to an arrest. The lawful course for police who conclude during booking that a phone may hold evidence is to continue holding the device and apply for a warrant. The delay principles discussed above govern how long police may hold the device before applying for the warrant.
Deleting Material During an Investigation
A person who learns that police have an interest in a phone should not delete messages, photographs, or accounts. Deletion can support a separate charge of intimidation of a witness under M.G.L. c. 268, § 13B, which covers conduct directed at interfering with a criminal investigation or proceeding. The Commonwealth can also use deletion to argue consciousness of guilt in the underlying case. A forensic examination may recover deleted material or identify evidence of deletion.
See intimidation of a witness in Massachusetts and the witness intimidation FAQs.
Suppression and Other Remedies
The defense may move to suppress evidence obtained through an unlawful seizure, an unreasonable period of retention, a defective warrant, or a search that exceeded the warrant. A judge’s decision whether to exclude derivative evidence as well depends on the connection between that evidence and the violation, and on any Commonwealth claim of independent source, inevitable discovery, or attenuation.
Depending on the procedural stage and the continuing investigation, counsel may also seek return of the device, limits on any further search, or exclusion of a particular category of data. The prosecution may be unable to proceed if suppression leaves the Commonwealth without admissible evidence sufficient to prove the charge.
The question whether a prosecution ends after a suppression ruling depends on what other admissible evidence exists. See how criminal cases get dismissed in Massachusetts.
The Records Counsel Should Obtain
In a case involving a seized device, counsel should obtain and organize the records listed below, which establish when police took the device, how long they held it, what authority permitted the search, and what the examiner reviewed.
- The police reports describing the seizure, including the time and circumstances.
- The property receipt and evidence log showing the chain of custody and the dates of transfer.
- The search warrant, the supporting affidavit, and the return.
- Any application for an extension or a second warrant.
- The complete forensic extraction report, not a selected excerpt.
- The examiner’s notes, the software and version used, and the search terms or filters applied.
- Provider process and returns, including preservation letters, subpoenas, court orders, and warrants.
- Any consent form, and any recording of the encounter in which consent was given.
- Body-worn camera and cruiser video of the seizure.
- Any communication between the department and the provider or the forensic vendor.
In a case in which the Commonwealth extracted a device, defense counsel should request the complete extraction, the examiner’s report and notes, and the software and search terms used. The defense may also retain an independent examiner. The Massachusetts text message and phone evidence FAQs answer the questions that arise most often.
Cases in Which Digital Evidence Commonly Appears
Phone and account evidence commonly appears in the categories of case listed below.
- Domestic violence prosecutions, where messages between the parties may form a substantial part of the Commonwealth’s evidence.
- 209A abuse prevention and 258E harassment prevention proceedings, where the phone may contain evidence of the alleged contact.
- Cases against students, where a campus proceeding may take place at the same time as the criminal case.
- Cases against licensed professionals, where a profession-specific disclosure or disciplinary rule may apply to a charge or disposition.
- Cases involving noncitizens, where federal immigration law may impose its own consequences on a charge or proposed disposition.
What to Do If Police Have a Person’s Device
A person whose device police have taken should state that they do not consent to a search. The person should not provide a passcode. The person should ask whether they are free to leave. The person should ask for a property receipt. The person should not delete anything. The person should write down the date, time, location, and the names and badge numbers of the officers involved. The person should contact counsel promptly so that counsel can document the seizure date, any request for return of the device, and the date police applied for a warrant.
Serpa Law Office can be reached at 617.936.0201 for a free and confidential consultation. The Boston office is at 20 Park Plaza #400A. The Quincy Office is at 500 Victory Road, Suite 400A.
Frequently Asked Questions About Phone and Computer Searches in Massachusetts
No. In Riley v. California, the United States Supreme Court held that police generally may not search the digital contents of a phone seized during an arrest without a warrant. Massachusetts applies the same rule under article 14 of the Declaration of Rights, and G.L. c. 276, § 1 limits a search incident to arrest to seizing evidence of the crime of arrest and removing weapons. Officers may take the phone and hold it. Officers may not open it, read messages, or view photographs until a judge or magistrate issues a search warrant, unless the person voluntarily consents or a true emergency exists.
A reasonable time, measured from the seizure date. The judge decides whether the delay was reasonable under all the circumstances, weighing the strength of the Commonwealth’s interest against the possessory interest of the person who owns the phone. In Commonwealth v. Solis and Commonwealth v. Diaz, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld delays of 109 and 123 days because of a specific combination of factors, including probable cause, the evidentiary value of the device, the seriousness of the charges, and a reduced possessory interest. The Commonwealth must explain the delay. A written request for the phone’s return documents the possessory interest the court weighs.
Sometimes. Counsel may ask the police or the prosecutor to return the device, and may file a motion in court for its return, for a copy of its contents, or for limits on any further search. A judge weighs the Commonwealth’s need to hold the device as evidence against the owner’s interest in it. Even when the judge denies the motion, the request serves a purpose. The request documents the possessory interest that a court later weighs when deciding whether police held the phone too long before applying for a warrant. A person whose phone was taken should make the request through counsel promptly.
Only on a specific showing. In Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, the Supreme Judicial Court held that entering a passcode is a testimonial act, so the Commonwealth may compel it only when the act communicates nothing the Commonwealth does not already know. In Commonwealth v. Jones, the Court held that article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knows the passcode before a judge may order entry. The Commonwealth must prove knowledge of the passcode, not ownership of the phone. Evidence that other people used the phone does not by itself defeat the motion.
No. A person may decline to provide a passcode, decline to unlock a phone, and state that he or she does not consent to a search. Only a judge can order a person to enter a passcode, after the showing that Commonwealth v. Jones requires. A person who voluntarily tells an officer the passcode may have allowed access, but the scope of that consent remains a separate question. Statements about the passcode made during custodial questioning without Miranda warnings, or after the person asked for a lawyer, may be suppressed with the evidence found through them. The safe answer is a polite refusal.
No. In Commonwealth v. White, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the fact of a criminal charge plus the fact that the defendant owned a phone did not establish probable cause to seize the phone. The affidavit must state particular facts connecting the device to the alleged crime, such as evidence that participants used phones to arrange the offense, which Commonwealth v. Holley illustrates. The same connection, called nexus, is required for the search warrant. A warrant affidavit that relies on the general observation that people communicate by phone is open to a motion to suppress everything found on the device.
A warrant must describe with particularity what police may search and seize. A warrant that authorizes examination of an entire phone without limit is open to challenge. In Commonwealth v. Dorelas, the Supreme Judicial Court addressed which areas of a phone a warrant for particular communications permitted examiners to open. In Commonwealth v. Snow, the Court addressed the date range and the categories of data that the affidavit must connect to the offense. The defense also examines execution. An examiner who searched categories the warrant did not name, or data outside the authorized period, exceeded the warrant. The judge may suppress what that search found.
Only with a warrant, with one narrow exception. In Commonwealth v. Augustine, the Supreme Judicial Court held that obtaining historical cell-site location information is a search under article 14 that requires a warrant. The United States Supreme Court adopted the same rule in Carpenter v. United States. In Commonwealth v. Estabrook, the Court held that no more than six hours of historical location data may be obtained without a warrant. In Commonwealth v. Almonor, the Court held that causing a phone to reveal its real-time location is a search. Defense counsel obtains the court orders the police used and the dates they covered.
Only over areas they share control of. A person who shares a device or an account may consent to a search of the areas over which that person has common authority. A roommate who knows the passcode but never uses the phone, or a spouse who uses a shared tablet but not a password-protected account on it, does not have authority over everything on the device. The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving the consenting person’s authority over the particular device, account, folder, or files searched. The defense develops that question at an evidentiary hearing rather than conceding it.
No. Booking is an inventory, not an investigative search. Officers may list the phone, record its make, model, and condition, and store it under the department’s written policy. Officers may not activate the screen, enter a passcode, or open files. In Commonwealth v. Mauricio, the Supreme Judicial Court suppressed images from a camera that an officer powered on during booking to identify the owner, because the examination was investigatory. An officer who concludes at booking that a phone may hold evidence must continue holding the device and apply for a search warrant. The booking record fixes the seizure date from which any delay is measured.
Only on specific facts. In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court preserved exigent circumstances as a case-specific exception, such as circumstances suggesting that a phone is about to be wiped remotely. The Court also identified less intrusive responses, including disabling the phone’s locking mechanism or placing it in a bag that blocks radio signals. A general statement that digital evidence can be deleted does not establish an emergency. Defense counsel tests the claim at an evidentiary hearing by examining what the officers knew at the moment of the search, what they did with the device, and whether the department had the equipment to secure it.
Yes, within limits. In Alasaad v. Wolf, the First Circuit held that border searches of electronic devices require no warrant and no probable cause. Officers may conduct a basic manual search without reasonable suspicion and may search for evidence of a border-related crime, not only for contraband. The agency policies described in the opinion required reasonable suspicion for an advanced search that uses external equipment to review or copy a device’s contents. Officers may detain a device for a reasonable period. Evidence found at the border and given to Massachusetts police is examined under the border rules, not the warrant rules inside the state.










