The Appeals Court Vacates a 209A Order Based on Coercive Control: V.B. v. B.W.R.T.

The Massachusetts Appeals Court has issued an early decision applying the coercive control definition that the Legislature added to the abuse prevention statute in 2024. In V.B. v. B.W.R.T., No. 25-P-1086 (Mass. App. Ct. July 24, 2026), the court vacated a 209A order that a District Court judge had issued on a coercive control theory, holding that vague and conclusory testimony about a threat to share private information could not support the order. The decision was issued under Appeals Court Rule 23.0 and is not binding precedent, but it may be cited for its persuasive value, and it is an early signal of how appellate judges will read the new statutory language.

The Coercive Control Definition

Chapter 209A defines abuse as the occurrence of any of four categories of acts between family or household members: attempting to cause or causing physical harm, placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm, causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat or duress, or coercive control. G. L. c. 209A, § 1. The fourth category is the newest. It was added by An Act to Prevent Abuse and Exploitation, St. 2024, c. 118, which took effect on September 18, 2024, the same statute that created the Massachusetts revenge porn law.

The statute defines coercive control as a pattern of behavior intended to threaten, intimidate, harass, isolate, control, coerce or compel compliance of a family or household member that causes that person to reasonably fear physical harm or to have a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy. G. L. c. 209A, § 1. The definition lists examples of qualifying conduct, including isolating the person from friends and relatives, depriving the person of basic needs, monitoring the person’s communications and finances, threatening to harm a child or relative, damaging property, and, as relevant in this case, threatening to publish sensitive personal information relating to the family or household member, including sexually explicit images. A single act can also qualify in three narrow situations, including publishing or attempting to publish sexually explicit images.

Two features of that definition matter in every contested hearing. First, the conduct must form a pattern, unless it falls within the short list of single acts. Second, the pattern must cause the plaintiff to reasonably fear physical harm or to have a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy. Conduct that is unpleasant, embarrassing, or controlling in a general sense does not satisfy the statute unless the evidence connects it to that statutory effect.

The Facts of the Case

The plaintiff filed a complaint on May 14, 2025, seeking a harassment prevention order under G. L. c. 258E. When the defendant did not appear at the scheduled two-party hearing, a judge issued an ex parte abuse prevention order under c. 209A instead. At the next hearing, on June 11, 2025, the plaintiff appeared pro se, the defendant appeared with counsel, and a second judge extended the 209A order for six months. The defendant appealed.

The plaintiff’s affidavit referred generally to a secret communication with the defendant during their relationship and claimed that the defendant “was insistent on sharing things I told him in private that were sexual in nature.” At the hearing, the plaintiff disclaimed any physical violence or threats of violence and testified that the defendant had tried to “control and humiliate” her, presenting her more than twenty-five times with an ultimatum that they had to disclose the private information to her family. The judge, showing sensitivity, asked her to explain the situation without describing what the communication contained. The defendant declined to testify, and his attorney argued that the evidence was insufficient. The judge found that the plaintiff had established a pattern of threats to communicate sensitive information to family members and issued the order on a coercive control theory.

The Appeals Court’s Decision

The Appeals Court vacated the order. The panel began from settled principles. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. Vanna V. v. Tanner T., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 552-553 (2023); Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 596 (1995). Before the “potent remedies” of a 209A order may be administered, there must be sufficient “objective evidence” to support the order. Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 286 (2003); Keene v. Gangi, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 667, 670 (2004). The powers of the court under c. 209A must be exercised in accordance with the statutory language, Carroll v. Kartell, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 83, 87 (2002), and an order should not issue “simply because it seems to be a good idea or because it will not cause the defendant any real inconvenience.” Smith v. Joyce, 421 Mass. 520, 523 n.1 (1995).

Applying those principles, the panel held that the judge could not find a threat to publish sensitive personal information without first evaluating the communication that was allegedly threatened with disclosure. All the judge had before him was the plaintiff’s vague and elliptical reference to a communication that was “private” and “sexual in nature.” The court acknowledged that the judge had steered the plaintiff away from details out of sensitivity, but that approach left the record with conclusory testimony and no underlying facts. Without objective evidence of what the communication was, the record could not support a finding that threatening to reveal it constituted coercive control under the statute.

The panel closed with a broader instruction. Before any order premised on coercive control issues, the record must be clear about how the defendant’s conduct satisfies the statutory requirements, including not only the specific nature of the conduct but also how it caused the plaintiff to reasonably fear physical harm or to have a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy. That language will appear in defense arguments at two-party hearings across the Commonwealth.

The Pending Constitutional Challenge

The panel also noted that the coercive control definition is broad and that the Supreme Judicial Court has solicited amicus briefs in G.P. v. S.P., No. SJC-13947, on whether the provision is vague and overbroad in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the cognate provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution. The Appeals Court expressed no view on that question. The pending case means that the ground rules for coercive control orders may change again within the year, and anyone litigating a coercive control allegation now should preserve constitutional objections on the record.

What the Decision Means for a Pending 209A Case

For a person defending against a coercive control allegation, the decision confirms that the two-party hearing is an evidentiary proceeding, not a formality. The plaintiff must prove specific conduct, and the judge must be able to evaluate that conduct against the statutory definition. General testimony that a partner was controlling, or that private matters were threatened with disclosure, does not carry the burden without facts a judge can examine. Counsel at a 209A abuse prevention order hearing can hold the plaintiff to each element: the pattern, the intent, and the statutory effect on safety or autonomy. The decision also illustrates a separate point about testimony. The defendant in this case declined to testify, and prevailed on appeal on the state of the plaintiff’s evidence alone. When a criminal investigation or a companion domestic violence charge is possible, the decision whether to testify at a 209A hearing implicates the Fifth Amendment in civil cases, and it should be made with counsel before the hearing, not at it.

For a person who has obtained an order, the lesson runs the other way. An order built on conclusory testimony is vulnerable on appeal. A plaintiff alleging coercive control should be prepared to describe the conduct with enough specificity that the judge can make the statutory findings, even when the subject matter is painful to discuss.

The Records Question After a Vacated Order

Vacatur of a 209A order is not the end of the matter, because the order leaves records behind: the court file, the local police department’s file, and the entry in the statewide domestic violence record keeping system (DVRS) that judges consult in later cases. What a vacated order does and does not remove, and when expungement is available for an order obtained through fraud on the court, is covered in State and Federal Records of Massachusetts 209A and 258E Protective Orders. A defendant who wins on appeal should treat the records question as the second half of the case.

The Bottom Line for a Pending Case

Coercive control is now a distinct statutory basis for a 209A order, and it is being tested in the appellate courts for the first time. V.B. v. B.W.R.T. establishes that the new definition does not lower the evidentiary floor: a judge must have objective evidence of specific conduct meeting the statutory elements before the order issues. Serpa Law Office represents both defendants and plaintiffs at 209A and 258E hearings in the district courts of Greater Boston. Anyone facing a hearing on a coercive control allegation, on either side of the courtroom, should get advice before the hearing date, because the record made that day is the record the Appeals Court will read.