The Appeals Court Vacates a 209A Order Based on Coercive Control: V.B. v. B.W.R.T.

The Massachusetts Appeals Court has issued an early decision on a 209A restraining order (abuse prevention order) based on coercive control. The Appeals Court applied the coercive control definition that the Legislature added to the abuse prevention statute in 2024. In V.B. v. B.W.R.T., No. 25-P-1086 (Mass. App. Ct. July 24, 2026), the court vacated a 209A restraining order that a District Court judge had issued on a coercive control theory. The Appeals Court held that vague and conclusory testimony about a threat to share private information could not support the order.

The decision was issued under Appeals Court Rule 23.0 and is not binding precedent, but it may be cited for its persuasive value. The decision is an early indication of how appellate judges will read the new statutory language. The firm’s post on coercive control in Massachusetts 209A restraining order cases explains the statutory definition and its elements.

The Coercive Control Definition

Chapter 209A defines abuse as the occurrence of any of four categories of acts between family or household members. The four categories are attempting to cause or causing physical harm, placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm, causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat or duress, and coercive control.

G. L. c. 209A, § 1. The fourth category is the newest. The coercive control category was added by An Act to Prevent Abuse and Exploitation, St. 2024, c. 118, which took effect on September 18, 2024. The same statute created the Massachusetts revenge porn law.

The statute defines coercive control as a pattern of behavior intended to threaten, intimidate, harass, isolate, control, coerce or compel compliance of a family or household member. Under the definition, the pattern must also cause the family or household member to reasonably fear physical harm or to have a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy.

G. L. c. 209A, § 1. The definition lists examples of qualifying conduct, including isolating the person from friends and relatives, depriving the person of basic needs, monitoring the person’s communications and finances, threatening to harm a child or relative, and damaging property. The list also includes the example relevant in this case, threatening to publish sensitive personal information relating to the family or household member, including sexually explicit images. A single act can also qualify in three narrow situations, including publishing or attempting to publish sexually explicit images.

Two features of the coercive control definition apply in every contested hearing. First, the conduct must form a pattern, unless it falls within the short list of single acts. Second, the pattern must cause the plaintiff to reasonably fear physical harm or to have a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy. Conduct that is unpleasant, embarrassing, or controlling in a general sense does not satisfy the statute unless the evidence connects the conduct to the statutory effect on safety or autonomy.

The Facts of the Case

The plaintiff filed a complaint on May 14, 2025, seeking a harassment prevention order under G. L. c. 258E. A judge instead issued an ex parte abuse prevention order under c. 209A when the defendant did not appear at the scheduled two-party hearing. At the next hearing, on June 11, 2025, the plaintiff appeared pro se and the defendant appeared with counsel. A second judge extended the 209A restraining order for six months. The defendant appealed.

The plaintiff’s affidavit referred generally to a secret communication with the defendant during their relationship and claimed that the defendant “was insistent on sharing things I told him in private that were sexual in nature.” At the hearing, the plaintiff disclaimed any physical violence or threats of violence.

The plaintiff testified that the defendant had tried to “control and humiliate” her, presenting her more than twenty-five times with an ultimatum that they had to disclose the private information to her family. The judge, showing sensitivity, asked her to explain the situation without describing what the communication contained. The defendant declined to testify, and his attorney argued that the evidence was insufficient. The judge found that the plaintiff had established a pattern of threats to communicate sensitive information to family members and issued the order on a coercive control theory.

The Appeals Court’s Decision

The Appeals Court vacated the order. The panel began by stating settled principles. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. Vanna V. v. Tanner T., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 552-553 (2023); Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 596 (1995). There must be sufficient “objective evidence” to support a 209A restraining order before the “potent remedies” of the order may be administered. Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 286 (2003); Keene v. Gangi, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 667, 670 (2004).

The powers of the court under c. 209A must be exercised in accordance with the statutory language. Carroll v. Kartell, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 83, 87 (2002). An order should not issue “simply because it seems to be a good idea or because it will not cause the defendant any real inconvenience.” Smith v. Joyce, 421 Mass. 520, 523 n.1 (1995).

Applying the settled principles, the panel held that the judge could not find a threat to publish sensitive personal information without first evaluating the communication that was allegedly threatened with disclosure. All the judge had before him was the plaintiff’s vague and elliptical reference to a communication that was “private” and “sexual in nature.”

The Appeals Court acknowledged that the judge had asked the plaintiff to avoid details out of sensitivity. As a result, the record contained only conclusory testimony and no underlying facts. Without objective evidence of what the communication was, the record could not support a finding that threatening to reveal it constituted coercive control under the statute.

The panel closed with a broader instruction. The record must be clear about how the defendant’s conduct satisfies the statutory requirements before any order premised on coercive control is issued. The record must show both the specific nature of the conduct and how the conduct caused the plaintiff to reasonably fear physical harm or to have a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy. The panel’s instruction will appear in defense arguments at two-party hearings across the Commonwealth.

The Pending Constitutional Challenge

The panel also noted that the coercive control definition is broad. The panel further noted that the Supreme Judicial Court has solicited amicus briefs in G.P. v. S.P., No. SJC-13947. The question for the amicus briefs is whether the provision is vague and overbroad in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the cognate provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution. The Appeals Court expressed no view on the constitutional question.

The rules for coercive control orders may change again within the year when the Supreme Judicial Court decides G.P. v. S.P. Anyone litigating a coercive control allegation while G.P. v. S.P. is pending should preserve constitutional objections on the record.

What the Decision Means for a Pending 209A Restraining Order Case

For a person defending against a coercive control allegation, the Appeals Court confirmed that the two-party hearing is an evidentiary proceeding, not a formality. The plaintiff must prove specific conduct. The judge must be able to evaluate the conduct against the statutory definition. General testimony that a partner was controlling, or that the partner threatened to disclose private information, does not meet the burden without facts a judge can examine. Counsel at a 209A restraining order (abuse prevention order) hearing can hold the plaintiff to proof of each element.

The elements are the pattern, the intent, and the statutory effect on safety or autonomy. The decision also illustrates a separate point about testimony. The defendant in this case declined to testify, and prevailed on appeal on the state of the plaintiff’s evidence alone. The decision whether to testify at a 209A restraining order hearing implicates the Fifth Amendment in civil cases when a criminal investigation or a companion domestic violence charge is possible. The decision whether to testify should be made with counsel before the hearing, not at the hearing.

The decision also has a lesson for a person who has obtained an order. An order based on conclusory testimony may be vacated on appeal. A plaintiff alleging coercive control should be prepared to describe the conduct with enough specificity that the judge can make the statutory findings, even when the subject matter is painful to discuss.

The Records Question After a Vacated Order

Records of a 209A restraining order remain after the order is vacated, including the court file and the entry in the statewide domestic violence record keeping system (DVRS) that judges consult in later cases. The post State and Federal Records of Massachusetts 209A Restraining Orders and 258E Harassment Prevention Orders explains which records are removed and which remain when an order is vacated. The post also explains when expungement is available for an order obtained through fraud on the court. A defendant who wins on appeal should then address the records that remain after the order is vacated.

Summary for a Person With a Pending Case

Coercive control has been a distinct statutory basis for a 209A restraining order since September 18, 2024. The Massachusetts appellate courts are reviewing coercive control orders for the first time. In V.B. v. B.W.R.T., the Appeals Court indicated that the new definition does not reduce the evidence a plaintiff must present.

A judge must have objective evidence of specific conduct meeting the statutory elements before the order issues. Serpa Law Office represents both defendants and plaintiffs at 209A restraining order and 258E harassment prevention order hearings in the district courts of Greater Boston. Anyone facing a hearing on a coercive control allegation, as a plaintiff or a defendant, should get advice before the hearing date, because the Appeals Court decides any appeal on the record made at the hearing.