Digital Evidence in Massachusetts Criminal Cases: Admission and Objection

Text messages, Snapchat videos, Instagram direct messages, dating-application conversations, screenshots, and phone-extraction reports are common exhibits in Massachusetts criminal cases. Before jurors may consider any of these exhibits, the Commonwealth must show that the exhibit is what the Commonwealth claims it is, connect the exhibit to the alleged author, address any hearsay objection, and present a sufficiently accurate and complete record. Defense counsel should identify these foundation and hearsay problems before trial, when the judge can hear a motion in limine, hold an evidentiary hearing, and keep an unreliable exhibit away from the jury.

The firm’s Massachusetts Text Message and Phone Evidence FAQs answer whether a judge or clerk-magistrate may consider messages and phone contents at a criminal trial, a clerk-magistrate hearing, a civil 209A restraining order or 258E harassment prevention order hearing, a dangerousness hearing, or a probation-violation hearing.

Forms of Digital Evidence

Digital evidence includes SMS and iMessage threads, Snapchat images and captions, Instagram posts, stories, and direct messages, and communications through Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, Signal, Tinder, Hinge, Bumble, and Grindr. Digital evidence also includes the records behind those communications, such as subscriber information, login history, Internet Protocol logs, preservation records, and reports generated from a seized phone.

A digital exhibit raises four separate questions. The first is whether the police obtained the exhibit lawfully. The second is whether the exhibit is an authentic communication or record. The third is what evidence identifies the person who created or sent the communication. The fourth is whether each statement in the exhibit is admissible for the purpose for which a party offers the statement. A satisfactory answer to one of these questions does not answer the other three.

How Massachusetts Courts Authenticate Digital Communications

A party offering a text message or other digital communication at a Massachusetts criminal trial must present enough evidence for a reasonable fact finder to conclude, more likely than not, that the communication is what the party claims it is. When the communication is relevant only if a particular person sent it, the party must also present evidence that the particular person sent the communication. The judge makes that authentication decision under Section 901(a) and Section 901(b)(11) of the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence.

Authentication is a preliminary question under Section 104(b). When the relevance of an exhibit depends on another fact, the party offering the exhibit (the proponent) must introduce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the fact exists. The judge may admit an exhibit de bene, on the condition that the proponent will later introduce the required evidence. The opponent should move to strike the exhibit if the proponent never introduces that evidence.

When a judge admits evidence de bene, defense counsel should ask the court to identify on the record what additional evidence is required and when the proponent must supply it. The judge’s statement on the record preserves the condition and marks the point at which counsel can move to strike the exhibit.

The authentication standard is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 447-451 (2011), the Supreme Judicial Court held that the judge asks whether the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find authenticity by a preponderance of the evidence. Under Purdy, a defense claim that another person wrote the message ordinarily affects the weight the jury gives the message rather than the judge’s decision to admit the message. The Supreme Judicial Court relied on Commonwealth v. Hartford, 346 Mass. 482, 488 (1963), and Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Mass. 857, 868-869 (2010).

Nothing Digital Is Self-Authenticating in Massachusetts

Section 902 of the Guide to Evidence lists fourteen categories of self-authenticating evidence. None of them covers digital content.

Massachusetts practice on self-authentication differs from federal practice in a way that helps the defense. Federal Rules of Evidence 902(13) and 902(14) make certified records generated by an electronic process, and certified data copied from an electronic device, self-authenticating in federal court. A federal prosecutor can authenticate a forensic extraction with a certificate from the examiner. Massachusetts has adopted no counterpart to Federal Rule 902(13) or Federal Rule 902(14).

Every item of digital evidence offered in a Massachusetts criminal case therefore requires a foundation established through evidence. The Commonwealth may meet the low authentication threshold with circumstantial evidence. A certificate, however, does not establish the foundation. A prosecutor cannot answer a defense objection that no foundation was laid by producing a certificate.

Account Names and Confirming Circumstances

The proponent cannot authenticate a communication by offering an account name alone. As the Supreme Judicial Court explained in Purdy, another person can create an account in the defendant’s name or use a phone that belongs to someone else. The Commonwealth must provide circumstances connecting the communication to the person it identifies as the author.

In Commonwealth v. Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 303, 308-313 (2019), the Appeals Court applied the Section 104(b) framework and confirmed that circumstantial evidence may authenticate an electronic communication. The possibility of fraud does not automatically require the judge to exclude the communication. Section 901(b)(11) now states the rule for electronic communications directly. Under Section 901(b)(11), confirming circumstances must permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the evidence is what its proponent claims. The proponent does not always need expert testimony or evidence of exclusive account access. See also Commonwealth v. Oppenheim, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 359, 366-368 (2014).

Courts consider the appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, and distinctive characteristics of the communication. Evidence that the defendant acknowledged using the account, owned the device, knew the password, or lived with the account holder may contribute to authentication. In Commonwealth v. Welch, 487 Mass. 425, 441-442 (2021), the Supreme Judicial Court collected these factors and quoted Commonwealth v. Lopez, 485 Mass. 471, 477-478 (2020), where cohabitation was a confirming circumstance.

When participants know each other, a recipient may testify to confirming circumstances drawn from that familiarity. Courts may consider a history of calls or messages through the same number or account, familiar tone, nicknames, references to earlier conversations or shared facts, distinctive language, and recurring spelling errors. In Commonwealth v. Oppenheim, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 359, 368 (2014), familiar tone and personal references supported authentication. In Commonwealth v. Alden, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 438, 440-441 (2018), the recipient’s repeated use of the same number and meetings arranged through that number were confirming circumstances.

A judge who admits a message rules only that the evidence is sufficient for a jury to find the message authentic. The jury weighs the evidence on whether the defendant personally typed the message. The Commonwealth may present circumstantial evidence of authorship. Defense counsel may then argue to the jury that another person typed the message.

Authenticity and the Identity of the Sender

Authenticity and authorship are different questions. A Snapchat or Instagram message may be genuine even when the evidence does not show that the defendant sent the message.

The Appeals Court emphasized the difference between authenticity and authorship in Commonwealth v. Bustard, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 442 (2026). The Commonwealth offered a single Snapchat message reading “You happy,” sent from an account bearing a name associated with the defendant’s acquaintances and a bitmoji resembling him. The Appeals Court concluded that the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant sent the message. The Appeals Court therefore reversed the defendant’s conviction.

Defense counsel should address authenticity and authorship separately and expressly. The judge applies Section 901 to decide whether the exhibit is authentic. The Commonwealth must still prove the identity of the sender to the degree required by the charge and the use it makes of the communication. The judge’s ruling admitting the exhibit does not decide whether the defendant sent the communication. In Bustard, the Appeals Court also discussed Commonwealth v. McMann, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 558, 559 (2020), which described Instagram and its messaging functions.

Text Messages, iMessage, and Group Chats

Text-message evidence often comes through a recipient who identifies a screenshot or thread. A witness with personal knowledge may authenticate an exhibit under Section 901(b)(1), but the witness’s testimony does not cure defects in the exhibit itself.

A screenshot may omit the sender’s number. A thread may be cropped. An iMessage may have come from a shared computer or tablet rather than the phone associated with the account. The time stamp may reflect a device setting, time-zone conversion, or the manner in which the exhibit was generated. Jurors ordinarily can interpret the meaning of a displayed time stamp without expert testimony. Commonwealth v. Caruso, 476 Mass. 275, 289 (2017).

Group chats present a separate authorship problem. A message displayed within a group conversation may show the conversation name rather than the individual sender unless the recipient’s device preserved the participant list at the relevant time. The Commonwealth must connect the specific communication to the defendant rather than rely on the existence of the group or the defendant’s membership in it.

Snapchat Images, Videos, and Captions

Snapchat evidence commonly appears as a recipient’s screenshot, a video saved to memories, or records produced by the platform. The Commonwealth must lay a different foundation for each format.

In Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 489 Mass. 107 (2022), the Supreme Judicial Court held that a defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in content shared with an undercover officer whom the defendant had accepted as a friend. The officer’s viewing of that shared content was not a constitutional search. The Supreme Judicial Court did not adopt a rule that a person who posts on social media gives up every privacy interest in the post.

Snapchat captions raise separate hearsay questions. In Commonwealth v. Theogene, Mass. App. Ct., No. 24-P-1395 (Apr. 9, 2026), the Appeals Court upheld the admission of captions on a Snapchat video as excited utterances. The Appeals Court relied on Commonwealth v. Mulgrave, 472 Mass. 170, 178-179 (2015), which recognized that text messages can qualify as excited utterances because the immediacy of the medium may support spontaneity.

Whether a caption qualifies as an excited utterance depends on the facts. Defense counsel should determine how much time passed between the event and the caption, whether the declarant remained under the stress of the event, and whether the declarant edited, retyped, or selected suggested text. Snapchat permits a user to record a video, save it, and add a caption later before sending it. When the Commonwealth offers a captioned video as an excited utterance, counsel should also find out when the video was recorded, when the caption was added, whether the video was edited, and whether the user sent the video from memories rather than in real time.

Instagram and Dating Applications

Instagram evidence includes public posts, stories, and direct messages. Public posts may raise fewer privacy questions, but the Commonwealth still must present evidence connecting each post to the alleged author. Direct messages raise both privacy and authorship questions.

The authentication rules for text messages also apply to Instagram evidence. The Commonwealth may identify the handle and then rely on confirming circumstances. Defense counsel may have a stronger challenge to authorship when the account is public and has many followers, because a larger group of people had access to the account.

Conversations from Tinder, Hinge, Bumble, and Grindr frequently appear in harassment, stalking, sexual-assault, and enticement prosecutions. A person can create a fake profile. A user may lose message history when a match is removed or an account is deleted. Users also often move conversations from the application to text messaging or another platform, which leaves fragments of the conversation with different custodians. Defense counsel may use these features of dating applications to challenge identity, completeness, and context.

Screenshots, Copies, and the Best Evidence Rule

Article X of the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence governs proof of the contents of writings and records. Section 1002 requires an original writing or record unless another evidence provision, statute, or common-law rule permits a substitute. Section 1001 defines writings and records as letters, words, numbers, or their equivalents. Section 1001 separately addresses photographs, recordings, videos, and digital images.

The best evidence rule does not bar every copy of an electronic record. An email or text message does not have an original in the traditional paper sense. Commonwealth v. Salyer, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 346, 356 n.10 (2013). In the same footnote, the Appeals Court explained that the reasons underlying the best evidence rule bar oral testimony offered to prove the contents of an electronic record. A detective who paraphrases a message from memory without placing the communication in evidence gives the kind of oral testimony that the Appeals Court described in Salyer.

A screenshot is a photograph of a display rather than a record produced by the platform or device. A screenshot shows what appeared on one screen at one moment, but the screenshot contains no metadata that an examiner can verify. When the Commonwealth possesses the device or an extraction report but offers screenshots instead, defense counsel can ask why the Commonwealth did not offer the device or the extraction report and can object to the screenshots under Section 403.

Section 1119 and Preservation of the Digital Original

Section 1119 of the Guide to Evidence addresses digital evidence directly. It defines digital evidence as information stored in or accessible through a personal electronic device, defines the devices themselves, and provides that the same evidentiary principles govern digital and traditional documents in both in-person and virtual proceedings.

Section 1119 contains no rule governing artificial intelligence or synthetic media, although some online sources describe Section 1119 that way. Massachusetts has adopted no rule of that kind. The 2026 edition of the Guide, published February 1, 2026, contains no rule on artificial intelligence or synthetic media.

Defense counsel can use § 1119 to preserve digital evidence for appeal. The section directs courts to take reasonable steps to preserve digital evidence, whether admitted or excluded, within the case record for appellate review, including by describing evidence that remains on a device. When a complainant displays a message thread on a phone at a hearing, defense counsel can rely on § 1119 to ask the judge to capture the digital original for the record. An appellate court reviews the version preserved in the record, which is also the version a forensic examiner can later study. When a party offers only a screenshot and the court never preserves the message in its native form, neither the appellate court nor a forensic examiner can review the original message.

Section 1119 also directs judges to make reasonable efforts so that self-represented parties can present and contest digital evidence. Digital material often appears first in 209A restraining order and 258E harassment prevention order sessions, where many parties have no lawyer.

Extraction Reports and the Lay-Expert Boundary

Phone evidence is often presented through an extraction report. In Commonwealth v. Cronin, 495 Mass. 170 (2025), the Supreme Judicial Court distinguished permissible lay testimony from expert testimony about extraction technology.

An officer who received certification training and performed the extraction may describe the general extraction procedure, the steps the officer personally took, and information displayed in a report formatted for ordinary readers. Section 701 can permit the officer’s testimony on those subjects as lay testimony.

The officer may not provide a lay opinion about the system’s accuracy, reliability, or protection against alteration. Testimony on accuracy, reliability, and protection against alteration requires a properly qualified expert under Section 702, because those subjects are beyond ordinary knowledge. When the officer begins to testify about why the software should be trusted rather than what the officer did, defense counsel should object, request a voir dire, and move to strike any inadmissible reliability opinion.

Defense counsel can separately challenge the reliability of a proprietary forensic tool when the Commonwealth’s attribution or extraction evidence depends on that tool. Massachusetts case law supports that challenge.

Massachusetts judges evaluate expert methodology under Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15 (1994), in which the Supreme Judicial Court accepted “the basic reasoning of the Daubert opinion because it is consistent with our test of demonstrated reliability.” The judge acts as a gatekeeper. The judge’s ultimate test is the reliability of the theory or process underlying the expert testimony.

In Commonwealth v. Camblin, 471 Mass. 639 (2015), the Supreme Judicial Court applied the Lanigan reliability requirement to a proprietary instrument. The Supreme Judicial Court held that a District Court judge abused his discretion and committed an error of law by declining to hold a hearing on a defendant’s challenge to the reliability of a breath-testing instrument’s source code, even though the device was made admissible by statute and the underlying scientific principle was generally accepted. The Court vacated the order denying the motion to exclude and remanded for the hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the premise that legislative authorization forecloses reliability review. The Court held that the Legislature’s power to prescribe rules of evidence does not mean that “the reliability of every type of evidence the Legislature may deem admissible, particularly in a criminal case, is automatically insulated from challenge and review on reliability grounds.”

Two facts from Camblin answer objections that commonly arise in practice. The source code in Camblin was produced to the defense under a nondisclosure agreement. The nondisclosure agreement in Camblin answers a prosecutor who says that a vendor’s code cannot be disclosed. The Supreme Judicial Court also stated that a Daubert-Lanigan hearing “need not always be an evidentiary hearing,” because a documentary record together with argument can permit a reasoned determination. In Camblin itself, however, the Court thought an evidentiary hearing likely necessary.

Defense counsel should seek discovery of the tool, its version number, its validation studies, and the examiner’s written protocol before the hearing. If that documentation does not exist or the Commonwealth does not produce it, defense counsel can argue that the absence of documentation leaves the reliability of the tool unestablished.

Hearsay Within Digital Evidence

A ruling that an exhibit is authentic does not resolve a hearsay objection to the exhibit. A message offered for the truth of what it says is hearsay unless an exclusion or exception applies.

The defendant’s own message, when offered against the defendant, is not hearsay under Section 801(d)(2). Section 801(d)(2) does not generally permit a defendant to introduce a separate exculpatory message merely because the Commonwealth offered an inculpatory one.

Section 803(2) permits an excited utterance made while the declarant remains under the stress of a startling event. Mulgrave applied that doctrine to text messages, and Theogene applied it to Snapchat captions. The medium may support immediacy, but the proponent still must establish the declarant’s condition and the timing and circumstances of the statement.

A party may offer a message for a purpose other than its truth, such as to show notice, fear, the message’s effect on the recipient, or the reason for a later action. When a party does so, the judge should identify the permitted purpose. Defense counsel should also request an appropriate limiting instruction.

Platform records may qualify as business records under G.L. c. 233, § 78 if the court makes the required findings. The record must have been made in good faith, in the regular course of business, before the proceeding began, and at a time when making that record was the regular course of the business. In a criminal jury trial, the statute requires the jury to make the final determination on those preliminary factual questions.

Even when the court admits platform data as a business record, the user’s messages remain separate potential hearsay and require their own basis for admission.

Records Obtained From a Platform

G.L. c. 233, § 79J governs certain third-party records accompanied by a custodian’s affidavit. The custodian certifies that the record is true and complete and delivers it to the clerk. The statute treats a photographic copy as equivalent to the original and provides sufficient identification when the record is otherwise admissible.

Federal law governs what an electronic-service provider may disclose. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, the government needs a warrant for content held in electronic storage for 180 days or less. For older content, the government may proceed by warrant without notice to the subscriber or, with notice, by subpoena or a Section 2703(d) order.

A Section 2703(d) order requires specific and articulable facts showing that the records sought are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. The standard is higher than relevance but lower than probable cause. A federal court or a state court of general criminal jurisdiction may issue a Section 2703(d) order. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(3). The government does not need a Section 2703(d) order when it proceeds by warrant.

The government may obtain other noncontent records with a warrant, a Section 2703(d) order, or the subscriber’s consent. Historical cell site location information requires a warrant. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018). Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 (2014). The government may obtain basic subscriber information by subpoena, including the subscriber’s name, address, session records, and payment information. Section 2703(f) permits the government to require preservation for 90 days and to renew the demand once.

Defense counsel cannot use a warrant, a Section 2703(d) order, or a government subpoena under § 2703. Defense counsel instead seeks a summons under Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(a)(2). Under Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265 (2004), the moving party must establish that the requested materials are evidentiary and relevant, are not otherwise procurable through due diligence, are necessary for trial preparation, and are requested in good faith rather than as a fishing expedition.

Rule 17 is not a general discovery device. Only a judge may issue a pretrial summons under Rule 17(a)(2), and only on a defense motion. The supporting affidavit may rely on hearsay, but it must identify the source, demonstrate reliability, and establish relevance with specificity.

Defense counsel also faces a separate practical problem in obtaining records from the platforms themselves. Under the Stored Communications Act, a provider may not disclose the contents of communications to a defendant, even under a court order or summons, unless an exception applies, such as the consent of the account holder. 18 U.S.C. § 2702. A provider may disclose noncontent records to a defendant, but major providers often decline to respond to a state court summons. Counsel should investigate early what records still exist, whether the Commonwealth obtained them, and whether a provider will respond to available defense process.

Suppression of Unlawfully Obtained Digital Evidence

The court must separately determine whether police obtained the evidence lawfully. A phone seized without lawful authority, an account searched without a warrant, or a device searched beyond the scope of a warrant may support a motion to suppress. Serpa Law Office explains the law of searches and seizures in its page on illegal searches and seizures in Massachusetts and its Massachusetts digital-search FAQs.

A defendant may also challenge police monitoring of social-media accounts as selective enforcement. In Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 496 Mass. 627 (2025), the Supreme Judicial Court confirmed that the selective-enforcement framework applies to police monitoring of social-media accounts, including Snapchat. The court relied on Commonwealth v. Dilworth, 494 Mass. 579, 587-588 (2024), and Commonwealth v. Long, 485 Mass. 711 (2020). A defendant who produces evidence supporting a reasonable inference that race motivated the investigation in part is entitled to an evidentiary hearing and need not show a physical intrusion.

Secret recordings raise questions beyond the ordinary rules for digital evidence. The firm’s Massachusetts wiretap and secret-recording guide explains when making or using a recording violates G.L. c. 272, § 99. The guide to courtroom use of secretly recorded audio covers suppression, federal Title III, and the different rules for criminal trials, probation matters, protective-order hearings, and civil cases.

Motions in Limine Addressing Digital Evidence

A motion in limine allows the judge to decide whether the Commonwealth has laid the foundation of the exhibit before jurors see the exhibit. In the motion, counsel asks the judge to require the Commonwealth to identify the confirming circumstances, the hearsay theory, the sponsoring witness, and the purpose for which it offers the evidence.

Counsel can also preserve an objection through a sufficiently specific pretrial motion. Section 103(b) of the Guide follows Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715 (2016). When a defendant moves before trial to exclude the same evidence on the same ground and the judge hears and denies the motion, counsel need not repeat the objection when the Commonwealth offers the exhibit at trial.

Counsel receives that preservation benefit only for the specific issue presented before trial. A motion challenging whether a witness may testify at all does not necessarily preserve an objection to particular testimony that the witness later gives. The pretrial motion should identify the specific exhibit, statement, and legal ground.

The written motion should also address Section 403. A judge may exclude relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or needless cumulative evidence. A judge may weigh a large set of repetitive screenshots differently under Section 403 than a single complete thread, because repetitive screenshots can be needlessly cumulative.

A defense motion in limine may raise several separate objections to digital evidence: insufficient confirming circumstances under Section 901(b)(11) and Purdy, failure to establish identity under Bustard, hearsay within the communication or platform record, an incomplete or cropped exhibit, extraction-reliability testimony from an unqualified witness under Cronin, oral testimony offered to prove the content of an electronic record under Salyer, and unfair prejudice under Section 403.

Trial Objections and Motions to Strike

Section 103(a) requires a timely objection or motion to strike on the record. Counsel must state the specific ground unless the context makes it apparent.

Defense counsel should object to the foundation before the court admits the exhibit, request a voir dire of the sponsoring witness when needed, and object when a witness paraphrases a communication that is not in evidence. Counsel should move to strike evidence that the judge admitted de bene if the Commonwealth never introduces the promised connecting evidence. When the judge admits a statement for a purpose other than its truth, counsel should request a limiting instruction identifying that purpose.

Completeness and Cropped Conversations

Section 106(a) permits an adverse party to introduce another part of a writing or recorded statement when that part concerns the same subject, belongs to the same writing or conversation, and is necessary to understand the portion already admitted. Defense counsel may use that provision when a screenshot removes the messages immediately before or after the offered statement. Section 106(b) separately governs curative admissibility after evidence has been admitted erroneously.

Section 106 does not compel the admission of unrelated conversations merely because they came from the same account. If the Commonwealth offers threats sent on March 15, messages from February showing a friendly relationship may be relevant, but the judge decides whether to admit the February messages under the ordinary rules of admissibility. Section 106 does not make the February messages automatically admissible.

Defense Investigation of Digital Evidence

Defense counsel should investigate early to determine what can be proved. Counsel may use an extraction report to identify deleted material, time stamps, account identifiers, and the parameters the officer used. The complete conversation may provide the context surrounding a selected message. Device-custody and account records may help identify who possessed the phone and whether someone accessed the account from more than one device or location.

When a witness supplied screenshots rather than a device, counsel should determine how the images were made, whether any were edited or omitted, whether the original device still exists, and whether the Commonwealth could have obtained a fuller extraction or platform record.

Defense counsel should also identify each purpose for which a party may offer each communication. A party may offer a message as evidence of identity, intent, notice, state of mind, or the sequence of events, or to impeach a witness. Counsel may need a different foundation and hearsay analysis for each proposed use.

In Massachusetts, “questions concerning the chain of custody usually go to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.” Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 Mass. 224, 230 (1992). Accord Commonwealth v. Herring, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 365 (2006). Gaps in the chain of custody therefore help the defense both before the judge admits the evidence and before the jury. A severe gap supports an argument to the judge that the proponent has not met the § 104(b) threshold. Defense counsel can use a lesser gap in cross-examination to reduce the weight the jury gives the evidence.

Prosecutors frequently rely on digital evidence in cases involving criminal harassment, nonconsensual intimate images, and AI-generated or deepfake images. Messages and recordings also appear in domestic-violence cases, 209A restraining order proceedings, and 258E harassment prevention order proceedings.

Group chats, social-media posts, and campus records frequently appear as evidence in college and university student defense. Police also often attach screenshots to applications for a criminal complaint, and defense counsel must address those screenshots at a clerk-magistrate hearing before the clerk-magistrate decides whether to issue the complaint.

Attorney Joe Serpa represents defendants in Massachusetts criminal cases involving text messages, social-media communications, phone extractions, screenshots, and digital recordings. The representation may include motions to suppress, motions in limine, evidentiary hearings, cross-examination of the sponsoring witness, and trial. For a confidential consultation, contact Serpa Law Office at 617.936.0201.

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