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        <title><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office - Serpa Law Office]]></title>
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        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 07:44:17 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        
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                <title><![CDATA[Matthew Farwell Convicted in the Death of Sandra Birchmore: The Evidence, the Elements and the Verdict]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/matthew-farwell-verdict-sandra-birchmore/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/matthew-farwell-verdict-sandra-birchmore/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 20:24:31 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Trial Strategy and Evidence Notes]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center On Tuesday, November 10, 2026, a federal jury in Boston found former Stoughton police officer Matthew Farwell guilty on both counts of the superseding indictment that charged him in the death of Sandra Birchmore, according to WBUR. Count One charged him with killing a witness or&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On Tuesday, November 10, 2026, a federal jury in Boston found former Stoughton police officer Matthew Farwell guilty on both counts of the superseding indictment that charged him in the death of Sandra Birchmore, according to WBUR. Count One charged him with killing a witness or victim, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C). Count Two charged him with causing the death of Ms. Birchmore’s unborn child, 18 U.S.C. § 1841. The jury of eight men and four women returned its verdict at about 2 p.m., according to Boston.com.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The jury began deliberating on the afternoon of Friday, November 6, after closing arguments, according to Boston.com. On Monday, November 9, it reported that it was deadlocked. Chief Judge Denise J. Casper sent the jurors home for the day, and they resumed deliberating on Tuesday, according to WBUR. They reached their verdict on their second full day of deliberations, according to NBC Boston.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/sandra-birchmore-matthew-farwell-federal-trial/">October 16 post on the trial</a> describes Ms. Birchmore’s life, the three Stoughton officers, the investigation that ruled her death a suicide, and the federal charges. This post explains what the government had to prove on each count, the evidence the jury heard, and how the jury likely reached its verdict.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What the Government Had to Prove</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The news reports of the trial do not describe Judge Casper’s instructions to the jury on the elements of each count. The elements below come from the statutes and from the Supreme Court’s decision in <em>Fowler v. United States</em>.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Count One: Killing a Witness or Victim</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Section 1512(a)(1)(C) makes it a federal crime to kill another person with intent to prevent any person from telling a federal law enforcement officer about the commission or possible commission of a federal offense. To convict Mr. Farwell on Count One, the jury had to find three things beyond a reasonable doubt.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">First, the jury had to find that Mr. Farwell killed Ms. Birchmore. The central dispute at trial was whether she was strangled or died by suicide. Second, the jury had to find that he killed her with malice aforethought, the state of mind required for murder. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Third, the jury had to find that he killed her with intent to prevent her, or anyone else, from reporting a federal offense to a law enforcement officer.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The indictment named three federal offenses that Mr. Farwell allegedly wanted to hide. They are deprivation of rights under color of law, 18 U.S.C. § 242, coercion and enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The government did not have to prove that Mr. Farwell knew a report would go to a federal officer. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(g). Where a defendant kills to prevent a report to law enforcement in general, the government must show a reasonable likelihood that at least one relevant communication would have been made to a federal officer. <em>Fowler v. United States</em>, 563 U.S. 668, 677 (2011). The likelihood must be more than remote, outlandish, or simply hypothetical. The government need not prove that a federal report was more likely than not. <em>Id.</em> at 678.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Count Two: The Death of the Unborn Child</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Section 1841 makes it a separate crime to cause the death of a child in utero while committing one of the federal offenses the statute lists. Section 1512 is one of those offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(b)(1). Count Two therefore depended on Count One. A finding that Mr. Farwell killed Ms. Birchmore in violation of § 1512, and that the killing ended her pregnancy, supported a conviction on Count Two. The government did not have to prove that he knew she was pregnant or that he intended to cause the death of the child. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(B). Ms. Birchmore had in fact told Mr. Farwell that she was pregnant.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Evidence at Trial</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The jury heard from about 50 witnesses and saw about 500 exhibits over nearly a month, according to the Associated Press. Mr. Farwell did not testify.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">How Ms. Birchmore Died</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Dr. William Smock, a medical expert called by the government, testified that Ms. Birchmore died of asphyxia from strangulation and that she was the victim of a homicidal act, according to Boston 25 News. He testified that the right side of her hyoid bone, a small bone in the neck, was fractured inward. He said that injury is consistent with strangulation and not with a partial hanging. He also testified that a mark on her upper chest matched the clasp of the duffel bag strap, which was tied to the door handle when police found her. He concluded that the clasp made the mark before the strap was tied to the door, and he called the scene altered, according to Boston 25 News and the Boston Globe.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The state medical examiner, Dr. María Del Mar Capó-Martínez, testified that she first ruled the death a suicide by hanging and later changed the manner of death to undetermined. She testified that she had not seen the surveillance video or the phone data when she made her first ruling, according to WJAR.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Dr. Thomas Andrew, a former chief medical examiner of New Hampshire called by the defense, testified that the manner of death was undetermined and that the autopsy findings favored suicide, according to the Boston Globe. He testified that the hyoid could have broken after death or during convulsions, according to WPRI. On cross-examination, he agreed that strangulation can occur without external injuries and that a hanging can be staged after death, according to NBC Boston. NBC Boston also reported that he acknowledged that hyoid fractures are far more common in strangulations than in hangings. Other defense experts testified that the hyoid fracture did not show one cause or the other and that the photographs of the chest mark were inconclusive, according to Boston.com.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Night of February 1, 2021</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Building surveillance video showed Mr. Farwell entering Ms. Birchmore’s building at about 9:14 p.m. in a surgical mask and a hood, and leaving at about 9:43 p.m., according to Boston.com and the Boston Globe. A forensic examiner testified that Ms. Birchmore sent her last text message at 9:13 p.m., telling him the door was open. Her phone recorded its last movement at 9:40 p.m., according to WJAR. The Associated Press reported that her phone stopped moving about three minutes before the lobby camera showed Mr. Farwell leaving. A defense expert testified that step data should be interpreted cautiously, according to WPRI.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The January 20 Call and the Motive</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A former Stoughton police dispatcher testified that he took the January 20, 2021 call from a woman who suggested that Mr. Farwell had a relationship with her friend, and that he told Mr. Farwell about it. The dispatcher testified that Mr. Farwell became visibly upset and told him never to talk about it again, according to Boston.com and WJAR. An FBI agent testified that Mr. Farwell texted Ms. Birchmore that day that her friend had called his job, according to WJAR.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The jury also saw text messages in which Ms. Birchmore threatened in October 2020 to tell Mr. Farwell’s wife about the relationship. The jury saw his reply to her news of the pregnancy, that she was the worst person on the face of the earth, according to WJAR and Boston.com. An FBI agent testified that there were no texts, searches or journal entries about suicide on the night Ms. Birchmore died, and that she had been texting about baby shower themes, according to Boston 25 News.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">William Farwell, Mr. Farwell’s twin brother, testified under a grant of immunity. He admitted that he had a sexual relationship with Ms. Birchmore when she was an adult, according to NBC Boston. He also testified that his brother later told him he had wiped his phones, according to Boston 25 News. An FBI examiner testified that a phone linked to Mr. Farwell searched in February 2021 whether deleted messages could be recovered, according to Boston.com. Jason Pickard, whom DNA testing identified as the father of the child, testified that he encouraged Ms. Birchmore to report Mr. Farwell and that she was not suicidal, according to WJAR.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Defense Case</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense presented evidence of Ms. Birchmore’s mental health history through a forensic psychiatrist, including a suicide attempt in early adolescence and a psychiatric hold in May 2020, according to the Boston Globe. The jury also heard about a 2017 journal entry that read as a suicide note, according to WJAR. In closing, defense attorney Kimberly Stevens argued that Ms. Birchmore took her own life. She also argued that Ms. Birchmore was never going to go to federal law enforcement or any other law enforcement, according to Boston.com.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Closing Arguments</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Assistant United States Attorney Brian Fogerty argued that Mr. Farwell planned the killing after he learned of the January 20 call. He pointed to evidence that Mr. Farwell obtained a key to her apartment, inspected her closet and bathroom, and timed his visit to a coming snowstorm, according to CBS Boston and Boston.com. Ms. Stevens answered that there was no evidence that Mr. Farwell ever had a key, according to Boston.com.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">How the Jury Likely Reached Its Verdict</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jurors do not explain their verdicts, and the public reports do not show what the jurors discussed. The verdict and the evidence nonetheless suggest how the jury resolved each element.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The jury first had to decide how Ms. Birchmore died. The medical experts disagreed, and the medical examiner had changed her ruling to undetermined. The jury likely did not decide the cause of death on the medical testimony alone. The defense’s own expert agreed on cross-examination that strangulation can occur without external injuries and that a hanging can be staged after death. Once the medical evidence permitted a finding of strangulation, the jury likely relied on the timeline to decide the question. Ms. Birchmore’s phone stopped moving while Mr. Farwell was still in the building, and he left minutes later with his hood up and his mask on. The defense theory required the jury to accept that Ms. Birchmore took her own life in the few minutes after he left. The phone data made that theory difficult to accept.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The jury next had to decide whether Mr. Farwell acted with malice aforethought and with intent to silence Ms. Birchmore. The order of events supported both findings. A friend called the Stoughton police on January 20, 2021. Mr. Farwell learned of the call that day and texted Ms. Birchmore that her friend had called his job. Ms. Birchmore had threatened to tell his wife, and she was preparing for the birth of a child she believed was his. Twelve days after the call, she was dead. The jury likely inferred that he killed her because she could expose him. The evidence that he wiped his phones and searched whether deleted messages could be recovered likely reinforced that inference.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The federal element was the strongest defense argument. No witness testified that Ms. Birchmore contacted or planned to contact the FBI. The defense argued that she never intended to report anyone. Under <em>Fowler</em>, however, the government did not have to prove that a federal report was more likely than not. It had to show only a reasonable likelihood that a report would have reached a federal officer. A report that a police officer began a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old girl he met through his department’s Explorers program describes possible federal offenses, including deprivation of rights under color of law and coercion and enticement of a minor. A former Stoughton deputy chief testified that the department would likely have opened an investigation had it learned of the relationship while Ms. Birchmore was alive, and that he later alerted the FBI, according to the Boston Globe and Boston.com. The jury likely concluded from that evidence that a report of Mr. Farwell’s conduct was reasonably likely to reach federal investigators.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The deadlock note on Monday shows that at least one juror was not yet persuaded on at least one element. The public reports do not show which element divided the jurors. Judge Casper told the jurors to take the time they need, and they returned unanimous verdicts on both counts the next afternoon, according to the Boston Globe and Boston.com. The conviction on Count Two rested on the same findings as Count One, because the killing of Ms. Birchmore ended her pregnancy.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What Happens Next</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Casper scheduled sentencing for February 3, 2027, according to WBUR and Boston.com. The Associated Press and the Boston Globe reported that the conviction on Count One requires a life sentence. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(3)(A), the punishment for a killing is the punishment that 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and 1112 provide. A defendant convicted of first-degree murder under § 1111 receives death or life imprisonment, and the Department of Justice is not seeking death. The public reports do not say whether the jury was instructed on first-degree murder alone or also on second-degree murder, which permits a sentence of any term of years.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Federal law requires a judge to detain a defendant found guilty of a crime of violence, or of an offense punishable by life imprisonment, while the defendant awaits sentencing, unless narrow exceptions apply. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2). Mr. Farwell has been held without bail since his arrest in August 2024.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense may ask Judge Casper to enter a judgment of acquittal or to order a new trial. Both motions are due within 14 days after the verdict, unless the judge extends the deadline. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1), 33(b)(2). A motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence may be filed up to three years after the verdict. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">After sentencing, Mr. Farwell may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The notice of appeal is due within 14 days after the judgment is entered. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The civil suit brought by Ms. Birchmore’s estate against the Town of Stoughton, Mr. Farwell and others is set for a hearing after the federal trial, according to NBC Boston. Later posts in this series will cover the sentencing.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>On November 10, 2026, a federal jury in Boston convicted former Stoughton police officer Matthew Farwell of killing Sandra Birchmore to prevent a report of federal offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), and of causing the death of her unborn child, 18 U.S.C. § 1841.</li>


<li>To convict on Count One, the jury had to find that Mr. Farwell killed Ms. Birchmore with malice aforethought and with intent to prevent a report of a federal offense. Under <em>Fowler v. United States</em>, the government had to show a reasonable likelihood that a report would have reached a federal officer.</li>


<li>The medical experts disagreed on whether Ms. Birchmore was strangled. Phone data showed that her phone stopped moving while Mr. Farwell was still in her building.</li>


<li>Mr. Farwell learned of a friend’s call to the Stoughton police about the relationship twelve days before Ms. Birchmore died.</li>


<li>Sentencing is scheduled for February 3, 2027.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Related Serpa Law Office Resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/sandra-birchmore-matthew-farwell-federal-trial/">When the Police Protect and Serve Only Themselves: Sandra Birchmore and the Federal Trial of Matthew Farwell</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/intimidation-of-a-witness-massachusetts-boston-lawyer/">Intimidation of a Witness (G.L. c. 268, § 13B)</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/strangulation-or-suffocation-massachusetts-lawyer/">Strangulation or Suffocation in Massachusetts (G.L. c. 265, § 15D)</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/massachusetts-opening-statements-closing-arguments/">Opening Statements and Closing Arguments in Massachusetts Criminal Trials</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/cross-examination-massachusetts-criminal-trials/">Cross-Examination in Massachusetts Criminal Trials</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/massachusetts-text-message-phone-evidence-faqs/">Massachusetts Text Message and Phone Evidence FAQs</a></li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It is based solely on public court proceedings, published decisions and published news reporting on the trial. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. This may constitute attorney advertising.</em></p>

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            <item>
                <title><![CDATA[Judge Denies Lindsay Clancy’s Double Jeopardy Motion: The November 9, 2026 Rulings]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-november-9-ruling-double-jeopardy-denied/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-november-9-ruling-double-jeopardy-denied/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 19:42:45 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Trial Strategy and Evidence Notes]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center On Monday, November 9, 2026, Judge William Sullivan denied Lindsay Clancy’s motion to dismiss the murder charges on double jeopardy grounds. He also denied her request for records about the holdout juror and her request to question that juror under oath. He denied the Commonwealth’s request&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On Monday, November 9, 2026, Judge William Sullivan denied Lindsay Clancy’s motion to dismiss the murder charges on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/double-jeopardy-massachusetts/">double jeopardy</a> grounds. He also denied her request for records about the holdout juror and her request to question that juror under oath. He denied the Commonwealth’s request for a gag order on the defense, without prejudice. The Commonwealth may now retry Ms. Clancy on the murder indictments.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Sullivan heard the three motions in Plymouth Superior Court on November 2, 2026. Our <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-november-2-hearing-double-jeopardy/">post on the November 2 hearing</a> explained why the motion to dismiss was unlikely to succeed. Judge Sullivan had said he would announce his decision on November 16. He issued written decisions on November 9 instead. The case returned to court on Monday, November 16. At that hearing, Judge Sullivan scheduled Ms. Clancy’s second trial to begin on March 29, 2027, according to the Associated Press.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Double Jeopardy Ruling</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Sullivan <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/massachusetts-mistrial-double-jeopardy-retrial/">declared a mistrial</a> on September 4, 2026, after the jury reported that it could not reach a verdict. The defense argued that the mistrial was not necessary and that a second trial would violate Ms. Clancy’s right not to be tried twice for the same offense.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Sullivan rejected that argument. He concluded that there was “a manifest necessity for a mistrial based on the jury’s deadlock,” and that a retrial on the murder indictments therefore does not violate double jeopardy, according to ABC News.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">What the Judge Relied On</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to Boston.com, Judge Sullivan pointed to the steps he took before he declared the mistrial. He declined to remove the holdout juror after the first jury note. He polled each juror individually. He instructed the jury again on reasonable doubt. Judge Sullivan wrote that he had to avoid coercing a verdict, according to WBUR and Boston.com, and that his primary concern was protecting the fairness of the proceedings, according to WBUR.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Sullivan also rejected the defense argument that information learned after the trial undermined the mistrial, according to Boston.com. That ruling follows <em>Read v. Commonwealth</em>, 495 Mass. 312 (2025), where the Supreme Judicial Court judged a deadlock mistrial on the information the trial judge had when he or she declared it.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Why the Ruling Follows Massachusetts Law</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Double jeopardy protections prohibit a second trial of a defendant whose first trial ended over the defendant’s objection without a conviction, unless the judge declared the mistrial out of manifest necessity. <em>Ray v. Commonwealth</em>, 463 Mass. 1, 3 (2012). A jury that cannot agree on a verdict is a traditional example of manifest necessity. <em>Commonwealth v. Troila</em>, 410 Mass. 203, 206 (1991). The Supreme Judicial Court upholds a deadlock mistrial where the judge gave counsel a full opportunity to be heard and carefully considered the alternatives. Judge Sullivan’s written decision describes the alternatives he considered.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Holdout Juror Records</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense had asked for court sign-in sheets, cellphone sign-in records, jury room video, the juror’s confidential questionnaire, and phone records, according to Boston.com. The defense also asked Judge Sullivan to question the juror under oath.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Sullivan denied both requests. He wrote that Ms. Clancy had failed to show that the records were relevant and material to her defense, according to WCVB. He also wrote that he could see no valid reason to examine the juror under oath, according to WCVB. WBUR reported that Judge Sullivan called the proposed inquiry an improper intrusion that would discourage citizens from serving as jurors. Judge Sullivan referred to the juror as “Juror Doe.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The law permits inquiry into extraneous influences on the jury, such as outside information a juror brought into the deliberations. The law prohibits inquiry into the substance of the deliberations, the jurors’ thought processes, or the reasons for their votes. <em>Commonwealth v. Moore</em>, 474 Mass. 541, 548 (2016), citing <em>Commonwealth v. Fidler</em>, 377 Mass. 192, 196-198 (1979). Our post on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/juror-nondisclosure-misrepresentation-massachusetts/">juror nondisclosure and misrepresentation</a> explains those rules.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Gag Order Request</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth had asked Judge Sullivan to bar the lawyers in the case from speaking publicly about it. Prosecutors described defense statements to the press as inflammatory, according to Boston.com.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Sullivan denied the request without prejudice, according to WCVB. He wrote that the Commonwealth had not met its burden to justify the extreme remedy of a prior restraint, according to WBUR. The Commonwealth may renew the request if circumstances change and it can show that a prior restraint is necessary, according to WCVB.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A court order forbidding speech before the speech occurs is a prior restraint. Massachusetts courts permit one only on detailed findings of a compelling interest and the absence of a reasonable, less restrictive alternative. A lawyer’s public statements remain subject to Rule 3.6 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, with or without a court order.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What Comes Next</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The November 16 Hearing and the March 29, 2027 Trial Date</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On Monday, November 16, 2026, Judge Sullivan scheduled Ms. Clancy’s second trial to begin on March 29, 2027, in Plymouth Superior Court, according to the Associated Press. The Commonwealth asked for a trial date in May, citing scheduling conflicts. Judge Sullivan chose the March date.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Assistant District Attorney Jennifer Sprague told Judge Sullivan that the Commonwealth was ready to pick a date for a jury trial, according to the Associated Press. Defense lawyer Kevin Reddington said that the Commonwealth’s remarks were an indirect signal that it will try Ms. Clancy again on the indictments for murder in the first degree. District Attorney Timothy Cruz has not publicly announced whether the Commonwealth will seek a conviction of murder in the first degree or a lesser degree, according to the Associated Press.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The lawyers return to court on December 30, 2026, to discuss trial logistics, security and media arrangements, according to the Associated Press.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">An Appeal Before the Second Trial</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A defendant ordinarily cannot appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss until after trial. Massachusetts recognizes a narrow exception for double jeopardy claims, because the right protects a defendant from being tried a second time. See <em>Neverson v. Commonwealth</em>, 406 Mass. 174, 175 (1989). The defendant files a petition with a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court under G.L. c. 211, § 3. Karen Read used that route after her mistrial in <em>Read v. Commonwealth</em>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Defense lawyer Martin Weinberg said that the defense expects to seek review in the Supreme Judicial Court in the very near future, according to Boston.com. The single justice decides whether to grant relief, deny it, or report the question to the full court.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>On November 9, 2026, Judge William Sullivan denied Lindsay Clancy’s motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, finding a manifest necessity for the mistrial based on the jury’s deadlock.</li>


<li>Judge Sullivan denied the defense requests for records about the holdout juror and for questioning of that juror under oath.</li>


<li>Judge Sullivan denied the Commonwealth’s request for a gag order without prejudice, so the Commonwealth may renew it if circumstances change.</li>


<li>A jury that cannot agree on a verdict is a traditional example of manifest necessity for a mistrial.</li>


<li>Massachusetts permits review of a double jeopardy ruling before a second trial through a petition to a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court under G.L. c. 211, § 3.</li>


<li>On November 16, 2026, Judge Sullivan scheduled Ms. Clancy’s second trial to begin on March 29, 2027, in Plymouth Superior Court.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Related Serpa Law Office Resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-november-2-hearing-double-jeopardy/">Lindsay Clancy Hearing on November 2, 2026 and the Double Jeopardy Motion</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-september-29-hearing-double-jeopardy/">Lindsay Clancy Hearing on September 29, 2026 and the Retrial Question</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/double-jeopardy-massachusetts/">Double Jeopardy in Massachusetts</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/massachusetts-mistrial-double-jeopardy-retrial/">Mistrials in Massachusetts Criminal Cases</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/juror-nondisclosure-misrepresentation-massachusetts/">Juror Nondisclosure and Misrepresentation in Massachusetts Criminal Trials</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-juror-nondisclosure-new-trial/">The Clancy Mistrial and the Juror Questionnaire</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-juror-removal-massachusetts-law/">The Lindsay Clancy Jury Dispute: When Massachusetts Law Permits Removal of a Deliberating Juror</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/criminal-responsibility-insanity-defense-massachusetts/">Criminal Responsibility in Massachusetts Criminal Cases</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-process/what-a-massachusetts-district-attorney-can-and-cannot-decide/">What a Massachusetts District Attorney Can and Cannot Decide</a></li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It is based solely on public court proceedings, public reporting, and published decisions and does not reflect any non-public information. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. This may constitute attorney advertising.</em></p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Lindsay Clancy Hearing on November 2, 2026 and the Double Jeopardy Motion]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-november-2-hearing-double-jeopardy/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-november-2-hearing-double-jeopardy/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 01:34:18 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Trial Strategy and Evidence Notes]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On November 2, 2026, Judge William Sullivan heard the Lindsay Clancy double jeopardy motion and indicated that a second trial could begin in March 2027.</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lindsay Clancy returned to Plymouth Superior Court on Monday, November 2, 2026, for a hearing before Judge William Sullivan. Her lawyers asked Judge Sullivan to dismiss the murder charges on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/double-jeopardy-massachusetts/">double jeopardy</a> grounds. The Commonwealth asked Judge Sullivan for a gag order on the prosecutors, the defense lawyers, and law enforcement, according to the Boston Globe. Judge Sullivan said that he would decide the motions later and scheduled a hearing for November 16, when he intends to announce his decision on the motion to dismiss.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The hearing lasted about three hours. The defense also asked Judge Sullivan to review court and cellphone records about the one juror who disagreed with the other eleven jurors at the first trial. Judge Sullivan set the November 16 hearing for 10 a.m., according to ABC News and TMZ.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth charges Ms. Clancy with murder in the deaths of her three children in Duxbury on January 24, 2023. At trial, the defense argued that Ms. Clancy was <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/criminal-responsibility-insanity-defense-massachusetts/">not criminally responsible</a> because she was suffering from postpartum psychosis. Judge Sullivan <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/massachusetts-mistrial-double-jeopardy-retrial/">declared a mistrial</a> on September 4, 2026, after the jury reported that it could not agree on a verdict. News reports describe the jury as divided 11 to 1 and call the one juror in the minority the holdout juror.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A Plymouth County grand jury indicted Ms. Clancy for murder and strangulation in the deaths of Cora, Dawson, and Callan Clancy. News reports describe the eleven jurors in the majority as favoring a verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Sullivan denied the defense’s <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-required-finding-motion-after-mistrial/">renewed motion for a required finding of not guilty</a> on October 1, 2026, according to NBC10 Boston and Boston 25 News. The defense filed the renewed motion under <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/rule-25-required-finding-of-not-guilty-massachusetts/">Mass. R. Crim. P. 25(b)(2)</a>, which permits a defendant to renew a motion for a required finding of not guilty after the judge discharges a jury that returned no verdict. Judge Sullivan ruled that the Commonwealth presented enough evidence for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Clancy killed the children and that she was criminally responsible, according to Boston 25 News.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Double Jeopardy Motion</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Defense attorney Martin Weinberg argued the motion to dismiss. Before the mistrial, the jury foreperson sent Judge Sullivan notes reporting that one juror was not following the instructions on the law. Judge Sullivan questioned each juror individually about whether the juror could follow the instructions and then repeated the instruction on reasonable doubt to the jury. Judge Sullivan also denied a defense request to replace the holdout juror with an alternate.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mr. Weinberg argued that Judge Sullivan should have conducted a more probing inquiry after receiving the foreperson’s notes and before declaring the mistrial. According to CBS Boston and the Associated Press, Mr. Weinberg told Judge Sullivan that further questioning could have shown whether the holdout juror was following the instructions on the law. The firm’s earlier post on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-juror-removal-massachusetts-law/">the Clancy jury dispute</a> explains when Massachusetts law permits a judge to remove a deliberating juror.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mr. Weinberg represented Karen Read on her double jeopardy petition to the Supreme Judicial Court in 2025. He told Judge Sullivan, “A probing voir dire could have disclosed that the 12th juror was not following instructions,” according to CBS Boston. The defense argues that the Commonwealth cannot establish the manifest necessity required for a second trial because Judge Sullivan declared the mistrial without questioning the jurors further, according to Newsweek.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Sullivan questioned Mr. Weinberg from the bench. He asked Mr. Weinberg whether the judge had already conducted a voir dire, sworn the jurors, and asked each juror whether the juror could follow the instructions. Judge Sullivan said that he also had to guard against coercing the jurors, according to CBS Boston. He told the defense that he understands the argument and does not take it personally, according to ABC News.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Assistant District Attorney Jennifer Sprague argued that Judge Sullivan handled the deadlocked jury correctly. Ms. Sprague wrote in the Commonwealth’s opposition that singling out the holdout juror for questioning would have led to judicial coercion of the juror and an intrusion into the jury’s private deliberations, according to ABC News and the Boston Globe. The Commonwealth also argued that the foreperson did not report any bias, outside influence, or other personal reason affecting the holdout juror.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At the hearing, Ms. Sprague told the court that Judge Sullivan questioned the jurors individually, reinforced his instructions, and stayed out of the substance of the deliberations. She said that the holdout juror “did not refuse to deliberate. He refused to agree,” according to Newsweek. The Commonwealth further argued that a reviewing court judges the mistrial by what Judge Sullivan knew when he declared it, without regard to information the defense gathered afterward.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Double jeopardy protections prohibit a second trial of a defendant whose first trial ended over the defendant’s objection without a conviction, unless the judge declared the mistrial out of manifest necessity. <em>Ray v. Commonwealth</em>, 463 Mass. 1, 3 (2012). A jury that cannot agree on a verdict is a traditional example of manifest necessity. <em>Commonwealth v. Troila</em>, 410 Mass. 203, 206 (1991). The <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-september-29-hearing-double-jeopardy/">September 29 update</a> describes the steps Judge Sullivan took before he declared the mistrial and how the Supreme Judicial Court applied the manifest necessity rule in Karen Read’s case.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Deliberations Before the Mistrial</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The jury deliberated for more than 38 hours over seven days and reported three times that it could not agree, according to WBUR. Judge Sullivan sent the jury back to deliberate after the first report. After the second report, on September 2, Judge Sullivan gave the jury the Tuey-Rodriquez instruction. On September 3, the foreperson reported that one juror refused to follow the law on reasonable doubt. After the foreperson’s final note on September 4, Judge Sullivan declared the mistrial. The Supreme Judicial Court declined the defense request for emergency relief the same day.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Tuey-Rodriquez Instruction and the Limit on Further Deliberations</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Tuey-Rodriquez instruction is the charge a Massachusetts judge gives a jury that reports a deadlock. The judge asks the jurors in the majority and the jurors in the minority to reconsider their positions in light of the views of the other jurors, without surrendering an honest conviction. <em>Commonwealth v. Rodriquez</em>, 364 Mass. 87, 101 (1973). The Supreme Judicial Court has held that the instruction is ordinarily the preferable course but that a judge is not required to give it, even when both parties request it. <em>Ray v. Commonwealth</em>, 463 Mass. 1, 5-6 (2012). In <em>Rodriquez</em>, the court cautioned that the instruction “has a sting” and should not be given prematurely or without evident cause. 364 Mass. at 100.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Massachusetts law limits how many times a judge can send a deadlocked jury back to deliberate. Under G.L. c. 234A, § 68C, a judge may restate the evidence or explain the law again and send the jury out for further deliberation after the jury first reports that it cannot agree. After the jury returns a second time without a verdict, the judge may not send the jury out again without the jurors’ own consent, unless the jury asks for a further explanation of the law.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Manifest Necessity Rule</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The manifest necessity rule governs Ms. Clancy’s motion to dismiss because Ms. Clancy objected to the mistrial on September 4 and asked the Supreme Judicial Court for emergency relief. The Supreme Judicial Court applies the rule as the United States Supreme Court stated it in <em>Arizona v. Washington</em>, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978), and <em>United States v. Perez</em>, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). <em>Ray</em>, 463 Mass. at 3.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Supreme Judicial Court reviews a mistrial declared because of a deadlocked jury for an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. <em>Ray</em>, 463 Mass. at 4. The court applies two principles in that review. The judge must give counsel a full opportunity to be heard. The judge must also give careful consideration to the alternatives to a mistrial. <em>Ray</em>, 463 Mass. at 4, quoting <em>Commonwealth v. Nicoll</em>, 452 Mass. 816, 818 (2008).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Supreme Judicial Court applies no mechanical formula to determine whether a deadlock mistrial was proper. The court considers the jury’s statements that it cannot agree and the time the jury spent deliberating, measured against the length of the trial and the complexity of the factual disputes. <em>Ray</em>, 463 Mass. at 4-5. A judge who follows the two principles is not required to consider every conceivable alternative before declaring a mistrial. <em>Read v. Commonwealth</em>, 495 Mass. 312 (2025), quoting <em>Commonwealth v. Cassidy</em>, 410 Mass. 174, 179 (1991). The judge is also not required to give the Tuey-Rodriquez instruction. <em>Ray</em>, 463 Mass. at 5-6.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Double jeopardy does not prevent a second trial after a deadlock where the judge followed those principles and the evidence at trial was legally sufficient to support a conviction. <em>Ray</em>, 463 Mass. at 4, quoting <em>Ferrari v. Commonwealth</em>, 448 Mass. 163, 167 (2007). Judge Sullivan ruled on October 1 that the evidence was sufficient. The double jeopardy motion therefore depends on whether Judge Sullivan abused his discretion when he declared the mistrial on September 4 without questioning the jurors further.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Information Before the Judge When He Declared the Mistrial</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Supreme Judicial Court judges a deadlock mistrial on the information the trial judge had when the judge declared it. <em>Read v. Commonwealth</em>, 495 Mass. 312 (2025), citing <em>Commonwealth v. Torres</em>, 453 Mass. 722, 736 (2009). In Ms. Read’s case, the defense offered juror accounts after the mistrial reporting that the jurors had privately agreed to acquit on two charges. The Supreme Judicial Court held that those posttrial juror accounts did not establish an acquittal and did not require the trial judge to question the jurors. The court explained that a jury verdict is valid only when the jury returns it unanimously in open court. <em>Read</em>, 495 Mass. 312, citing Mass. R. Crim. P. 27(a). The court reviews a trial judge’s refusal to conduct a posttrial juror inquiry only for an abuse of discretion. <em>Read</em>, 495 Mass. 312, citing <em>Commonwealth v. Guisti</em>, 434 Mass. 245, 251 (2001).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Sullivan applied the same rule in his October ruling denying the defense request for an evidentiary hearing. The allegations about the holdout juror’s phone use and questionnaire answers surfaced after the mistrial. Under <em>Read</em>, a reviewing court examines the foreperson’s notes, the jurors’ answers to Judge Sullivan’s individual questions, and the rest of the record as it stood on September 4.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The sequence Judge Sullivan followed resembles the sequence the Supreme Judicial Court upheld in <em>Read</em>. The trial judge in Ms. Read’s case sent the jury back after the first deadlock note, gave the Tuey-Rodriquez instruction after the second note, and declared a mistrial after the third note. Judge Sullivan took the same three steps. He also questioned each juror individually after the foreperson’s note about the holdout juror. The defense argues that Ms. Clancy’s case differs from <em>Read</em> because the foreperson’s notes described one juror who would not apply the reasonable doubt instruction.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Limits on Questioning or Removing a Holdout Juror</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A Massachusetts judge may discharge a juror during deliberations only after a hearing and only on a finding of an emergency or other compelling reason. G.L. c. 234A, § 39. The Supreme Judicial Court has construed the discharge statutes to permit discharge only for reasons personal to the juror, unrelated to the case itself or to the juror’s relationship with the other jurors. <em>Commonwealth v. Connor</em>, 392 Mass. 838, 844-845 (1984). An alternate replaces a deliberating juror whom the judge discharges. The reconstituted jury then begins its deliberations anew. G.L. c. 234A, § 68.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Supreme Judicial Court has warned that a report from other jurors that a juror cannot follow the juror’s oath may be a euphemism for a different fact, namely that the juror persists in a minority position. <em>Connor</em>, 392 Mass. at 846. A juror’s own statement that the juror cannot abide by the oath does not establish good cause for discharge. <em>Connor</em>, 392 Mass. at 846. A judge who questions the juror should first tell the juror that discharge is possible only for a personal problem unrelated to the juror’s views of the case or relationships with the other jurors. The judge should stop the questioning unless the juror reports a personal problem. <em>Connor</em>, 392 Mass. at 845.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The <em>Connor</em> rule is the basis of the Commonwealth’s argument that questioning the holdout juror further would have coerced him. The defense answers that the foreperson’s notes reported a refusal to apply the reasonable doubt instruction rather than a disagreement about the evidence. According to Fox News, the defense motion cites the foreperson’s report that the holdout juror acknowledged doubt but refused to apply it.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Unlikely to Succeed</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Attorney Joe Serpa’s assessment is that the motion to dismiss is unlikely to succeed. A reviewing court asks only whether Judge Sullivan abused his discretion when he declared the mistrial. <em>Ray</em>, 463 Mass. at 4. The public reports of the trial describe a judge who followed both principles that review applies. Judge Sullivan heard the defense requests before he declared the mistrial, including the request to replace the holdout juror with an alternate. He considered alternatives to a mistrial. He questioned each juror individually, repeated the reasonable doubt instruction, and gave the Tuey-Rodriquez instruction.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Sullivan also followed the three steps the Supreme Judicial Court upheld in <em>Read</em>. He sent the jury back after the first deadlock report, gave the Tuey-Rodriquez instruction after the second, and declared the mistrial after the third. The jury had deliberated for more than 38 hours over seven days, according to WBUR.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The further inquiry the defense seeks is the kind of inquiry Massachusetts law discourages. The Supreme Judicial Court has discouraged polling a deadlocked jury about its division because of the risk of coercing the jurors in the minority. <em>Ray</em>, 463 Mass. at 5 n.5. A judge may not discharge a deliberating juror because of the juror’s views of the evidence, and a report that a juror will not follow the law may describe a juror who holds a minority position. <em>Connor</em>, 392 Mass. at 844-846. G.L. c. 234A, § 39. Judge Sullivan was not required to consider every conceivable alternative before he declared the mistrial. <em>Read</em>, 495 Mass. 312, quoting <em>Cassidy</em>, 410 Mass. at 179.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The allegations about the holdout juror’s phone and questionnaire surfaced after the mistrial. A reviewing court judges the mistrial on the information Judge Sullivan had on September 4. <em>Read</em>, 495 Mass. 312, citing <em>Torres</em>, 453 Mass. at 736. Those later allegations therefore do not show that the mistrial lacked manifest necessity. Judge Sullivan ruled on October 1 that the evidence at the first trial was legally sufficient. Where the judge followed the two principles and the evidence was sufficient, double jeopardy does not prevent a second trial. <em>Ray</em>, 463 Mass. at 4.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Evidence About the Holdout Juror</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Defense attorney Kevin Reddington asked Judge Sullivan to consider evidence about the holdout juror that became known after the mistrial. Mr. Reddington alleged that the juror used a cellphone during deliberations and was not truthful about his criminal history during <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/jury-selection-massachusetts-criminal-trials/">jury selection</a>. Judge Sullivan admonished Mr. Reddington for naming the juror in open court and called the lawyers to sidebar after the Commonwealth objected to Mr. Reddington’s statements about the juror.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mr. Reddington told the court that another juror saw the holdout juror scrolling on his phone and that the holdout juror researched terms related to the trial, according to Newsweek. Mr. Reddington further told the court that the holdout juror did not disclose a past <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/">domestic violence arrest</a> on his juror questionnaire, according to the Boston Globe. Judge Sullivan told Mr. Reddington that there was no need to use the juror’s name in the courtroom and directed counsel to refer to the juror as Juror Doe, according to the Boston Globe and Newsweek. Mr. Reddington answered that the name was already on the internet. Judge Sullivan responded that the juror’s exposure in the media did not result from any ruling he made. The court placed some of the questionnaire material under seal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense also asked Judge Sullivan to review the juror’s cellphone records, according to ABC News and Boston.com. In October, Judge Sullivan denied a defense request for an evidentiary hearing about the holdout juror, according to WBUR and ABC News. Judge Sullivan wrote in the October ruling that information about the juror that surfaced after the trial “simply is not relevant to whether there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial,” according to WBUR.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense records request covers the juror’s confidential questionnaire, the juror’s cellphone records from the days of deliberation, and court records of the juror’s criminal history and of a civil restraining order, according to the Boston Globe. Heather O’Connor, the lawyer for the holdout juror, opposed the defense requests. Ms. O’Connor told the court that the juror disclosed a prior arrest on his questionnaire and that the defense reviewed the questionnaire, questioned him, and accepted him onto the jury, according to Newsweek. Ms. O’Connor said that the court allowed every juror to keep a phone. She argued that the defense investigated the juror because of his vote and warned that searching a juror’s phone after a mistrial would deter people from serving on juries. Ms. Sprague told Judge Sullivan that a further inquiry could require the court to examine the statements and actions of the other eleven jurors as well, according to the Boston Globe.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In September, news organizations began reporting on the juror’s answers on the <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-juror-nondisclosure-new-trial/">juror questionnaire</a> and on his phone use during deliberations. The firm’s page on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/juror-nondisclosure-misrepresentation-massachusetts/">juror nondisclosure and misrepresentation</a> explains the rules that apply when a juror gives a false or incomplete answer during jury selection.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Confidential Juror Questionnaire</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Every prospective juror in Massachusetts completes a confidential juror questionnaire that the Office of Jury Commissioner provides. G.L. c. 234A, § 22. The completed questionnaires are not public records. The clerk provides copies to the trial judge and counsel for use during jury selection. Every copy other than the judge’s copy and the clerk’s original must be destroyed as soon as practicable after jury selection ends. G.L. c. 234A, § 23.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The court, the jury commissioner, and the clerk of court may obtain the criminal history records of jurors for the limited purpose of confirming their qualifications for jury service. The persons who receive those records must keep them confidential. G.L. c. 234A, § 33. A juror who wilfully misrepresents a material fact on the questionnaire to avoid or to secure jury service commits a crime. On a conviction for that misrepresentation, the judge may fine the juror up to $2,000. G.L. c. 234A, § 32.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ms. Clancy’s jury returned no verdict. The defense therefore raises the questionnaire allegations in support of the double jeopardy claim and the request for records, rather than in a motion for a new trial after a verdict.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Contact With Jurors After They Are Discharged</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A lawyer may contact a discharged juror without first asking the court’s permission, subject to the limits in Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5(c). <em>Commonwealth v. Moore</em>, 474 Mass. 541, 547-548 (2016). The lawyer may not contact a juror when the law or a court order prohibits the contact, when the juror has said that the juror does not want to communicate, or when the contact involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress, or harassment. Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5(c). Before contacting any juror, the lawyer must give opposing counsel five business days’ notice describing the manner of the proposed contact and the substance of the proposed inquiry. <em>Moore</em>, 474 Mass. at 552.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The law permits inquiry into extraneous influences on the jury, such as outside information a juror brought into the deliberations. The law prohibits inquiry into the substance of the deliberations, the jurors’ thought processes, or the reasons for their votes. <em>Moore</em>, 474 Mass. at 548, citing <em>Commonwealth v. Fidler</em>, 377 Mass. 192, 196-198 (1979). The Supreme Judicial Court has called the secrecy of jury deliberations a bedrock of the judicial system. <em>Moore</em>, 474 Mass. at 548. Under those rules, the defense allegation that the holdout juror researched terms related to the trial describes an extraneous influence. The foreperson’s report that the juror refused to apply the reasonable doubt instruction describes the deliberations themselves.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Jurors’ Names</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The list of jurors’ names in a Massachusetts criminal trial is a court record open to the public unless a judge finds good cause to impound it. The court file must contain the list by the end of the trial. <em>Commonwealth v. Fujita</em>, 470 Mass. 484 (2015). Good cause may include a risk of harm to the jurors or to the integrity of their service. <em>Fujita</em>, 470 Mass. 484. Judge Sullivan entered an impoundment order protecting the identities of the jurors in Ms. Clancy’s case, according to Fox News.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Commonwealth’s Request for a Gag Order</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth asked Judge Sullivan to bar the prosecutors, the defense lawyers, and law enforcement from making prejudicial statements to the media while the case is pending, according to the Boston Globe. The Commonwealth argued that public statements by the defense could taint the pool of potential jurors for a second trial, according to the Boston Globe and ABC News.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Plymouth County District Attorney’s Office filed the motion for a gag order on September 28, 2026. According to the Boston Globe, the proposed order would remain in effect until every posttrial proceeding, including any appeal, has ended. The Commonwealth proposes enforcement through contempt proceedings, fines, or a referral to the Board of Bar Overseers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At the hearing, Ms. Sprague argued that Mr. Reddington’s comments to the press were inappropriate and could taint the pool of potential jurors for a second trial. She cited his public remark that the holdout juror should “sleep well at night” and his statement that he would try to hire Judge Sullivan after the judge retires, according to the Boston Globe.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense argued in its written response that the proposed order would be a prior restraint on speech, according to the Associated Press and the Boston Globe. Laura McConnell, a lawyer for Ms. Clancy, wrote that the harm the Commonwealth feared was speculative because there was no jury and no trial date.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ms. McConnell’s six-page response argued that the proposed order would infringe the First Amendment rights of Mr. Reddington and Ms. Clancy. The response further argued that the Commonwealth offered no detailed evidence to support the order and that the order addresses only one side’s comments about discharged jurors, according to the Associated Press. At the hearing, Ms. McConnell argued that Mr. Reddington has a right to respond to unsubstantiated and prejudicial public statements about Ms. Clancy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Rule 3.6 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct applies to the lawyers whether or not Judge Sullivan enters a gag order. Rule 3.6 prohibits a lawyer participating in a case from making a statement outside court that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be publicly disseminated and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a proceeding in that case. Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.6(a).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">What Rule 3.6 Permits a Lawyer to Say</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Comment 5 to Rule 3.6 lists subjects more likely than not to cause material prejudice in a criminal case. The list includes the character, credibility, reputation, or criminal record of a party or witness, and any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Comment 6 states that criminal jury trials are the proceedings most sensitive to statements made outside the courtroom.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Rule 3.6(b) lists statements a lawyer may make despite Rule 3.6(a). A lawyer may state the claim, offense, or defense involved, information contained in a public record, and the scheduling or result of any step in the case. Under Rule 3.6(c), a lawyer may also make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity that neither the lawyer nor the client initiated. The lawyer must limit the statement to the information necessary to counter that publicity. Ms. McConnell’s argument that Mr. Reddington has a right to answer public statements about Ms. Clancy corresponds to Rule 3.6(c).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Gentile Decision on Lawyers’ Public Statements</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The United States Supreme Court has held that a State may regulate the public statements of lawyers representing clients in pending cases under the substantial likelihood of material prejudice standard. <em>Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada</em>, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074-1075 (1991). The Court explained that a State may hold a participating lawyer to a less demanding standard than the standard governing restraints on the press, because the lawyer takes part in the case and the public is likely to receive the lawyer’s statements as especially authoritative. <em>Gentile</em>, 501 U.S. at 1074. The Court described the limits as aimed at two harms. The first harm is comments likely to influence the actual outcome of the trial. The second harm is comments likely to prejudice the pool of potential jurors, even if an untainted jury can ultimately be found. <em>Gentile</em>, 501 U.S. at 1075.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Massachusetts Standard for an Order Restricting Speech</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A court order forbidding speech before the speech occurs is a prior restraint. A judge who enters an order restraining speech must base the order on detailed findings of fact. The findings must identify a compelling interest the restraint will serve and must show that no reasonable, less restrictive alternative exists. <em>Commonwealth v. Barnes</em>, 461 Mass. 644, 652 (2012), citing <em>George W. Prescott Publishing Co. v. Stoughton Division of the District Court Department of the Trial Court</em>, 428 Mass. 309 (1998).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>Shak v. Shak</em>, 484 Mass. 658 (2020), the Supreme Judicial Court set aside orders that barred two divorcing parents from disparaging each other. The court held that a prior restraint is permissible only where the harm expected from the speech is grave, the likelihood of that harm without the restraint is all but certain, and no less restrictive means can reduce the harm.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Neither <em>Barnes</em> nor <em>Shak</em> involved a lawyer in a pending criminal case. <em>Barnes</em> involved the publication of courtroom recordings by a radio station. <em>Shak</em> involved parties to a divorce. Judge Sullivan must apply the Massachusetts prior restraint decisions together with <em>Gentile</em>, which permits more regulation of a participating lawyer’s speech than of speech by the press. In <em>Barnes</em>, the Supreme Judicial Court held that questioning of prospective jurors and cross-examination at a later trial were among the alternatives that protected a defendant’s right to a fair trial when a radio station published recordings of a court proceeding. <em>Barnes</em>, 461 Mass. at 659-660.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A Second Trial and the Next Court Date</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ms. Sprague indicated that the District Attorney’s Office intends to retry Ms. Clancy, according to the Boston Herald and Boston 25 News. Ms. Sprague also told Judge Sullivan that the office has not decided which murder charge the Commonwealth will pursue at a second trial. According to NBC10 Boston and the Boston Herald, the office will decide the charge after Judge Sullivan rules on the pending motions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“This would be a retrial,” Ms. Sprague told the court, according to ABC News. Plymouth County District Attorney Timothy Cruz said outside the courthouse that his office is reviewing the case and will make a methodical decision, according to the Boston Globe.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mr. Reddington told Judge Sullivan that the defense wants a trial this spring. Ms. Clancy remains held at a state psychiatric hospital. Judge Sullivan indicated that a second trial could begin in March 2027 and said that he would set a trial date at the November 16 hearing if he denies the motion to dismiss.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mr. Reddington said that Ms. Clancy should not remain held for two more years, according to the Boston Globe. Ms. Clancy has been held at Tewksbury State Hospital under psychiatric care since 2023. Mr. Reddington also asked Judge Sullivan to remain on the case, according to TMZ. Judge Sullivan said that discussing a trial date does not prevent him from allowing the motion to dismiss, according to Newsweek. He described the November 16 hearing as brief, with no arguments, according to TMZ.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ms. Clancy can petition a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court to review the double jeopardy claim before a second trial begins if Judge Sullivan denies the motion to dismiss. A defendant who raises a double jeopardy claim of substantial merit is entitled to review of the claim before retrial, through a petition to a single justice under G.L. c. 211, § 3. <em>Neverson v. Commonwealth</em>, 406 Mass. 174, 175 (1989).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Karen Read used that procedure, as did the petitioner in <em>Ray</em>. Conversely, the Commonwealth may appeal to the Appeals Court if Judge Sullivan allows the motion and dismisses the indictments. Mass. R. Crim. P. 15(a)(1).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Charges at a Second Trial</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-process/what-a-massachusetts-district-attorney-can-and-cannot-decide/">District Attorney’s Office decides</a> whether the Commonwealth asks a second jury to convict Ms. Clancy of murder in the first degree or proceeds only on murder in the second degree. The Commonwealth may retry a defendant on the same indictments after a mistrial declared because the jury could not agree. <em>Troila</em>, 410 Mass. at 206.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The judge sentences a defendant convicted of murder in the first degree for a killing committed as an adult to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole. G.L. c. 265, § 2(a). The judge sentences a defendant convicted of murder in the second degree to life imprisonment and fixes a minimum term of between 15 and 25 years, after which the defendant is eligible for parole. G.L. c. 265, § 2(c), and G.L. c. 279, § 24.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A defendant tried on an indictment for murder in the first degree must be tried by a jury. General Laws c. 263, § 6 permits a defendant to waive a jury only in a criminal case “other than a capital case.” An indictment that charges murder in the first degree makes the case a capital case for that purpose. <em>Commonwealth v. Francis</em>, 450 Mass. 132, 136-137 (2007). The court looks to the charge in the indictment rather than to the definition of a capital case in G.L. c. 278, § 33E, which applies after a conviction. <em>Francis</em>, 450 Mass. at 136-137. The Supreme Judicial Court has held that any change to that rule must come from the Legislature. <em>Commonwealth v. O’Brien</em>, 371 Mass. 605, 607 (1976).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">News reports, including CBS Boston, note that Ms. Clancy could ask to be tried by a judge without a jury if the Commonwealth proceeds only on murder in the second degree. Section 6 requires the defendant to sign a written waiver and file it with the clerk before a jury is impanelled. In a trial without a jury, the judge would decide whether the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Clancy was criminally responsible.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Criminal Responsibility and Hospitalization After a Verdict</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Commitment proceedings under G.L. c. 123, § 16 may begin after a verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility. Section 16 describes that verdict as a finding of not guilty by reason of mental illness or mental defect. The court that heard the criminal case may order the defendant hospitalized for 40 days for observation and examination. G.L. c. 123, § 16(a). Within 60 days after the verdict, the district attorney, the superintendent of a facility, or the medical director of Bridgewater State Hospital may petition that court to commit the defendant. A first commitment order lasts six months. G.L. c. 123, § 16(b). A court may then order additional commitments of one year each on the findings required by G.L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. G.L. c. 123, § 16(c).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The district attorney receives notice of every commitment hearing and has the right to be heard. G.L. c. 123, § 16(d). The superintendent must notify the court and the district attorney before discharging the defendant or before deciding not to seek a further commitment. The district attorney then has 30 days to petition for commitment. The defendant remains at the facility during those 30 days. G.L. c. 123, § 16(e).</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Judge William Sullivan heard arguments on November 2, 2026, on the defense motion to dismiss the murder charges against Lindsay Clancy on double jeopardy grounds and said that he would decide the motion later.</li>


<li>The defense argued that Judge Sullivan should have questioned the jurors further before he declared the mistrial. The Commonwealth argued that further questioning would have led to judicial coercion of the holdout juror and an intrusion into the jury’s deliberations.</li>


<li>Defense attorney Kevin Reddington alleged that the holdout juror used a cellphone during deliberations and was not truthful about his criminal history during jury selection.</li>


<li>The Commonwealth asked for a gag order barring the prosecutors, the defense lawyers, and law enforcement from making prejudicial statements to the media about the case. The defense called the proposed order a prior restraint on speech.</li>


<li>Prosecutors indicated that the District Attorney’s Office intends to retry Ms. Clancy but has not decided which murder charge to pursue.</li>


<li>Judge Sullivan scheduled a hearing for November 16 and indicated that a second trial could begin in March 2027 if he denies the motion to dismiss.</li>


<li>Attorney Joe Serpa’s assessment is that the double jeopardy motion is unlikely to succeed because Judge Sullivan heard the defense, considered the alternatives, and followed the sequence the Supreme Judicial Court upheld in <em>Read v. Commonwealth</em>.</li>


<li>The Supreme Judicial Court upholds a deadlock mistrial where the judge gave counsel a full opportunity to be heard and carefully considered the alternatives. Under <em>Read v. Commonwealth</em>, the court judges the mistrial on the information the trial judge had at the time.</li>


<li>Massachusetts law permits a judge to discharge a deliberating juror only for a reason personal to that juror, unrelated to the juror’s views of the case or relationships with the other jurors.</li>


<li>A Massachusetts judge may enter an order restraining speech only on detailed findings of a compelling interest and the absence of a reasonable, less restrictive alternative.</li>


<li>A defendant tried on an indictment for murder in the first degree must be tried by a jury.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Related Serpa Law Office Resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-november-9-ruling-double-jeopardy-denied/">Judge Denies Lindsay Clancy’s Double Jeopardy Motion: The November 9, 2026 Rulings</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-september-29-hearing-double-jeopardy/">Lindsay Clancy Hearing on September 29, 2026 and the Retrial Question</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/double-jeopardy-massachusetts/">Double Jeopardy in Massachusetts</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/massachusetts-mistrial-double-jeopardy-retrial/">Mistrials in Massachusetts Criminal Cases</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/juror-nondisclosure-misrepresentation-massachusetts/">Juror Nondisclosure and Misrepresentation in Massachusetts Criminal Trials</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/criminal-responsibility-insanity-defense-massachusetts/">Criminal Responsibility in Massachusetts Criminal Cases</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/jury-selection-massachusetts-criminal-trials/">Jury Selection in Massachusetts Criminal Trials</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-juror-nondisclosure-new-trial/">The Clancy Mistrial and the Juror Questionnaire</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-required-finding-motion-after-mistrial/">After the Mistrial: The Renewed Motion for a Required Finding of Not Guilty in the Clancy Case</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-juror-removal-massachusetts-law/">The Lindsay Clancy Jury Dispute: When Massachusetts Law Permits Removal of a Deliberating Juror</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/rule-25-required-finding-of-not-guilty-massachusetts/">Rule 25: The Motion for a Required Finding of Not Guilty in Massachusetts</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-process/what-a-massachusetts-district-attorney-can-and-cannot-decide/">What a Massachusetts District Attorney Can and Cannot Decide</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/filming-jurors-lindsay-clancy-trial-witness-intimidation/">Filming Jurors in the Lindsay Clancy Trial and Massachusetts Witness Intimidation Law</a></li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It is based solely on public court proceedings, public reporting, and published decisions and does not reflect any non-public information. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. This may constitute attorney advertising.</em></p>
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            <item>
                <title><![CDATA[Leaving a 14-Year-Old and a 9-Year-Old Home Alone for Days: The Florida Case Under Massachusetts Law]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/leaving-children-home-alone-for-days-massachusetts-law/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/leaving-children-home-alone-for-days-massachusetts-law/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Sat, 31 Oct 2026 13:08:44 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Decisions]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>A Florida mother left four children, ages 14 to 9, home for five nights with a sitter by day and no adult overnight. Under Massachusetts law, the circumstances decide whether a parent faces a reckless endangerment charge under G.L. c. 265, § 13L.</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>October 31, 2026</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On October 18, 2026, a mother in Kissimmee, Florida flew to Las Vegas and left her four children, ages 14, 12, 11, and 9, at home for what she planned as a five-day trip. According to news reports, a babysitter drove in from Tampa each morning to get the children ready for school and came back each afternoon to check on them, but no adult stayed overnight.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the evening of October 21, a dumbbell fell on the nine-year-old’s head. One of the children called 911. Deputies found no adult in the home. The nine-year-old was treated at a hospital and released. The children’s father then took the children. Detectives arrested the mother at Orlando International Airport when she returned, on four counts of child neglect without great bodily harm, a third degree felony in Florida under Fla. Stat. § 827.03. Those are allegations. She has not been convicted of anything.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This post applies Massachusetts law to those reported facts. The question is what a Massachusetts parent would face after leaving a fourteen-year-old in charge of a nine-year-old for several nights while the parent was out of state. Massachusetts has no statute that names an age at which a child can stay home alone, so the answer depends on the circumstances. The circumstances reported in the Florida case, several nights with no adult in the home, a parent a flight away, and an injury at night, are the circumstances that support a charge of reckless endangerment of a child in Massachusetts.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-massachusetts-charge-reckless-endangerment-of-a-child">The Massachusetts Charge: Reckless Endangerment of a Child</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A Massachusetts parent who leaves children without adult supervision is charged, when charged at all, with reckless endangerment of a child under G.L. c. 265, § 13L.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The first element is that the child was under eighteen. The second element is a substantial risk of serious bodily injury or sexual abuse to the child. The third element is that the parent wantonly or recklessly created the risk, or, having a duty to act, wantonly or recklessly failed to take reasonable steps to reduce it. <em>Commonwealth v. Coggeshall</em>, 473 Mass. 665, 667-668 (2016).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The firm’s page on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/reckless-endangerment-child-massachusetts-265-13l/">reckless endangerment of a child under § 13L</a> explains each element. A defendant convicted under § 13L faces up to two and one-half years in a house of correction. The charge is a misdemeanor.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a home-alone case, the defense ordinarily contests two elements. The first is the risk. The risk must be a risk of serious bodily injury, which the statute defines as an injury that results in permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of a bodily function, limb, or organ, or a substantial risk of death. A substantial risk means “a good deal more than a possibility.” <em>Commonwealth v. Hendricks</em>, 452 Mass. 97, 103 (2008).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The second is awareness. The parent must have been aware of the risk and consciously disregarded it. The Commonwealth must prove what the parent actually knew, not what a reasonable parent would have known. <em>Coggeshall</em>, 473 Mass. at 670.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Florida law and Massachusetts law differ on one point. The Florida neglect statute now states that neglect does not include allowing a child to remain at home for a reasonable period of time, unless allowing it is willful and wanton conduct that endangers the child. Fla. Stat. § 827.03(1)(e). Massachusetts has no clause like that. Section 13L instead protects a parent through the awareness element: an ordinary lapse in supervision, however poor the judgment, is not a crime unless the parent knew of a substantial risk of serious injury and disregarded it.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-no-minimum-age-and-the-circumstances-a-court-considers">No Minimum Age, and the Circumstances a Court Considers</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Massachusetts law does not name an age at which a child may stay home alone or babysit a younger brother or sister. The firm’s page on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/what-age-can-a-child-stay-home-alone-massachusetts/">what age a child can stay home alone in Massachusetts</a> explains that rule.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Appeals Court has held that whether leaving a child without supervision is reckless endangerment depends on the totality of the circumstances. The circumstances a court considers are the seriousness of the possible harm, how easily the child could get to the parent, how long the parent was away, the age and maturity of the children, the precautions the parent took, and any other fact that shows whether the parent acted recklessly. <em>Commonwealth v. Santos</em>, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 558, 561 (2018).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>Santos</em>, a mother left her three-year-old in front of the television for ten to fifteen minutes while she used the upstairs bathroom. The child wandered out of the apartment. The Appeals Court held that leaving the child in front of the television did not give the police probable cause to charge reckless endangerment. The same mother then searched for about ten minutes, assumed the child was with a neighbor, and went home without calling the police. The Appeals Court held that stopping the search did give the police probable cause. <em>Id.</em> at 561-563.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-applying-the-circumstances-to-a-fourteen-year-old-and-a-nine-year-old">Applying the Circumstances to a Fourteen-Year-Old and a Nine-Year-Old</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The length of the absence.</strong> In <em>Santos</em>, the absence was ten to fifteen minutes, inside the same home. In <em>Commonwealth v. Gibbs</em>, No. 23-P-1128 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 21, 2025), an unpublished decision, the Appeals Court upheld the § 13L convictions of two parents who left four children, ages thirteen, six, two, and eight months, in a running car in a casino parking garage, in heat of at least ninety degrees, three times over almost five hours.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Supreme Judicial Court upheld a DCF neglect finding against a day care worker who left a three-year-old alone in a vehicle for a period of hours. <em>Lindsay v. Department of Social Services</em>, 439 Mass. 789, 799-800 (2003). A parent who leaves children for several nights with no adult in the home is away far longer than in any case in which a Massachusetts appellate court has held the evidence insufficient for a § 13L charge.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>How easily the children could get to the parent.</strong> In <em>Santos</em>, the mother was upstairs. In <em>Commonwealth v. Nebel</em>, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 316, 321-322 (2003), the father was a short distance from the car. A parent in Las Vegas is a flight of several hours from Florida. The same is true of a Massachusetts parent in Las Vegas. The children can call the parent, but the parent cannot get to them. In the Florida case, one of the children called 911. That call is the evidence a prosecutor uses to show that the parent was not accessible.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The age and maturity of the children.</strong> A fourteen-year-old can babysit in Massachusetts. Many fourteen-year-olds watch younger brothers and sisters after school. No statute makes that a crime. A fourteen-year-old left in charge of three younger children for five nights, with responsibility for meals, bedtime, a nine-year-old, and any emergency, is a different fact.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>Gibbs</em>, the Appeals Court did not treat the thirteen-year-old in the driver’s seat as supervision that reduced the risk to the younger children. The nine-year-old’s age also brings a second statute into the case, discussed below, because Massachusetts separately punishes abandoning a child under ten.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The precautions the parent took.</strong> The reported precautions were a babysitter each morning and each afternoon, and a phone. A prosecutor would use those precautions as proof of awareness. A parent who hires a sitter for the mornings and the afternoons knows that the children need an adult. The decision to leave the nights uncovered is therefore the conscious disregard the statute requires. <em>Coggeshall</em>, 473 Mass. at 670.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A defense lawyer would use the same precautions as proof that the parent believed the children were safe: a sitter checked on them every day, the children had a phone, the oldest was fourteen, and nothing had gone wrong before. In <em>Santos</em>, the Appeals Court gave weight to the deadbolt the parents had installed after the child wandered off the first time. 94 Mass. App. Ct. at 562. The result of that argument depends on what the parent knew about the children’s needs at night and on what the parent said to the police.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The seriousness of the possible harm.</strong> The reported injury, a dumbbell falling on a nine-year-old’s head at 8:30 p.m., is the kind of accident that happens with a parent home as well. The Commonwealth does not have to prove that a child was hurt. The injury itself, treated and released, is also not a serious bodily injury under § 13L. <em>Santos</em>, 94 Mass. App. Ct. at 564.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The question is the risk the parent created. A prosecutor would frame the risk this way: four children alone every night for five nights, with no adult to respond to a fire, a medical emergency, a stranger at the door, or an injury like this one, face a substantial risk of serious bodily injury.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense answer comes from two decisions. In <em>Commonwealth v. Costa</em>, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 447, 451-452 (2020), the Appeals Court held that the Commonwealth’s claim that a child left in a car “could have injured herself in any number of ways” was speculation and showed negligence at most. In <em>Commonwealth v. Sanon</em>, No. 23-P-1158 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 9, 2025), an unpublished decision, the Appeals Court reversed three § 13L convictions because the Commonwealth proved only speculative risks from a cluttered home in which the children’s grandmother was present.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The parent’s own statements.</strong> In <em>Coggeshall</em>, the father’s statements that he always walked on the railroad tracks and that he had been drinking supplied the proof that he knew the danger. 473 Mass. at 670-671. The Florida mother reportedly told detectives about the sitter’s schedule. In a Massachusetts case, that statement proves the overnight gap. A parent questioned after a report that a child was left alone should speak with a lawyer before speaking with the police or with DCF.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-nine-year-old-and-the-abandonment-statute">The Nine-Year-Old and the Abandonment Statute</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">G.L. c. 119, § 39 makes it a crime to abandon “an infant under the age of ten.” A defendant convicted under § 39 faces up to two years in a jail or house of correction, and up to five years in state prison if the child dies because of the abandonment. The statute does not define “abandons.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>Nebel</em>, the Appeals Court reversed the § 39 conviction of a father who left his sleeping three-and-a-half-year-old in a car at a rest area while he went a short distance away. The Appeals Court held that an absence must at a minimum be more than brief and temporary. The evidence showed that the father intended to return shortly. 59 Mass. App. Ct. at 320-322. A five-night trip out of state is not brief and temporary.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense to a § 39 charge on the Florida facts is the arrangement itself. A parent who hired a sitter, planned a return date, and stayed in phone contact did not desert the child. The Appeals Court in <em>Nebel</em> wrote that “[t]o equate abandonment with poor judgment . . . is a leap we are not prepared to take.” <em>Id.</em> at 321. The fourteen-year-old, the twelve-year-old, and the eleven-year-old are outside § 39 entirely, because each is ten or older.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-injury-and-assault-and-battery-on-a-child">The Injury and Assault and Battery on a Child</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When a child under fourteen is hurt, the Commonwealth can also charge the parent under G.L. c. 265, § 13J(b) with wantonly or recklessly permitting bodily injury to the child. A defendant convicted of permitting bodily injury faces up to two and one-half years in a house of correction. Permitting substantial bodily injury is a felony. A defendant convicted of permitting substantial bodily injury faces up to five years in state prison. The firm’s page on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/assault-battery-child-massachusetts-265-13j/">assault and battery on a child under § 13J</a> explains the statute.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the reported facts, a § 13J charge would require proof that the parent’s recklessness permitted the dumbbell injury. A weight that falls on a child in a bedroom is an accident that a parent in the next room could not have prevented either. The nine-year-old is under fourteen. The fourteen-year-old is not.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-dcf-investigation">The DCF Investigation</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Massachusetts, the police officers who found the children would report the incident to the Department of Children and Families. Police officers are mandated reporters under G.L. c. 119, §§ 21 and 51A. A child left without adequate supervision is a condition a mandated reporter must report. DCF screens the report and can open a response under G.L. c. 119, § 51B, separate from any criminal case.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">DCF defines neglect as a caregiver’s failure to provide a child with minimally adequate supervision, among other essentials. 110 CMR 2.00. The courts give great deference to DCF’s judgment of what supervision is minimally adequate. <em>Lindsay</em>, 439 Mass. at 799. DCF does not have to prove that the parent was aware of a risk or that the risk was one of serious bodily injury. DCF can therefore support a finding of neglect on these facts even when a clerk-magistrate denies the criminal complaint.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The firm’s page on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/dcf-51a-investigation-domestic-violence-arrest/">DCF 51A investigations</a> explains the screening, the response, the findings, and the fair hearing. A parent should not give DCF a statement before speaking with counsel, because the Commonwealth can use the statement in the criminal case.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-how-the-case-would-begin-in-massachusetts">How the Case Would Begin in Massachusetts</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Florida, detectives arrested the mother at the airport. In Massachusetts, the police can arrest a parent at the scene or apply for a criminal complaint. Reckless endangerment of a child and abandonment of a child under ten are both misdemeanors. A parent who has not been arrested has the right under G.L. c. 218, § 35A to a clerk-magistrate hearing before any complaint issues on a misdemeanor application.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At that hearing the clerk-magistrate decides whether the application shows probable cause. A denial means no complaint, no arraignment, and no CORI entry. The firm’s page on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/massachusetts-clerk-magistrate-hearing-lawyer/">clerk-magistrate hearings</a> explains the hearing. The probable cause standard at that stage is low. In <em>Coggeshall</em>, the Supreme Judicial Court called the standard “not particularly burdensome.” 473 Mass. at 671.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-circumstances-that-separate-a-charge-from-an-ordinary-afternoon">The Circumstances That Separate a Charge From an Ordinary Afternoon</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the reported Florida facts, a Massachusetts prosecutor has the circumstances the <em>Santos</em> list describes: an absence of several nights, a parent a flight away, a nine-year-old among the children, and an injury at night with no adult present. A Massachusetts defense lawyer has the awareness element, the daily sitter, the phone, the fourteen-year-old’s age, and the rule that a speculative risk is negligence at most.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A different set of facts changes the answer. A parent who leaves a fourteen-year-old and a nine-year-old for one evening, with a phone and a neighbor next door, has not committed a crime in Massachusetts. A parent who must travel overnight arranges for an adult to stay in the home, because the overnight hours with no adult are the fact that separates this case from an ordinary afternoon of babysitting.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Attorney Joe Serpa represents parents accused of reckless endangerment of a child at clerk-magistrate hearings and in the District Court and the Boston Municipal Court, and advises parents whom DCF contacts after a report that a child was left alone.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-related-serpa-law-office-resources">Related Serpa Law Office resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/reckless-endangerment-child-massachusetts-265-13l/">Reckless Endangerment of a Child in Massachusetts Under G.L. c. 265, § 13L</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/what-age-can-a-child-stay-home-alone-massachusetts/">What Age Can a Child Stay Home Alone in Massachusetts?</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/assault-battery-child-massachusetts-265-13j/">Assault and Battery on a Child in Massachusetts Under G.L. c. 265, § 13J</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/dcf-51a-investigation-domestic-violence-arrest/">DCF 51A Investigations After a Massachusetts Domestic Arrest</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/massachusetts-clerk-magistrate-hearing-lawyer/">Massachusetts Clerk-Magistrate Hearing Lawyer</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/">Massachusetts Criminal Charges Defense</a></li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
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            <item>
                <title><![CDATA[Withdrawing an Old OUI Plea After the Massachusetts Breathalyzer Scandal: Commonwealth v. Pierre]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/withdraw-oui-plea-breathalyzer-scandal-pierre/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/withdraw-oui-plea-breathalyzer-scandal-pierre/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 15:00:36 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Decisions]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[OUI and Motor Vehicle]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>In Commonwealth v. Pierre, the Appeals Court refused to undo a 2015 OUI admission over the breathalyzer scandal because the other evidence was overwhelming.</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>October 29, 2026</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On October 29, 2026, the Massachusetts Appeals Court upheld a judge’s refusal to let Gerald Pierre withdraw the admission he made in a 2015 <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/dui-motor-vehicle/">OUI case</a> in the <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/massachusetts-district-courts/boston-municipal-court-dorchester-division-criminal-defense/">Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court</a>. Mr. Pierre based his motion on the Massachusetts breathalyzer scandal, the misconduct of the State police Office of Alcohol Testing involving the calibration of Alcotest 9510 breathalyzers. During litigation over those breathalyzers, the Office of Alcohol Testing withheld hundreds of records of failed calibrations from defendants, prosecutors, and judges.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>Commonwealth v. Pierre</em>, No. 25-P-1415, the Appeals Court held that the evidence of intoxication against Mr. Pierre was overwhelming even without the breath test final analysis. Mr. Pierre therefore could not show a reasonable probability that he would have refused to admit to sufficient facts if he had known of the misconduct.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Because the Appeals Court published the opinion, judges in the District Court and the Boston Municipal Court must follow <em>Pierre</em>. In the opinion, the Appeals Court explained how a judge evaluates a motion under <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-breath-test-exclusion-ananias-hallinan/"><em>Commonwealth v. Hallinan</em></a>, 491 Mass. 730 (2023), brought by a person whose older OUI case ended with a guilty plea or an admission after an Alcotest 9510 breath test.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-traffic-stop-on-interstate-93-and-the-2015-admission">The Traffic Stop on Interstate 93 and the 2015 Admission</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At about 2:04 A.M. on April 7, 2014, Mr. Pierre drove past a State trooper on an Interstate 93 on-ramp at eighty-five miles per hour. The posted speed limit was fifty-five miles per hour. The trooper stopped Mr. Pierre and walked up to the car. While the trooper stood beside the car, Mr. Pierre lifted his foot from the brake, which made the car jump forward.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The trooper smelled a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the car and saw that Mr. Pierre’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Mr. Pierre’s speech was slurred. After several requests, he stepped out of the car with difficulty. He told the trooper that he was coming from a bar in Boston and had consumed two shots of liquor between 11:30 P.M. and midnight.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The trooper then administered five <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/dui-motor-vehicle/massachusetts-field-sobriety-breath-test-defense/">field sobriety tests</a>. Mr. Pierre did not complete any of the five tests to the trooper’s satisfaction. He recited the alphabet in no particular order after the letter L and could not count backward from eighty-three to sixty-four. On the walk and turn, he repeatedly stepped off the line, stopped walking, and used his arms for balance. He fell backward during the one leg stand, which had to be stopped for his own safety. He also misspelled Massachusetts.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The trooper arrested Mr. Pierre. At the State police barracks, Mr. Pierre urinated heavily and consented to a breath test. During the <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/dui-motor-vehicle/massachusetts-breath-test-blood-alcohol-science/">observation period before the test</a>, he asked for a cup of water, which he drank in less than ten seconds. He fell asleep while waiting to take the test. The breath test final analysis was a blood alcohol content of 0.13 percent. During booking, Mr. Pierre vomited heavily for several minutes. The trooper also noted that Mr. Pierre had a $156 nightclub receipt and the payment card associated with the receipt.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mr. Pierre was charged with OUI and with the civil infractions of speeding and unsafe operation of a motor vehicle. On September 1, 2015, he admitted to sufficient facts on the OUI charge. By admitting to sufficient facts, a defendant agrees that the Commonwealth’s evidence is enough for a judge to find the defendant guilty. The judge <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-records-outcomes/what-is-a-cwof-pretrial-probation-diversion-lawyer/">continued the case without a finding</a> for one year and placed Mr. Pierre on probation with conditions that he complete the <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-section-24d-first-offense-oui-program/">driver alcohol education program under G.L. c. 90, § 24D</a> and a substance use education program.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mr. Pierre’s driver’s license was <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/dui-motor-vehicle/massachusetts-oui-dui-license-suspensions/">suspended for forty-five days</a>. He was found not responsible for both civil infractions. The court later extended Mr. Pierre’s probation. After he completed the probation, the court dismissed the OUI charge on January 13, 2017.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On August 10, 2023, Mr. Pierre moved to withdraw his admission to sufficient facts. A court treats that request as a <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-process/#h-appeal-and-postconviction-review">motion for a new trial</a> under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b). Under that rule, a judge may grant a new trial at any time if it appears that justice may not have been done.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mr. Pierre supported the motion with his own affidavit, which stated, “If I had known that the breathalyzer results were presumptively unreliable and inadmissible, I believe that I would not have admitted to sufficient facts.” His plea counsel also filed an affidavit, which stated, “Had I known the extent of the issues surrounding the breath test in this matter, I would have explained this to [the defendant], and advised him accordingly as it related to his admission.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">After a hearing, a Boston Municipal Court judge who had not accepted the original admission denied the motion. Mr. Pierre appealed.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-alcotest-9510-misconduct-and-the-hallinan-presumption">The Alcotest 9510 Misconduct and the <em>Hallinan</em> Presumption</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Office of Alcohol Testing, a unit of the State police crime laboratory, certifies the breathalyzers that Massachusetts police departments use. In consolidated District Court litigation known as <em>Commonwealth v. Ananias</em>, OUI defendants <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/dui-motor-vehicle/massachusetts-breathalyzer-defense/">challenged the reliability of the Alcotest 9510</a>. The judge in that litigation ordered the Office to produce its annual certification and calibration worksheets for the Alcotest 9510 devices. The Office produced 1,976 worksheets and represented that the production was complete. The Office had intentionally withheld another 432 worksheets that reported failed annual calibrations. <em>Hallinan</em>, 491 Mass. at 733-743.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>Hallinan</em>, the Supreme Judicial Court decided how a person with an older OUI case may rely on that misconduct to withdraw a plea. A defendant who moves to <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/withdraw-guilty-plea-police-misconduct/">withdraw a guilty plea because of government misconduct</a> must show that egregious government misconduct occurred before the plea. The defendant must also show that the misconduct influenced the decision to plead guilty. <em>Hallinan</em>, 491 Mass. at 744-745.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For the first requirement, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a person whose OUI case included a breath test from an Alcotest 9510 device last calibrated and certified before April 18, 2019, receives a conclusive presumption of egregious government misconduct. The presumption applies whether the case ended with a guilty plea, an admission to sufficient facts, or a conviction after trial. A judge must also exclude the breath test final analysis from any later trial of the case. <em>Hallinan</em>, 491 Mass. at 731.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For the second requirement, a person who pleaded guilty or admitted to sufficient facts must show a reasonable probability that the person would not have pleaded guilty or admitted to sufficient facts if the person had known of the misconduct. The judge decides that question by examining the totality of the circumstances. The Supreme Judicial Court listed five factors for the judge to consider. <em>Hallinan</em>, 491 Mass. at 750.</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Whether evidence of the misconduct could have weakened the facts used to support the guilty plea.</li>

<li>Whether the evidence could have been used to impeach a witness whose credibility may have been decisive.</li>

<li>Whether the evidence only repeated other evidence the defendant already had.</li>

<li>Whether the evidence would have influenced defense counsel’s recommendation about accepting the plea offer.</li>

<li>Whether the benefits of the plea agreement outweighed the value of the evidence.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>Hallinan</em> itself, the Supreme Judicial Court described the breath test final analysis of 0.23 percent as the “crown jewel,” the most incriminating evidence against the defendant. Ms. Hallinan’s plea counsel stated in an affidavit that he would have advised her to go to trial if he had known that the breath test was inadmissible. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the motion judge that Ms. Hallinan had shown the required reasonable probability. <em>Hallinan</em>, 491 Mass. at 750-751.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-appeals-courts-reasons-for-upholding-the-denial">The Appeals Court’s Reasons for Upholding the Denial</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Justice Ditkoff wrote the opinion for a panel of Justices Desmond, Ditkoff, and Toone. The Appeals Court first agreed with Mr. Pierre that an excessive focus on whether the breath test final analysis was the “crown jewel” of the Commonwealth’s case does not help the judge decide the motion.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Appeals Court had made the same point in <em>Commonwealth v. Crump</em>, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 307, 313 (2025). In <em>Crump</em>, the court wrote that the breath test may have been the crown jewel in <em>Hallinan</em> but that the crown jewel description is not the standard that every defendant must meet.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Appeals Court then stated the question that the motion judge must answer. The judge asks whether, in light of how the case ended and the evidence other than the breath test, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have admitted to sufficient facts if the defendant had known that the breath test final analysis was inadmissible. The importance of the breath test final analysis to the Commonwealth’s case is one factor the judge considers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Appeals Court held that the evidence of intoxication was overwhelming even without the breath test final analysis. Mr. Pierre drove thirty miles per hour over the speed limit on an on-ramp and at first failed to stop his car completely. He had bloodshot, glassy eyes, slurred speech, and an odor of an alcoholic beverage. He had difficulty balancing, counting, spelling, and reciting the alphabet. He admitted drinking two shots of liquor and had a $156 nightclub receipt with him. After the arrest, he urinated heavily, drank water profusely, fell asleep, and then vomited for several minutes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Given that evidence, the Appeals Court held that Mr. Pierre had not shown a reasonable probability that he would have refused to admit to sufficient facts if he had known that the breath test final analysis was inadmissible.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Appeals Court contrasted <em>Commonwealth v. Baez</em>, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 219, 221, 224 (2025). <em>Baez</em> concerned the right of a person held on an OUI charge to be examined by a physician of the person’s choosing under G.L. c. 263, § 5A. In deciding that question, the Appeals Court held that the evidence of intoxication in <em>Baez</em> was not overwhelming.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The driver in <em>Baez</em> ran a red light after coming to a complete stop, stepped off the line during the walk and turn, admitted drinking, and had slurred speech and an odor of alcohol. On the booking video, the driver appeared alert, attentive, and compliant with directions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Appeals Court described Mr. Pierre’s two affidavits as ambiguous. Plea counsel’s affidavit did not state, even equivocally, that counsel would have advised Mr. Pierre to go to trial. In <em>Hallinan</em>, by contrast, plea counsel stated unequivocally that he would have advised trial. The Appeals Court reasoned that the evidence against Mr. Pierre was so strong that plea counsel could not say he would have given different advice without the breath test final analysis.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mr. Pierre’s own affidavit stated that he “believe[d]” he would not have admitted to sufficient facts. The Appeals Court noted that the statement was equivocal and held that the judge does not decide the motion on the defendant’s subjective belief. Because a judge cannot evaluate whether a defendant is telling the truth about a decision the defendant never made, the judge evaluates the defendant’s statement under a reasonable person standard. <em>Crump</em>, 105 Mass. App. Ct. at 317.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Given the overwhelming evidence, the Appeals Court held that the motion judge did not err in discrediting what the court called Mr. Pierre’s “self-serving affidavit.” The Appeals Court therefore upheld the order denying Mr. Pierre’s motion to withdraw his admission to sufficient facts.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-what-the-decision-means-for-a-person-with-an-older-oui-case">What the Decision Means for a Person With an Older OUI Case</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A person whose OUI case included a breath test from an Alcotest 9510 device last calibrated and certified before April 18, 2019, receives the <em>Hallinan</em> presumption of misconduct without proving the misconduct in that person’s own case. After <em>Pierre</em>, the outcome of a motion to withdraw the plea or admission depends in large part on the evidence other than the breath test final analysis.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>Crump</em>, the Appeals Court listed facts that Massachusetts appellate courts have considered in judging the strength of the Commonwealth’s case without the breath test final analysis. The facts include classic signs of intoxication such as glassy and bloodshot eyes, an odor of alcohol, and slurred speech. The facts also include erratic driving seen by an officer or another witness, a crash, alcohol in the car, an admission to drinking, and the person’s performance on field sobriety tests. <em>Crump</em>, 105 Mass. App. Ct. at 316.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In addition, the judge weighs the affidavits of plea counsel and the defendant. In <em>Crump</em>, the Appeals Court noted that an equivocal affidavit from plea counsel may not shed light on whether a defendant should be permitted to withdraw a plea. <em>Crump</em>, 105 Mass. App. Ct. at 316-317. The judge evaluates the defendant’s own affidavit under the reasonable person standard.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The judge then compares the benefits of the plea with the value of the evidence of misconduct. In <em>Hallinan</em>, the Commonwealth offered no charge concession. The plea judge imposed a two-year loss of Ms. Hallinan’s driver’s license and probation conditions that included weekly Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, a fourteen-day second offender program, and random alcohol testing. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the motion judge that the benefits of that plea did not outweigh the value of the evidence. <em>Hallinan</em>, 491 Mass. at 751.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Records of an older case can be lost over time. In <em>Pierre</em>, any record of the exact words of the 2015 plea hearing had been destroyed under the courts’ ordinary record retention rules. The Appeals Court therefore took the facts from the application for the criminal complaint. A person considering a motion under <em>Hallinan</em> should gather the court and docket number, the police report, the breath test documents, the plea paperwork, and the probation, program, and license records as early as possible.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A person convicted of OUI again can face the penalties for a second offense because of an older OUI case that ended with a continuance without a finding. Under G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1), the penalties for a second or later OUI apply to a person previously assigned to an alcohol education program because of an earlier OUI, just as the penalties apply to a person previously convicted of OUI. The earlier assignment to the § 24D program remains a prior offense even when the court dismissed the first OUI charge after the person completed probation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A person facing a <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/dui-motor-vehicle/massachusetts-cahill-second-chance-oui-24d/">second offense OUI charge</a> therefore has a reason to find out whether the first case involved a breath test from an Alcotest 9510 device last calibrated and certified before April 18, 2019.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Attorney Joe Serpa has practiced Massachusetts criminal defense since 1995. Serpa Law Office reviews older OUI cases involving Alcotest 9510 breath tests and represents clients in current <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/dui-motor-vehicle/oui-dui-dwi-attorney-greater-boston-massachusetts/">OUI cases</a> in the District Court and the Boston Municipal Court.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-frequently-asked-questions-about-old-oui-pleas-and-the-breathalyzer-scandal">Frequently Asked Questions About Old OUI Pleas and the Breathalyzer Scandal</h2>



<div class="schema-faq wp-block-yoast-faq-block"><div class="schema-faq-section" id="faq-question-1793290000001"><strong class="schema-faq-question">Can I withdraw an old OUI plea because of the Massachusetts breathalyzer scandal?</strong> <p class="schema-faq-answer">A person may move to withdraw an old OUI guilty plea or admission to sufficient facts if the evidence included a breath test from an Alcotest 9510 device last calibrated and certified before April 18, 2019. Under <em>Commonwealth v. Hallinan</em>, that person receives a conclusive presumption of egregious government misconduct. The person must still show a reasonable probability that the person would not have pleaded guilty or admitted to sufficient facts if the person had known of the misconduct.</p> </div> <div class="schema-faq-section" id="faq-question-1793290000002"><strong class="schema-faq-question">What did the Appeals Court decide in <em>Commonwealth v. Pierre</em>?</strong> <p class="schema-faq-answer">On October 29, 2026, the Appeals Court upheld the denial of Gerald Pierre’s motion to withdraw his 2015 admission to sufficient facts on an OUI charge. The court held that the evidence of intoxication was overwhelming without the breath test final analysis. Mr. Pierre therefore had not shown a reasonable probability that he would have refused to admit to sufficient facts if he had known of the Alcotest 9510 misconduct.</p> </div> <div class="schema-faq-section" id="faq-question-1793290000003"><strong class="schema-faq-question">Does the breath test have to be the main evidence against me to withdraw an OUI plea?</strong> <p class="schema-faq-answer">A defendant does not have to show that the breath test final analysis was the “crown jewel” of the Commonwealth’s case. The judge considers the whole case, including the driving, the field sobriety tests, the person’s appearance and statements, the benefits of the plea, and the affidavits. A judge can deny the motion where the other evidence of intoxication was overwhelming, as the Appeals Court held it was in <em>Pierre</em>.</p> </div> <div class="schema-faq-section" id="faq-question-1793290000004"><strong class="schema-faq-question">Which breath tests are covered by the <em>Hallinan</em> presumption?</strong> <p class="schema-faq-answer">The <em>Hallinan</em> presumption covers a breath test from an Alcotest 9510 device last calibrated and certified before April 18, 2019. Coverage depends on the calibration and certification history of the device rather than the date of the test alone. A lawyer can obtain the calibration and certification records of the device to confirm whether the presumption applies.</p> </div> <div class="schema-faq-section" id="faq-question-1793290000005"><strong class="schema-faq-question">Does an old OUI continuance without a finding count as a prior offense in Massachusetts?</strong> <p class="schema-faq-answer">A judge sentencing a person for a later OUI treats an earlier assignment to the § 24D alcohol education program as a prior offense under G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1). The earlier assignment is a prior offense even if the court dismissed the first OUI charge after the person completed probation.</p> </div> <div class="schema-faq-section" id="faq-question-1793290000006"><strong class="schema-faq-question">What records should I gather before filing a <em>Hallinan</em> motion?</strong> <p class="schema-faq-answer">A person considering a <em>Hallinan</em> motion should gather the court and docket number, the police report, the breath test documents, the plea paperwork, and the probation, program, and license records. In <em>Pierre</em>, any record of the exact words of the 2015 plea hearing had been destroyed under ordinary retention rules. The Appeals Court therefore took the facts from the application for the criminal complaint.</p> </div> <div class="schema-faq-section" id="faq-question-1793201275400"><strong class="schema-faq-question">What is a Hallinan motion?</strong> <p class="schema-faq-answer">A motion to withdraw a guilty plea or an admission to sufficient facts in an older OUI case that included a breath test from an Alcotest 9510 device last calibrated and certified before April 18, 2019. The court treats the motion as a motion for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b). Under Commonwealth v. Hallinan, 491 Mass. 730 (2023), the defendant receives a conclusive presumption that egregious government misconduct occurred before the plea. The defendant must still show a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty or admitted to sufficient facts if the defendant had known of the misconduct.</p> </div> <div class="schema-faq-section" id="faq-question-1793201275401"><strong class="schema-faq-question">What are the five Hallinan factors?</strong> <p class="schema-faq-answer">The five questions the judge considers in deciding whether the misconduct influenced the decision to plead. First, whether evidence of the misconduct could have weakened the facts used to support the plea. Second, whether the evidence could have been used to impeach a witness whose credibility may have been decisive. Third, whether the evidence only repeated other evidence the defendant already had. Fourth, whether the evidence would have influenced defense counsel’s recommendation about accepting the plea offer. Fifth, whether the benefits of the plea agreement outweighed the value of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Hallinan, 491 Mass. 730, 750 (2023). No single factor decides the motion.</p> </div> <div class="schema-faq-section" id="faq-question-1793201275402"><strong class="schema-faq-question">Can the Commonwealth use the breath test if my old OUI case is retried?</strong> <p class="schema-faq-answer">No. Under Commonwealth v. Hallinan, 491 Mass. 730, 731 (2023), a judge must exclude the breath test final analysis from any later trial of a case that included a breath test from an Alcotest 9510 device last calibrated and certified before April 18, 2019. The Commonwealth may still try the case on the other evidence, such as the officer’s observations, the field sobriety tests, the defendant’s statements, and any video. In Commonwealth v. Pierre, the Appeals Court held that the other evidence against Mr. Pierre was overwhelming, which is why he could not show that he would have refused to admit to sufficient facts.</p> </div> <div class="schema-faq-section" id="faq-question-1793201275403"><strong class="schema-faq-question">Is there a deadline to file a Hallinan motion?</strong> <p class="schema-faq-answer">No. Under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b), a judge may grant a new trial at any time if it appears that justice may not have been done. Mr. Pierre filed his motion in August 2023, eight years after his 2015 admission and six years after the court dismissed the charge. The passage of time did not bar the motion. The passage of time can make the motion harder to support. The plea counsel’s file, the police report, the booking video, and the court recording may no longer exist. A person considering the motion should gather those records before they are destroyed.</p> </div> <div class="schema-faq-section" id="faq-question-1793201275404"><strong class="schema-faq-question">Why did Mr. Pierre lose his motion?</strong> <p class="schema-faq-answer">Because the evidence of intoxication other than the breath test was overwhelming. Mr. Pierre drove past a State trooper at eighty-five miles per hour in a fifty-five zone, let his car jump forward while the trooper stood beside it, smelled strongly of alcohol, had bloodshot and glassy eyes, slurred his speech, admitted drinking two shots at a bar, and failed all five field sobriety tests, falling backward during the one leg stand. The Appeals Court held that he could not show a reasonable probability that he would have refused to admit to sufficient facts without the breath test.</p> </div> <div class="schema-faq-section" id="faq-question-1793201275405"><strong class="schema-faq-question">What did the Office of Alcohol Testing do wrong?</strong> <p class="schema-faq-answer">The Office of Alcohol Testing, the unit of the State police crime laboratory that certifies breathalyzers, withheld records of failed calibrations from defendants, prosecutors, and judges. In the consolidated District Court litigation known as Commonwealth v. Ananias, the judge ordered the Office to produce its annual certification and calibration worksheets for the Alcotest 9510 devices. The Office produced 1,976 worksheets and represented that the production was complete. The Office had intentionally withheld another 432 worksheets that reported failed annual calibrations. Commonwealth v. Hallinan, 491 Mass. 730, 733 to 743 (2023). That misconduct is the basis of the conclusive presumption in Hallinan.</p> </div> </div>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-key-takeaways">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>In <em>Commonwealth v. Pierre</em>, No. 25-P-1415 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 29, 2026), the Appeals Court upheld the denial of a motion to withdraw a 2015 OUI admission to sufficient facts that the defendant challenged because of the Alcotest 9510 calibration misconduct.</li>

<li>Under <em>Commonwealth v. Hallinan</em>, 491 Mass. 730, 731 (2023), a person whose OUI case included a breath test from an Alcotest 9510 device last calibrated and certified before April 18, 2019, receives a conclusive presumption of egregious government misconduct.</li>

<li>The person must also show a reasonable probability that the person would not have pleaded guilty or admitted to sufficient facts if the person had known of the misconduct. <em>Hallinan</em>, 491 Mass. at 750.</li>

<li>A defendant does not have to show that the breath test final analysis was the “crown jewel” of the Commonwealth’s case, but a judge can deny the motion where the other evidence of intoxication was overwhelming.</li>

<li>A judge evaluates a defendant’s statement about what the defendant would have done under a reasonable person standard. <em>Commonwealth v. Crump</em>, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 307, 317 (2025).</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-related-serpa-law-office-resources">Related Serpa Law Office resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-breath-test-exclusion-ananias-hallinan/"><em>Commonwealth v. Hallinan</em> and Massachusetts Alcotest 9510 Cases</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/dui-motor-vehicle/massachusetts-breathalyzer-defense/">Breathalyzer Defense in Massachusetts</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/dui-motor-vehicle/massachusetts-breath-test-blood-alcohol-science/">Breath Test and Blood Alcohol Science in Massachusetts: The Alcotest 9510, the Regulations, and the Blood Rules</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/massachusetts-breath-test-bac-faqs/">Massachusetts Breath Test and Blood Alcohol Evidence FAQs</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/withdraw-guilty-plea-police-misconduct/">Withdrawing a Guilty Plea After Later-Discovered Police Misconduct</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/dui-motor-vehicle/massachusetts-cahill-second-chance-oui-24d/">Second-Offense OUI and the Cahill Disposition in Massachusetts</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/dui-motor-vehicle/">Massachusetts OUI Defense</a></li>
</ul>
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                <title><![CDATA[Massachusetts Restraining Order and Harassment Prevention Order Appeals: The Week of October 19, 2026]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-restraining-order-appeals-october-2026/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-restraining-order-appeals-october-2026/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 10:06:06 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Domestic Violence and Restraining Orders]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Decisions]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>The Massachusetts Appeals Court decisions on 209A abuse prevention orders and 258E harassment prevention orders from the week of October 19, 2026.</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>October 26, 2026</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the week of October 19, 2026, the Massachusetts Appeals Court decided a group of cases about <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/209a-restraining-orders-lawyer-boston/">abuse prevention orders under G. L. c. 209A</a> and <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/massachusetts-258e-harassment-prevention-order-lawyer/">harassment prevention orders under G. L. c. 258E</a>. One of the decisions, <em>Kehlani K. v. Tripp T.</em>, is a published opinion that applies the coercive control definition the Legislature added to c. 209A in 2024. The others are summary decisions under Appeals Court Rule 23.0, which a court may cite for persuasive value but not as binding precedent.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Together the decisions show how District Court and Probate and Family Court judges apply the two statutes, and how the Appeals Court reviews an extension, a sufficiency challenge, and a criminal charge for violating an order. This article summarizes each decision and the practical point a reader on either side of an order can take from it.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-published-decision-on-coercive-control">The Published Decision on Coercive Control</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>Kehlani K. v. Tripp T.</em>, No. 25-P-960 (Oct. 22, 2026), the Appeals Court <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-209a-coercive-control-kehlani-k/">upheld the one-year extension of an abuse prevention order on a finding of coercive control</a>. The court held that the husband’s repeated presence around the plaintiff’s home, his monitoring of her movements, and his photographing of her calendar formed a pattern he intended to use to compel her to drop the divorce. A plaintiff can prove abuse through coercive control without proving a fear of imminent serious physical harm.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-abuse-prevention-order-extensions-under-chapter-209a">Abuse Prevention Order Extensions Under Chapter 209A</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>S.S. v. A.C.G.</em>, No. 26-P-75 (Oct. 22, 2026), a summary decision, the Appeals Court affirmed the <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-209a-extension-hearing-defense/">extension of an abuse prevention order</a>. A plaintiff who seeks an order or an extension must prove abuse by a preponderance of the evidence, and a fear of imminent serious physical harm must be both reasonable and current. <em>Iamele v. Asselin</em>, 444 Mass. 734 (2005).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The court held that the parties’ relationship and the plaintiff’s affidavits showed a reasonable and current fear of imminent serious physical harm. The court did not decide whether the evidence would have been enough on a coercive control theory alone, noting that coercive control sets a lower threshold than fear of imminent serious physical harm. See <em>Nan N. v. Rex R.</em>, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 601 (2026). As a Rule 23.0 decision, <em>S.S.</em> is persuasive only.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>A.M. v. C.J.M.</em>, No. 25-P-1565 (Oct. 20, 2026), a summary decision, the Appeals Court affirmed the five-year extension of an abuse prevention order. The defendant argued that he lacked reasonable notice of the extension hearing and that the judge denied him a meaningful opportunity to be heard.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The court held that the defendant had two years’ notice of the hearing date because he was present when the court set it, and that he did not request a continuance at the hearing or explain how the late service of the plaintiff’s motion prejudiced him. The court also held that the judge did not limit his cross-examination but instead clarified that the plaintiff was not required to produce privileged medical records.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As a Rule 23.0 decision, <em>A.M.</em> is persuasive only. A respondent who believes a late filing prevents a fair hearing should request a continuance on the record and state the specific prejudice at that time.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-harassment-prevention-orders-under-chapter-258e">Harassment Prevention Orders Under Chapter 258E</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>D.M. v. A.M.</em>, No. 25-P-969 (Oct. 21, 2026), a summary decision, the Appeals Court affirmed the extension of a harassment prevention order. A harassment prevention order under G. L. c. 258E requires three or more acts of willful and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person, committed with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse, or damage to property, that in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse, or damage to property.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The court held that the defendant’s repeated calls and visits to the plaintiff’s workplace and the threatening statements the District Court judge recited were three or more acts of harassment, and that the plaintiff moved to a different work location out of fear. As a Rule 23.0 decision, <em>D.M.</em> is persuasive only.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>E.A. v. A.N.N.</em>, No. 25-P-1436 (Oct. 20, 2026), a summary decision, the Appeals Court affirmed a harassment prevention order and did not decide whether the evidence was sufficient. The defendant argued for the first time on appeal that the evidence did not support the order. The court held that the defendant waived that argument because the judge offered him a hearing on whether the order should issue and the defendant told the judge that he did not object to the order.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As a Rule 23.0 decision, <em>E.A.</em> is persuasive only. A respondent who contests an order must object at the District Court hearing, because a respondent who agrees to the order forfeits a later challenge to the evidence.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-criminal-charges-for-violating-a-protective-order">Criminal Charges for Violating a Protective Order</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>Commonwealth v. Rosenfield</em>, No. 25-P-591 (Oct. 22, 2026), a summary decision, the Appeals Court affirmed a conviction for <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/criminal-violation-258e-harassment-prevention-order-massachusetts/">violating a harassment prevention order under G. L. c. 258E, § 9</a>. The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient because he did not personally install the surveillance cameras that pointed at the protected neighbor’s home.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The court held that the evidence allowed the judge to find that the defendant intended or shared the intent to install the cameras, based on his earlier threat to install cameras so the neighbor would have no privacy, the placement of a camera aimed at her bathroom window and hot tub, and his presence during the installation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth may prove a violation by proving that the defendant intended that another person commit the prohibited act. As a Rule 23.0 decision, <em>Rosenfield</em> is persuasive only.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>Commonwealth v. Griffin</em>, No. 24-P-1404 (Oct. 23, 2026), a summary decision, the Appeals Court affirmed convictions that included <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/assault-and-battery-on-a-family-or-household-member-boston/">assault and battery on a family or household member under G. L. c. 265, § 13M</a>, <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/violation-209a-abuse-prevention-order-massachusetts/">violation of an abuse prevention order under G. L. c. 209A, § 7</a>, and <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/intimidation-of-a-witness-massachusetts-boston-lawyer/">witness intimidation under G. L. c. 268, § 13B</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The court upheld a probation condition of GPS monitoring for the full term of probation. The court held that the judge balanced the Commonwealth’s interest in rehabilitation and public protection against the defendant’s privacy interest and reasonably imposed the condition given the defendant’s violation of the order and his conduct while under earlier supervision.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The court also held that the evidence supported the witness intimidation conviction, because the jury could infer from a letter the defendant sent that he intended to prevent the victim from testifying. As a Rule 23.0 decision, <em>Griffin</em> is persuasive only.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-key-takeaways">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><em>Kehlani K. v. Tripp T.</em>, No. 25-P-960 (Oct. 22, 2026), is a published decision upholding the extension of a 209A abuse prevention order on a finding of coercive control, and a plaintiff can prove abuse through coercive control without proving a fear of imminent serious physical harm.</li>

<li><em>S.S. v. A.C.G.</em> affirmed the extension of a 209A abuse prevention order on a reasonable and current fear of imminent serious physical harm and did not decide whether coercive control alone would have been enough.</li>

<li><em>A.M. v. C.J.M.</em> affirmed a five-year extension of a 209A abuse prevention order and held that a respondent who claims unfair surprise must request a continuance and state the specific prejudice on the record.</li>

<li><em>D.M. v. A.M.</em> affirmed the extension of a 258E harassment prevention order on a finding of three or more acts of harassment, and <em>E.A. v. A.N.N.</em> held that a respondent who tells the judge he does not object to the order forfeits a later sufficiency challenge.</li>

<li><em>Commonwealth v. Rosenfield</em> affirmed a conviction for violating a 258E harassment prevention order where the defendant intended that another person install the cameras, and <em>Commonwealth v. Griffin</em> upheld a full-term GPS probation condition and a witness intimidation conviction.</li>

<li><em>S.S.</em>, <em>A.M.</em>, <em>D.M.</em>, <em>E.A.</em>, <em>Rosenfield</em>, and <em>Griffin</em> are Rule 23.0 summary decisions, so counsel should cite them for persuasive value only and rely on published authority as binding.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-related-serpa-law-office-resources">Related Serpa Law Office resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-209a-coercive-control-kehlani-k/">Coercive Control at a Chapter 209A Extension Hearing: Kehlani K. v. Tripp T.</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/209a-restraining-orders-lawyer-boston/">Massachusetts 209A Restraining Orders (Abuse Prevention Orders): Defense and Plaintiff Representation</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/massachusetts-258e-harassment-prevention-order-lawyer/">Massachusetts 258E Harassment Prevention Orders: Defense and Plaintiff Representation</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/violation-209a-abuse-prevention-order-massachusetts/">Criminal Violation of a 209A Abuse Prevention Order</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/criminal-violation-258e-harassment-prevention-order-massachusetts/">Criminal Violation of a 258E Harassment Prevention Order</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-209a-extension-hearing-defense/">Massachusetts 209A Extension Hearings: Evidence and Burden</a></li>
</ul>
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                <title><![CDATA[When Holding a Person’s ID for a Warrant Check Becomes a Seizure: Commonwealth v. Bennett]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/identification-warrant-check-seizure-bennett/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/identification-warrant-check-seizure-bennett/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 10:06:05 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Decisions]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Search and Seizure]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>In Commonwealth v. Bennett the Appeals Court held that holding a person’s ID for a warrant check was an unlawful seizure and affirmed suppression.</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>October 26, 2026</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On October 19, 2026, the Massachusetts Appeals Court held in <em>Commonwealth v. Bennett</em>, No. 25-P-1445, that a police officer seized a man when the officer took the man’s identification card and held it while calling in a warrant check. Because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion that the man had committed a crime when the seizure occurred, the court held that the seizure was unlawful and affirmed the suppression of the <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/drug-possession-distribution-massachusetts/">suspected fentanyl</a> the police found afterward.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Bennett</em> is an unpublished summary decision under Appeals Court Rule 23.0, so a court may cite it for its persuasive value but not as binding precedent. The decision still shows how a routine street encounter becomes a seizure under settled Supreme Judicial Court law.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-what-happened">What Happened</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The police approached the defendant and asked whether he needed assistance or medical attention. The Appeals Court agreed with the parties and the motion judge that the officers were acting within their community caretaking function when they first approached and spoke with him. The officer then took the defendant’s identification card and held it while requesting a warrant check. The warrant check revealed a warrant, the police arrested the defendant, and a search of his backpack produced the suspected fentanyl.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defendant <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/illegal-searches-and-seizures-massachusetts/">moved to suppress</a> the fentanyl, and a District Court judge allowed the motion. The Commonwealth appealed, and the Appeals Court affirmed the order suppressing the evidence.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-when-a-police-encounter-becomes-a-seizure">When a Police Encounter Becomes a Seizure</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A person is seized by the police when an officer, through words or conduct, communicates that the officer will use police authority to require the person to stay. <em>Commonwealth v. Matta</em>, 483 Mass. 357 (2019).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Appeals Court held that the officer communicated exactly that when the officer took the defendant’s identification card and held it while running the warrant check, because a reasonable person would understand that he had to stay at least until the dispatcher answered. The court relied on <em>Commonwealth v. Lyles</em>, 453 Mass. 811 (2009), in which the Supreme Judicial Court held that an officer seized a person by requesting and taking the person’s identification and calling in a warrant check.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The court held that the calm tone and the brief length of the encounter did not change the result. The defendant was seized the moment the officer took the identification card and called in the warrant check. A seizure requires that the police have <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/police-pursuit-seizure-reasonable-suspicion-palmer/">reasonable suspicion</a> that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. <em>Commonwealth v. Palmer</em>, 498 Mass. 117 (2026). The court held that the police did not have reasonable suspicion of any crime at the moment of the seizure, so the seizure was unlawful.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-community-caretaking-did-not-justify-the-warrant-check">Community Caretaking Did Not Justify the Warrant Check</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The police may approach a person and offer assistance as part of their community caretaking function without seizing the person. A community caretaking encounter becomes a seizure, however, when the officer’s words or conduct communicate that the person must stay. The Appeals Court held that the encounter became a seizure when the officer took and held the identification card to run the warrant check, and that the community caretaking function did not justify that seizure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth argued that the warrant check furthered officer safety. The Appeals Court rejected that argument on this record because the Commonwealth presented no evidence that this defendant posed a specific danger to the officers. The court noted that the Supreme Judicial Court has refused to adopt a blanket rule allowing a patfrisk before transporting a person as community caretaking, and has required a reasonable basis for that more limited step. Because a warrant check is less connected to officer safety than a patfrisk, the Commonwealth needed at least the same justification for the warrant check, and the Commonwealth offered no evidence of one.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-what-the-decision-means-for-a-motion-to-suppress">What the Decision Means for a Motion to Suppress</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A person who hands an officer identification during a street encounter may already be seized once the officer keeps the identification and runs a warrant check. Where the police lack reasonable suspicion of a crime at that moment, a court can suppress the evidence the police find after the warrant check, including evidence found during a search that followed an arrest on a warrant the check revealed. The analysis depends on when the seizure occurred and what the police knew at that moment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A defendant who wants to suppress evidence from this kind of encounter should establish, through the police reports and the officers’ testimony, the exact point at which the officer took the identification and called in the warrant check, and what facts the officer knew at that point. Because <em>Bennett</em> is a Rule 23.0 summary decision, counsel should cite the Supreme Judicial Court decisions it applies, <em>Matta</em>, <em>Lyles</em>, and <em>Palmer</em>, as the binding authority, and cite <em>Bennett</em> only as a persuasive application of those decisions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Attorney Joe Serpa has practiced Massachusetts criminal defense since 1995 and files <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/motion-to-suppress-massachusetts-motor-vehicle-stops/">motions to suppress</a> in drug and firearm cases in the District Court, the Boston Municipal Court, and the Superior Court.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-key-takeaways">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>In <em>Commonwealth v. Bennett</em>, No. 25-P-1445 (Oct. 19, 2026), the Appeals Court held that an officer seized a man by taking and holding his identification card to run a warrant check, and affirmed the suppression of the suspected fentanyl found afterward.</li>

<li>A person is seized when an officer’s words or conduct communicate that the person must stay. <em>Commonwealth v. Matta</em>, 483 Mass. 357 (2019). <em>Commonwealth v. Lyles</em>, 453 Mass. 811 (2009).</li>

<li>A seizure is unlawful unless the police have reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. <em>Commonwealth v. Palmer</em>, 498 Mass. 117 (2026).</li>

<li>A community caretaking encounter becomes a seizure when the officer requires the person to stay, and the Commonwealth must show specific facts to justify a warrant check as furthering officer safety.</li>

<li><em>Bennett</em> is a Rule 23.0 summary decision, so counsel should rely on the Supreme Judicial Court decisions it applies as binding authority and cite <em>Bennett</em> only for its persuasive value.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-related-serpa-law-office-resources">Related Serpa Law Office resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/police-pursuit-seizure-reasonable-suspicion-palmer/">When a Police Chase Becomes a Seizure: Commonwealth v. Palmer</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/motion-to-suppress-massachusetts-motor-vehicle-stops/">A Practitioner’s Guide to the Motion to Suppress in Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Stops</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/categories/search-and-seizure/">Search and Seizure Updates</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/massachusetts-traffic-stop-faqs/">Massachusetts Traffic Stop FAQs: Exit Orders, Searches, and Your Rights</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/drug-possession-distribution-massachusetts/">Drug Distribution, Possession With Intent to Distribute, and Trafficking in Massachusetts</a></li>
</ul>
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                <title><![CDATA[The Age-21 License to Carry Requirement After Bruen: Commonwealth v. Thomson]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-age-21-license-to-carry-thomson/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-age-21-license-to-carry-thomson/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 10:06:04 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Decisions]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>The SJC upheld the age-21 license to carry requirement in Commonwealth v. Thomson under the Bruen test. What it means for a section 10(a) firearm charge.</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>October 26, 2026</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On October 20, 2026, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided <em>Commonwealth v. Thomson</em>, SJC-13856, and upheld the state requirement that a person be at least twenty-one years old to obtain a license to carry a firearm. Mikai Thomson was twenty years old when the police charged him, and he had never applied for a license to carry. A jury convicted him of <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/carrying-possession-gun-firearm-massachusetts-lawyer/carrying-firearm-without-license-massachusetts-269-10a/">carrying a firearm without a license under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a)</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Thomson argued that the age-21 requirement violates the Second Amendment. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the requirement is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and affirmed the conviction. This article explains the licensing requirement, the constitutional challenge, and what the decision means for a young adult charged under § 10 (a).</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-what-massachusetts-law-requires">What Massachusetts Law Requires</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Massachusetts makes it a crime to carry or possess a firearm without a license, unless a statute exempts the conduct. G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). A conviction under § 10 (a) is a felony. A person who wants to carry a firearm must obtain a <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-gun-licensing-after-bruen-nonresidents/">license to carry</a> from a licensing authority, and the firearm licensing statute, G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d), does not allow a person under twenty-one years old to obtain one. A person under twenty-one therefore cannot carry a firearm lawfully outside the narrow settings that the statutes exempt.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Thomson did not hold a license to carry and had never applied for one. Because he was twenty years old at the time, the licensing statute would not have allowed him to obtain a license even if he had applied. He did not challenge a separate assault and battery conviction, so the Supreme Judicial Court addressed only the firearm conviction.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-second-amendment-challenge-and-the-bruen-test">The Second Amendment Challenge and the Bruen Test</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Thomson argued that the age-21 licensing requirement violates the Second Amendment, both on its face and as applied to him. He relied on <em>New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen</em>, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a firearm regulation is constitutional only where the government shows that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under that test, a court first asks whether the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the conduct. Where it does, the government must then identify historical firearm regulations that are relevantly similar to the challenged law. The Supreme Judicial Court assumed, without deciding, that people under twenty-one are among “the people” the Second Amendment protects, and moved to the historical question.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-what-the-supreme-judicial-court-decided">What the Supreme Judicial Court Decided</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Supreme Judicial Court held that the age-21 licensing requirement is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and affirmed Thomson’s conviction under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). The court concluded that restricting the unsupervised possession of firearms by people considered too young to handle them safely fits a long tradition of regulating who may possess firearms. Because the requirement is consistent with that tradition, the court held that it does not violate the Second Amendment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The court assumed that people under twenty-one fall within the Second Amendment’s protected class, so the decision does not hold that young adults have no Second Amendment rights. The decision instead holds that the age-21 licensing requirement survives the historical-tradition test even if those young adults are protected.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-what-the-decision-means-for-a-young-adult-charged-under-section-10-a">What the Decision Means for a Young Adult Charged Under Section 10(a)</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A person under twenty-one who is charged under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) cannot defeat the charge by arguing that the age-21 licensing requirement is unconstitutional, because the Supreme Judicial Court has upheld that requirement. The defense of a § 10 (a) charge instead depends on the facts and the police conduct in the particular case. A defendant can <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/illegal-searches-and-seizures-massachusetts/">challenge the stop, the search, and the seizure</a> that produced the firearm, can contest whether the Commonwealth has proved that the item meets the statutory definition of a firearm, and can contest whether the Commonwealth has proved knowing possession.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The absence of a license to carry is an element of the offense that, like every element, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. A young adult charged under § 10 (a) should have counsel review how the police found the firearm and whether the Commonwealth can prove each element. Attorney Joe Serpa has practiced Massachusetts criminal defense since 1995 and defends <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/carrying-possession-gun-firearm-massachusetts-lawyer/">firearm charges</a> in the District Court, the Boston Municipal Court, and the Superior Court.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-key-takeaways">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>In <em>Commonwealth v. Thomson</em>, SJC-13856 (Oct. 20, 2026), the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the requirement that a person be at least twenty-one years old to obtain a license to carry a firearm.</li>

<li>Massachusetts makes carrying a firearm without a license a felony under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and the licensing statute, G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d), does not allow a person under twenty-one to obtain a license to carry.</li>

<li>The court applied the historical-tradition test from <em>New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen</em>, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and held that the age-21 requirement is consistent with that tradition.</li>

<li>The court assumed, without deciding, that people under twenty-one are among “the people” the Second Amendment protects, so the decision does not deny young adults Second Amendment rights.</li>

<li>A person under twenty-one charged under § 10 (a) cannot defeat the charge by attacking the age-21 requirement, so the defense depends on the stop, the search, and whether the Commonwealth can prove each element.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-related-serpa-law-office-resources">Related Serpa Law Office resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/carrying-possession-gun-firearm-massachusetts-lawyer/carrying-firearm-without-license-massachusetts-269-10a/">Carrying a Firearm Without a License in Massachusetts: G.L. c. 269, § 10(a)</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-gun-licensing-after-bruen-nonresidents/">Massachusetts Gun Licensing After Bruen: Nonresidents and Travelers</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/carrying-possession-gun-firearm-massachusetts-lawyer/">Massachusetts Criminal Defense of Firearms Offenses</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/motion-to-suppress-massachusetts-motor-vehicle-stops/">A Practitioner’s Guide to the Motion to Suppress in Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Stops</a></li>
</ul>
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            <item>
                <title><![CDATA[Coercive Control at a Chapter 209A Extension Hearing: Kehlani K. v. Tripp T.]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-209a-coercive-control-kehlani-k/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-209a-coercive-control-kehlani-k/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 10:05:55 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Domestic Violence and Restraining Orders]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Decisions]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>The Appeals Court applied the 2024 coercive control definition to uphold a 209A abuse prevention order extension in Kehlani K. v. Tripp T.</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>October 26, 2026</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Updated November 4, 2026</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On October 22, 2026, the Massachusetts Appeals Court decided <em>Kehlani K. v. Tripp T.</em>, No. 25-P-960, a published decision applying the <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-209a-coercive-control/">coercive control definition</a> that the Legislature added to the abuse prevention statute, G. L. c. 209A, in 2024. The plaintiff obtained an <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/209a-restraining-orders-lawyer-boston/">abuse prevention order</a> against her husband in the District Court. A District Court judge extended the order for one year at the hearing after notice.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The husband appealed, and the Appeals Court upheld the extension, holding that the plaintiff’s testimony proved abuse by coercive control. This article explains the coercive control definition, the evidence the court found adequate to meet it, and what the decision means for a person on either side of a 209A extension hearing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Appeals Court stated that this case was the first in which it interpreted and applied the coercive control language of G. L. c. 209A, § 1.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-what-the-2024-amendment-added-to-chapter-209a">What the 2024 Amendment Added to Chapter 209A</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The 2024 amendment made coercive control a fourth form of abuse under G. L. c. 209A, § 1. Before the amendment, a plaintiff proved abuse by showing that the defendant caused or attempted physical harm, placed the plaintiff in fear of imminent serious physical harm, or caused the plaintiff to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat, or duress. A plaintiff can now also prove abuse by showing coercive control.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The statute defines coercive control as a pattern of behavior intended to threaten, intimidate, harass, isolate, control, coerce, or compel the compliance of a family or household member that causes that person reasonably to fear physical harm or to have a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy. The statute then lists examples, including isolating the person from friends and relatives, depriving the person of basic needs, monitoring the person’s activities, communications, movements, or finances through technological or other means, and damaging the person’s property. The list gives examples and does not limit the conduct that can qualify.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-evidence-the-appeals-court-found-adequate">The Evidence the Appeals Court Found Adequate</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Appeals Court held that the plaintiff’s credited testimony proved each part of the coercive control definition. The court broke the definition into three questions and answered each one on the hearing record.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">First, the court found a pattern of behavior. Because the statute does not define “pattern,” the court applied the ordinary meaning of the word, a mode of behavior or series of acts that are recognizably consistent. The plaintiff testified that the husband repeatedly intruded into her home and her activities, and the court held that this testimony established a pattern.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The husband did not argue that the plaintiff had proved too few acts. The court therefore left for another day whether a plaintiff must prove some <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-209a-coercive-control/">minimum number of acts</a> to establish a pattern. The court noted that, under the criminal harassment statute, G. L. c. 265, § 43A, a pattern of conduct or series of acts requires proof of three or more incidents. A defendant can argue at a hearing that a plaintiff who describes only one or two incidents has not proved a pattern.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Second, the court found that the husband intended the pattern to coerce or compel the plaintiff’s compliance. The plaintiff testified that the husband maintained a presence in and around her home at all hours of the day and, on at least one occasion, photographed her daily calendar. The court held that this conduct was monitoring of the plaintiff’s activities and movements. The court further held that the husband used the information he gathered to press the plaintiff to drop the divorce, and that a judge may infer intent from conduct even without direct evidence of intent.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Third, the court found that the pattern caused the plaintiff a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy. The plaintiff testified that the husband entered her house through a window, circled her home on foot, blocked her car in the driveway, and appeared to track her movements, and that she feared him for those reasons. The court held that this evidence satisfied the reduced sense of physical safety. The court added that the same evidence satisfied the reduced sense of autonomy, which the court defined as a person’s ability to make significant decisions without concern that making them will expose the person to abuse.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-defendants-due-process-and-confrontation-claims">The Defendant’s Due Process and Confrontation Claims</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The husband argued that the judge denied him a meaningful opportunity to be heard because the plaintiff referred to photographs during her closing argument without offering them in evidence during her testimony. The Appeals Court rejected that argument. A judge has broad discretion over the scope of cross-examination, and in a 209A proceeding the rules of evidence need not be followed as long as the judge is fair in what evidence the judge admits and relies on. See <em>Frizado v. Frizado</em>, 420 Mass. 592 (1995). The court noted that the photographs illustrated subjects on which the husband had already cross-examined the plaintiff at length.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The husband separately argued that the judge wrongly limited the follow-up questions his counsel could ask him. The Appeals Court declined to address that argument because the husband’s brief cited no part of the record and amounted to a bald assertion of error. A party who raises an argument on appeal must cite the parts of the record the party relies on, and a party who does not do so forfeits the argument.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-what-the-decision-means-for-a-209a-extension-hearing">What the Decision Means for a 209A Extension Hearing</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A plaintiff can prove abuse under G. L. c. 209A through coercive control without proving a fear of imminent serious physical harm. Conduct that is not physical, such as repeated surveillance, following, and monitoring, can meet the coercive control definition when it forms a consistent pattern and the defendant intends it to control or compel the plaintiff. A judge may infer the defendant’s intent from the conduct itself.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Before the 2024 amendment, a plaintiff whose spouse tracked her movements and kept showing up at her home generally had to prove a fear of imminent serious physical harm. Under the coercive control definition, that plaintiff can now prove abuse in another way. In this case, the husband monitored the plaintiff to press her to drop the divorce. The decision whether to go forward with a divorce is one of the significant decisions that the court’s definition of autonomy covers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A plaintiff who seeks an order or an extension based on coercive control should build the record on each part of the definition. The plaintiff must show a consistent pattern, an intent to coerce or compel, and a resulting reasonable fear of physical harm or reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A respondent who <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-209a-extension-hearing-defense/">contests an extension</a> should test each part of the definition on the record. The respondent can contest whether the conduct forms a consistent pattern, whether the defendant intended it to coerce or compel the plaintiff, and whether it caused the plaintiff a reasonable and reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A respondent who wants to preserve an evidentiary ruling for appeal must object on the record at the hearing and, in any later brief, cite the part of the record where the ruling occurred. Attorney Joe Serpa has practiced Massachusetts criminal defense since 1995 and represents both <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/how-to-get-209a-restraining-order-massachusetts-plaintiff/">plaintiffs</a> and respondents at abuse prevention hearings in the District Court and the Probate and Family Court.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-key-takeaways">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>In <em>Kehlani K. v. Tripp T.</em>, No. 25-P-960 (Oct. 22, 2026), the Massachusetts Appeals Court upheld the one-year extension of an abuse prevention order on a finding of coercive control.</li>

<li>The 2024 amendment to G. L. c. 209A, § 1 makes coercive control a form of abuse, defined as an intended pattern of controlling behavior that causes a reasonable fear of physical harm or a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy.</li>

<li>The court held that the husband’s repeated presence around the plaintiff’s home, his monitoring of her movements, and his photographing of her calendar formed a pattern he intended to use to compel her to drop the divorce.</li>

<li>The court defined autonomy as a person’s ability to make significant decisions without concern that making them will expose the person to abuse.</li>

<li>A plaintiff can prove abuse through coercive control without proving a fear of imminent serious physical harm, and a judge may infer the defendant’s intent from the defendant’s conduct.</li>

<li>The Appeals Court left open whether a plaintiff must prove a minimum number of acts to establish a pattern of coercive control.</li>

<li>A respondent who wants to challenge an evidentiary ruling on appeal must object at the hearing and cite the record in any later brief.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-related-serpa-law-office-resources">Related Serpa Law Office resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-209a-coercive-control/">What Is Coercive Control Under Massachusetts 209A Law?</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-209a-extension-hearing-defense/">Massachusetts 209A Extension Hearings: Evidence and Burden</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-restraining-order-appeals-october-2026/">Massachusetts Restraining Order and Harassment Prevention Order Appeals: The Week of October 19, 2026</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/209a-restraining-orders-lawyer-boston/">Massachusetts 209A Restraining Orders (Abuse Prevention Orders): Defense and Plaintiff Representation</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/">Massachusetts Restraining Orders and Harassment Prevention Orders</a></li>

<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/fifth-amendment-civil-cases-massachusetts/">The Fifth Amendment at the 209A Restraining Order Hearing and in Civil Cases</a></li>
</ul>
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                <title><![CDATA[Gunshot Residue Evidence in a Massachusetts Murder Trial: Commonwealth v. Williams]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/gunshot-residue-evidence-murder-trial-massachusetts-williams/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/gunshot-residue-evidence-murder-trial-massachusetts-williams/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 19:43:05 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Decisions]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Trial Strategy and Evidence Notes]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>The SJC vacated a murder conviction because jurors heard gunshot residue particle counts from negative tests. What the Commonwealth must prove first.</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>October 19, 2026</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On September 22, 2026, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a judge may not let a jury hear an opinion that gunshot residue particles were found on a defendant as evidence that the defendant fired a gun, unless the Commonwealth first proves that the particle count is reliable evidence of having fired a shot. The jury in the case heard that police found one particle on the defendant’s hand and one on his T-shirt, even though the State Police counted both tests as negative. The Commonwealth’s own expert testified that nothing could be drawn from the results. The court vacated the defendant’s first-degree murder conviction and ordered a new trial.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A Suffolk County jury had convicted Keith Williams in 2017 of murder in the first degree, armed assault with intent to murder, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/carrying-possession-gun-firearm-massachusetts-lawyer/carrying-firearm-without-license-massachusetts-269-10a/">carrying a firearm without a license</a>. The charges arose from a shooting at a parade in Dorchester in August 2014. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated all four convictions. The Commonwealth may retry Williams for murder in the first degree. The decision is <em>Commonwealth v. Williams</em>, SJC-12702 (Mass. Sept. 22, 2026).</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Shooting on Blue Hill Avenue</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the morning of August 23, 2014, a crowd gathered on Blue Hill Avenue in Dorchester to watch a parade. Security cameras recorded two groups of young men with a tense encounter at a convenience store. Shortly afterward, a man in the second group pulled a handgun and pointed it toward the first group. A man in the first group then fired at least five bullets toward him. None of the bullets hit the man with the gun or his companion. One bullet killed a woman crossing the street, and another struck a woman sitting on the median in the leg.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">No witness identified Williams as the shooter. A witness who lived nearby watched Williams and two companions walk away from the scene, heard one companion tell him to “get rid of it,” and saw Williams dispose of a revolver at a house across the street. Police found a .357 revolver under the porch, and ballistic testing linked it to both victims. Tests of the revolver for DNA and fingerprints were inconclusive. Police stopped and handcuffed Williams and the two companions a short distance away.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense at trial was that Williams was not the shooter. Witnesses described the shooter differently, and some of the details did not fit Williams. One defense witness described a shooter whose clothing matched one of the two companions.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Gunshot Residue Tests</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Police collected samples from the hands of all three men at 11:53 A.M., more than three and one half hours after the shooting. Police collected Williams’s T-shirt the next day, and a criminalist collected samples from it thirteen months later. A State Police criminalist examined each sample with a scanning electron microscope. A gunshot residue particle contains three components that are not generally found together in nature. Those components are barium nitrate, lead styphnate, and antimony sulfide.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The State Police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation require three or more particles for a positive test, and a laboratory cannot add up particles found on separate samples. Every test in the case was negative. The criminalist found one particle on one sample from Williams’s hands and one particle on the T-shirt. He found no particles on either companion. The criminalist agreed on cross-examination that there was “nothing to be drawn from” the negative results. He also agreed that the threshold exists in part to account for contamination.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The criminalist testified that gunshot residue particles are resilient and transferable, and that they persist on handcuffs and on surfaces in police cruisers and police stations. Police had handcuffed and transported all three men before collecting the samples.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Trial Judge Admitted the Particle Counts</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Before trial, the Commonwealth asked to present the expert’s testimony that one particle was found on each of the two samples from Williams. The Commonwealth acknowledged that the expert would testify that the results were negative. The Commonwealth cited <em>Commonwealth v. Johnson</em>, 463 Mass. 95, 108-109 (2012), and planned to argue that the jury could infer from the particles that Williams was the shooter.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Williams opposed the request. He argued that the Commonwealth was using a negative result as if it were positive, and that the particles could have come from contamination. He submitted the laboratory report on the T-shirt, which stated that no conclusions could be drawn from the results. He also submitted a Boston police policy stating that it was not yet possible to assess scientifically the significance of a gunshot residue identification. The judge allowed the testimony, ruled that Williams’s objections went to the weight of the evidence, and left it to the jury to decide what inferences to draw.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth then relied on the particles in its <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/massachusetts-opening-statements-closing-arguments/">opening statement and its closing argument</a>. In closing, the prosecutor told the jury that the three-particle threshold was “not [their] protocol” but a State Police standard, and that the jury could interpret the evidence however it wanted.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Reliability Holding</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Supreme Judicial Court held that the judge should not have admitted the testimony as evidence that Williams was the shooter. <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/hsu-abusive-head-trauma-medical-expert-testimony-massachusetts/">Expert testimony</a> is admissible under the <em>Daubert-Lanigan</em> standard only when the party offering it proves that it is reliable. The Commonwealth had to prove that the method is reliable and that the expert applied it reliably to the facts of this case. <em>Commonwealth v. Hinds</em>, 487 Mass. 212, 220 (2021); <em>Commonwealth v. Davis</em>, 487 Mass. 448, 453 (2021).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The court held that the Commonwealth offered no evidence that detecting one particle in each of two negative results reliably showed that Williams fired the gun. The only evidence on the point was its own expert’s statement that nothing could be drawn from the results. The Commonwealth also offered no measure of reliability for the particle counts. The Commonwealth argued that the jury could draw the inference and that Williams’s objections went to weight, but the court held that the Commonwealth had to lay the foundation first.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Court Limits <em>Johnson</em></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth relied on <em>Johnson</em>, in which the Supreme Judicial Court said that the jury could infer a greater likelihood of guilt from two particles found on a sweatshirt. The court explained that in <em>Johnson</em> the defendant did not object to the testimony, and that the court had not decided whether particle counts below the positive threshold are reliable evidence that a person fired a gun. The court disavowed any suggestion in <em>Johnson</em> that such counts support the inference by themselves.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The court did not hold that a below-threshold particle count is always inadmissible. Admissibility depends on the foundation the Commonwealth lays and the inference it asks the jury to draw. The court contrasted <em>Commonwealth v. Linton</em>, 483 Mass. 227, 241-242 (2019), in which an expert showed that a DNA result below a minimum threshold still provided relevant data. The Commonwealth in <em>Williams</em> made no comparable showing.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Error Required a New Trial</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Supreme Judicial Court held that the error was prejudicial. The prosecutor used the particles in both the opening statement and the closing argument. The prosecutor also used them to answer the defense argument that contamination explained the particles. Both companions had also been handcuffed and transported, yet no particles were found on them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth’s other evidence of identity was not overwhelming. Williams was seen with the companions seconds after the shooting and disposing of the revolver, and one witness described the shooter as the largest of the three men. However, no witness or forensic test identified him as the shooter. The strongest description for the Commonwealth also included details that did not fit him. Another witness described a shooter who matched a companion’s appearance. The court could not conclude that the error had little or no effect on the jury, so it ordered a new trial on the murder, armed assault, and assault and battery charges.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Retrial for First-Degree Murder Remains Possible</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Williams also argued that the evidence did not prove deliberate premeditation, which would have barred a retrial for first-degree murder. The court rejected the argument. Deliberate premeditation can form in a few seconds, and the jury could infer from the events that Williams decided to kill the man with the gun before he fired at least five rounds toward him. The Commonwealth may therefore retry him for first-degree murder.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The court separately vacated the conviction for carrying a firearm without a license. The judge had not instructed the jury that the Commonwealth must prove the defendant had no valid license. <em>Commonwealth v. Carleton</em>, 497 Mass. 11, 13 (2026).</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Gunshot Residue Evidence After <em>Williams</em></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When the Commonwealth offers gunshot residue evidence that falls short of a positive result, the defense can <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/trial-motion-practice-massachusetts-criminal-cases/">ask the judge to exclude it</a> unless the Commonwealth proves, before the jury hears it, that it reliably shows what the Commonwealth says it shows. The defense can ask for a hearing under the <em>Daubert-Lanigan</em> standard, often with <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/how-i-use-experts-massachusetts-criminal-case/">a defense expert</a>, and can use the laboratory’s own reports, its protocols, and the expert’s own statements about the threshold.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The decision also shows what a defense lawyer can ask in these cases. When did the police collect the samples? Where was the person held and transported before collection? Did the other people tested have the same contact with handcuffs and cruisers? The expert in <em>Williams</em> agreed that particles persist on those surfaces. The answers can support a motion to exclude the evidence and can support <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/cross-examination-massachusetts-criminal-trials/">cross-examination</a> if the judge admits it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Serpa Law Office defends <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/carrying-possession-gun-firearm-massachusetts-lawyer/">firearms charges</a> in the Boston Municipal Court, the District Court, and the Superior Court. Gunshot residue testing is one of several kinds of forensic evidence that can arise in a firearms case.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>In <em>Commonwealth v. Williams</em>, SJC-12702 (Mass. Sept. 22, 2026), the Supreme Judicial Court vacated a first-degree murder conviction because the jury heard gunshot residue particle counts from negative test results.</li>



<li>The Commonwealth must prove that expert testimony is reliable before the jury hears it, including that the method was reliably applied to the facts of the case.</li>



<li>A laboratory’s own positive threshold, and its expert’s statement that nothing can be drawn from a negative result, can support a motion to exclude particle counts below the threshold.</li>



<li>The court limited <em>Commonwealth v. Johnson</em>, 463 Mass. 95 (2012), and held that below-threshold counts are not automatically admissible as evidence that a person fired a gun.</li>



<li>The court did not bar retrial for first-degree murder, and it separately vacated the license conviction under <em>Commonwealth v. Carleton</em>, 497 Mass. 11, 13 (2026).</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Related Serpa Law Office resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/carrying-possession-gun-firearm-massachusetts-lawyer/">Massachusetts Criminal Defense of Firearms Offenses</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/carrying-possession-gun-firearm-massachusetts-lawyer/carrying-firearm-without-license-massachusetts-269-10a/">Carrying a Firearm Without a License in Massachusetts: G.L. c. 269, § 10(a)</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/when-police-may-frisk-for-gun-massachusetts-vihaan-v/">When Police May Frisk a Person for a Gun in Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Vihaan V.</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/how-i-use-experts-massachusetts-criminal-case/">How I Use Experts in a Massachusetts Criminal Case</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/hsu-abusive-head-trauma-medical-expert-testimony-massachusetts/">Medical Expert Testimony in Massachusetts Criminal Cases: The Hsu Decision on Abusive Head Trauma</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/cross-examination-massachusetts-criminal-trials/">Cross-Examination in Massachusetts Criminal Trials</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/">Massachusetts Criminal Charges Defense</a></li>
</ul>
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                <title><![CDATA[The Effort to Expose Cornell’s Jane Doe: Doxing, Misogyny, and the Law]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/cornell-jane-doe-doxxing-law/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/cornell-jane-doe-doxxing-law/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Sun, 18 Oct 2026 20:40:24 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Trial Strategy and Evidence Notes]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Strangers tried to name Cornell’s Jane Doe, named the wrong women, and sent armed police to her family’s home. What New York and Massachusetts law does about doxing, threats and false police reports.</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It is based on the court’s October 16, 2026 decision in Jane Doe’s civil case, the statutes and decisions cited below, and published news reporting by Reuters, CNN, The Washington Post, Courthouse News and ABC News. Jane Doe’s allegations have not been proved in any court. The men she sued deny them. No criminal charge had been filed as of October 19, 2026.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jane Doe, <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/college-university-student-criminal-defense-lawyer-boston-cambridge/">a former Cornell University student</a>, sued Cornell University, the Chi Phi fraternity, seven fraternity members, and others in New York in September 2026. She alleges that the seven men <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/">sexually assaulted her at the fraternity house</a> in October 2024 <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/voluntary-intoxication-consent-massachusetts-new-york-cornell/">after giving her alcohol and ketamine</a>. The men deny the allegations. No court has decided them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Within days of the filing, strangers on social media began trying to learn her name and publish it. One commentator posted a name and deleted it. Others named the wrong women. Someone leaked her phone number and her family’s address. On the night of October 6, police officers arrived at her family’s home with guns drawn because a caller had falsely reported that someone inside was killing people.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The firm examined <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/cornell-fraternity-rape-case-massachusetts-law/">how the men and the institutions at Cornell failed Jane Doe</a> in an earlier post. This post is about the people who have tried to expose her since she sued. The campaign to identify her is misogyny, and it deserves condemnation on its own. Some of the conduct in that campaign is also a crime or a civil wrong. Some of that conduct is speech the First Amendment protects. A published name, a leaked address, a threat, and a false call to the police are four different acts under the law, and this post explains how a court treats each one.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jane Doe’s lawsuit is pending in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County, which is New York’s trial court. New York law governs her case. The Massachusetts statutes and decisions discussed below show how a Massachusetts court would treat the same conduct. Nothing in this post predicts what a New York court or prosecutor will do about any commentator.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What the Reporting Shows</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Reuters reported on October 3 and 4 that a political commentator had asked his followers earlier that week to name Jane Doe, had posted a name early on October 2, and had deleted the post within hours, saying his point had been made. Reuters could not verify the name. The commentator described publishing it as journalism protected by the First Amendment and said he sympathized with the men over the harassment they had faced. He also told Reuters that he did not want anyone to threaten or harass her.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Washington Post reported on October 17 that posts on X claiming to identify Jane Doe drew more than 87 million views over two weeks. The first posts appeared on September 29, the day after the Tompkins County District Attorney reopened the criminal investigation, and the posts peaked around the weekend of October 3. X’s chatbot, Grok, repeated the purported name in replies to users at least 300 times. Facebook, Instagram and TikTok blocked searches for the name. Her lawyer, Thomas Giuffra, said that users had named at least three different women as Jane Doe. Young men who share a name with one of the defendants were harassed as well.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">CNN reported on October 8 what followed. On October 5, Jane Doe received a text message containing three gun emojis. Callers demanded that she drop the lawsuit. On the night of October 6, someone called the police and reported that people were being killed inside her family’s home. An officer who believed he was responding to an active shooter stopped a car backing out of the driveway. The car was carrying her boyfriend and her brother. Her lawyer said that officers threw her boyfriend to the ground and pointed guns at her father. Her father told the police that his daughter is Jane Doe and that the family was being threatened by people they did not know. Her phone rang without stopping while the officers were still in the house. The next day she taped paper over the windows. The police and the FBI are investigating the false call. The judge sealed the complaint and other filings in the case because of the doxing.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Campaign to Expose Jane Doe Is Misogyny</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A commentator who asks a large audience to find and name a woman who reports a rape has chosen whose life will be exposed. He controls nothing that follows. Strangers decide whether to threaten her, whether to leak her address, and whether to call the police to her house. Other strangers guess wrong, and women who have nothing to do with the case receive the same abuse.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sexualized degradation of a woman who reports a rape is misogyny. She must defend her account while strangers pick over her body, her sexual history, her family and her private life. A public debate about the evidence in her lawsuit does not require that degradation. The men she sued are entitled to a fair trial and to protection from threats. She is entitled to the same fair hearing and the same protection. Respect for the men’s rights does not require cruelty toward the woman who asked a court to hear her claims.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The commentator who posted her name said he did so because her lawsuit named seven men. The lawsuit named the men in a court filing, where they can answer it with lawyers, evidence and a judge. He exposed her to a crowd. Naming a defendant in a complaint and exposing a plaintiff to a crowd are different acts, and his excuse has put a woman, her family, and several uninvolved women in danger.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Doxing is vile. Doxing is not always a crime. The remaining sections explain what the law does about it, and what the law leaves to decency.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Confrontation Rights Belong to a Defendant in a Courtroom</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Some commentators have defended the effort to name Jane Doe as a form of confrontation. The Sixth Amendment gives a criminal defendant <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/alleged-victim-will-not-testify-domestic-violence-massachusetts/">the right to confront the witnesses against him at trial</a>. The United States Supreme Court explained in <em>Crawford v. Washington</em>, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004), that the right guarantees adversarial testing through cross-examination in court. The right belongs to the accused. He exercises it through his lawyer in a courtroom. Spectators, commentators and strangers online have no confrontation right against anyone.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">No one has been charged with a crime in the Cornell case. The Attorney General of New York is investigating. Jane Doe’s case is a civil lawsuit, and the seven men she sued, along with their lawyers, know who she is. The pseudonym shields her from the public, not from the people defending the lawsuit. The defendants have full discovery rights. New York law requires disclosure of all information material and necessary to the case (CPLR 3101), lets each side examine and cross-examine witnesses at depositions (CPLR 3113(c)), and lets the judge limit discovery to prevent unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment or prejudice (CPLR 3103). The defendants lose nothing when the public does not know her name.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A commentator who posts her name online is not confronting a witness. He is exposing a woman to strangers. The firm’s page on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/cross-examination-massachusetts-criminal-trials/">cross-examination in Massachusetts criminal trials</a> explains what confrontation is in a courtroom. Whether a particular publication has First Amendment protection is a separate question, addressed below.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Judge Declined to Gag the Lawyers</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On October 16, 2026, Justice Phaedra Perry-Bond declined to sign an order that one of the seven men proposed in <em>Jane Doe v. Cornell University, Inc.</em>, Index No. 161704/2026. The proposed order would have barred the parties and their lawyers from making statements about the case outside court, including to the media, and from disclosing or republishing certain statements and documents. The judge called the application a possible “side show” meant to distract from the merits of the claims and defenses. She found that the statements the defendant complained of, made by Jane Doe’s lawyer, were expressions of the lawyer’s opinion, that the defendants can answer them, and that a judge can instruct a jury to disregard publicity. She also found the proposed order too broad. She rebuked the defendant’s lawyers for filing another lawyer’s email as an exhibit, ordered the exhibit sealed, gave the parties until October 20 to file redacted papers, warned all counsel against “mudslinging” and possible sanctions, and urged every party to cooperate on safeguards against further doxing and harassment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The ruling follows settled New York law. A gag order is a prior restraint on speech, and a party who asks for one must prove that publicity poses a serious threat to a fair trial and that nothing less restrictive will protect the trial. The Appellate Division reversed a civil gag order on the parties and their lawyers in <em>Cleveland v. Perry</em>, 175 A.D.3d 1017 (4th Dep’t 2019). The Appellate Division also vacated an order restricting a litigant’s letters to his condominium’s owners in <em>Ash v. Board of Managers of the 155 Condominium</em>, 44 A.D.3d 324 (1st Dep’t 2007), because the defendants had not shown a clear and present threat to the administration of justice. A federal judge likewise denied a gag order on the parties, lawyers and witnesses in Andrea Constand’s civil sexual assault case against Bill Cosby. <em>Constand v. Cosby</em>, 229 F.R.D. 472 (E.D. Pa. 2005). Lawyers in the Cornell case are bound by Rule 3.6 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, 22 NYCRR § 1200.0, which prohibits a lawyer in a pending matter from making a public statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the proceeding. Justice Perry-Bond wrote that lawyers bound by that rule should not need a gag order to litigate the case properly.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two points follow for the people outside the case. First, a gag order binds the parties and their lawyers. A nonparty is bound by a court’s injunction only when the nonparty knows of the order and acts as a party’s agent or in collusion with a party. <em>Ricatto v. Ricatto</em>, 4 A.D.3d 514, 515 (2d Dep’t 2004). The judge’s sealing orders restrict access to court records. They do not order the public to stop discussing the case. Second, the refusal to gag the lawyers gives no commentator a right to expose Jane Doe. Justice Perry-Bond declined the gag order and, in the same decision, urged the parties to protect Jane Doe from doxing.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Truthful Reporting and the First Amendment</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The United States Supreme Court has twice protected the publication of a rape victim’s name. In <em>Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn</em>, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975), the Court held that Georgia could not punish a television station for broadcasting the name of a rape victim that a reporter had copied from court records open to the public. In <em>The Florida Star v. B.J.F.</em>, 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989), the Court reversed a damages award against a newspaper that had printed a rape victim’s name from a police report, and held that a state may punish the publication of truthful, lawfully obtained information only under a law narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Those decisions mean that a court cannot treat the publication of a sexual assault complainant’s name as a crime in every case. They do not protect every way of obtaining a name, every act that accompanies the publication, or the threats that follow. A court deciding whether a particular commentator broke the law asks how he obtained the information, what he published with it, what he asked his audience to do, and which statute applies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The constitutional right to publish also does not answer the question of decency. A publisher may have a legal right to print a name and every reason to withhold the name. A commentator can report on Cornell’s failures and argue about the evidence in the lawsuit without naming Jane Doe, publishing her address, or sending an audience to her family’s door.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">New York Law on a Victim’s Identity, Threats, Stalking, and False Reports</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">New York Civil Rights Law § 50-b requires public officers and employees to keep confidential the records that identify the victim of a sex offense, subject to exceptions, and allows a court to restrict further disclosure by the people authorized to receive those records. The statute binds officials. It does not prohibit a private person from publishing a name he learned from another source.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">New York Penal Law § 240.30 criminalizes a communication that threatens physical harm when the sender intends to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm the recipient and knows or reasonably should know that the communication will cause reasonable fear of harm. <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/threats-to-commit-a-crime-massachusetts/">A prosecution for a threat</a> must also satisfy the First Amendment. In <em>Counterman v. Colorado</em>, 600 U.S. 66 (2023), the Supreme Court held that the prosecution must prove at least that the speaker consciously disregarded a substantial risk that the communication would be understood as threatening violence. A prosecutor who charges the person who sent Jane Doe three gun emojis must prove that state of mind.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">New York Penal Law § 120.45 criminalizes stalking in the fourth degree. The prosecution must prove an intentional course of conduct directed at a specific person, undertaken without a legitimate purpose, that the defendant knows or reasonably should know is likely to cause reasonable fear of material harm to that person’s physical health, safety or property, or that causes material harm to the person’s mental or emotional health by following, calling or contacting the person after the person has clearly told the defendant to stop. A single post naming Jane Doe is not a course of conduct. Repeated calls to her phone after she asked the caller to stop can be a course of conduct.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A person who knowingly makes a false report of a crime or emergency to the police commits a crime under New York Penal Law § 240.50. The police and the FBI are investigating the caller who sent armed officers to Jane Doe’s family home.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">How Massachusetts Law Treats the Same Conduct</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Massachusetts gives every person a statutory right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with privacy under G.L. c. 214, § 1B, and the Superior Court may enforce that right in equity and award damages. The Supreme Judicial Court confirmed in <em>Polay v. McMahon</em>, 468 Mass. 379, 382 (2014), that a plaintiff must prove an interference that is both unreasonable and either substantial or serious. A judge weighing a claim under § 1B asks what was disclosed, how private it was, and how the defendant obtained it. Publishing a woman’s home address and phone number so that strangers can reach her is a far more serious interference than repeating a name. New York recognizes no comparable claim. The New York Court of Appeals declined to recognize a common-law right of privacy in <em>Howell v. New York Post Co.</em>, 81 N.Y.2d 115, 123 (1993), so a Massachusetts privacy claim has no counterpart in Jane Doe’s case.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/massachusetts-criminal-harassment-defense/">Massachusetts criminalizes a willful and malicious pattern of conduct or series of acts</a>, directed at a specific person over a period of time, that seriously alarms that person and would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress. G.L. c. 265, § 43A(a). A person convicted of criminal harassment for a first offense faces up to two and one-half years in a house of correction, a fine of up to $5,000, or both. The Supreme Judicial Court upheld criminal harassment convictions in <em>Commonwealth v. Johnson</em>, 470 Mass. 300, 309-313 (2014), where the defendants posted false online advertisements that sent strangers to the victims’ home. The court held that the defendants’ speech was an integral part of their criminal conduct and that harassment carried out through third parties is still harassment by the person who set it in motion. In <em>Commonwealth v. Bigelow</em>, 475 Mass. 554, 563-566 (2016), the court reversed a conviction based on letters criticizing a town official, because the letters were political speech. The court distinguished <em>Johnson</em>, where the defendants had used speech to recruit others to commit the harassment. The firm’s post on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/criminal-harassment-258e-first-amendment-massachusetts/">First Amendment limits in Massachusetts criminal harassment and 258E cases</a> explains the line between the two decisions. A judge or jury judges a commentator who invites a crowd to find a woman, and the strangers who then call her, on the pattern, the purpose and the content of what each of them did. Recruiting strangers to harass a person is the conduct the court punished in <em>Johnson</em>. A single truthful statement is not criminal harassment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A Massachusetts woman in Jane Doe’s position could also ask a court for <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/massachusetts-258e-harassment-prevention-order-lawyer/">a harassment prevention order under G.L. c. 258E</a> against any person she can identify. A judge issues the order when the plaintiff proves three or more acts of willful and malicious conduct aimed at her, committed with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property, that did cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property. The firm’s page on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/how-to-get-258e-harassment-prevention-order-massachusetts-plaintiff/">how a plaintiff gets a 258E harassment prevention order</a> explains the hearing and the proof. Anonymous accounts are the practical obstacle, and the firm’s post on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/anonymous-emails-stalking-harassment-prevention-order-hayes/">proving who sent anonymous emails in a Massachusetts stalking case</a> explains how prosecutors trace a message to its sender.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A false report of a crime to the police is a crime in Massachusetts under G.L. c. 269, § 13A. A person convicted of it faces a fine of $100 to $500, imprisonment for up to one year, or both.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What a Person Who Is Being Threatened Should Do</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A person who receives threats should keep the complete messages, the original files, the dates and times, the account names and the links, and should call the police at once when a threat describes violence. Lawyers and investigators need proof of who did what and when. Reposting a victim’s name or address, even to condemn the person who published it, exposes the victim again. The firm’s <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/massachusetts-text-message-phone-evidence-faqs/">text message and phone evidence FAQs</a> explain how a court decides who wrote a message and what it meant.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jane Doe’s allegations deserve a fair examination in court. Filing a lawsuit should not cost her safety, her family’s safety, or her privacy. People can argue about the evidence in her case without helping strangers find her. The law punishes the threats, the false police report, and any pattern of harassment. The rest is a question of decency, and the people who tried to expose her have none.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Jane Doe sued Cornell University, the Chi Phi fraternity, seven fraternity members, and others in September 2026 under a pseudonym. Since then, strangers have posted a purported name, named at least three other women as Jane Doe, leaked her family’s address, threatened her, and sent armed police to her family’s home with a false report. The men deny her allegations, and no court has decided them.</li>


<li>The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation belongs to a criminal defendant at trial. <em>Crawford v. Washington</em>, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The men Jane Doe sued know who she is and have full civil discovery rights. No spectator or commentator has a right to confront her.</li>


<li>On October 16, 2026, Justice Phaedra Perry-Bond declined to gag the lawyers and parties, called the application a possible “side show,” and urged the parties to cooperate against doxing. New York treats a gag order as a prior restraint that requires proof of a serious threat to a fair trial. <em>Cleveland v. Perry</em>, 175 A.D.3d 1017 (4th Dep’t 2019). A court order binds a nonparty only when the nonparty acts as a party’s agent or in collusion with a party. <em>Ricatto v. Ricatto</em>, 4 A.D.3d 514 (2d Dep’t 2004).</li>


<li>The First Amendment protects the publication of a rape victim’s name obtained from public records or other lawful sources. <em>Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn</em>, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). <em>The Florida Star v. B.J.F.</em>, 491 U.S. 524 (1989). It does not protect threats, a false report to the police, or a pattern of harassment.</li>


<li>New York criminalizes threatening communications (Penal Law § 240.30), stalking (§ 120.45), and false reports to the police (§ 240.50). A threat prosecution must prove at least recklessness about the threatening character of the message. <em>Counterman v. Colorado</em>, 600 U.S. 66 (2023).</li>


<li>Massachusetts criminalizes a pattern of harassment under G.L. c. 265, § 43A, including harassment carried out by recruiting strangers. <em>Commonwealth v. Johnson</em>, 470 Mass. 300 (2014). A victim may seek a 258E harassment prevention order against an identified harasser. A privacy claim under G.L. c. 214, § 1B requires an unreasonable and substantial or serious interference. <em>Polay v. McMahon</em>, 468 Mass. 379 (2014).</li>


<li>A person who receives threats should preserve every message and call the police when a threat describes violence. No one should repost a victim’s name or address, even to condemn the people who published it.</li>

</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Related Serpa Law Office resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/cornell-fraternity-rape-case-massachusetts-law/">How the Men of Cornell University Failed Jane Doe: The Cornell Fraternity Rape Case Under New York and Massachusetts Law</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/voluntary-intoxication-consent-massachusetts-new-york-cornell/">Voluntary Intoxication and Consent After the Cornell Case: The New York Rule and the Massachusetts Rule</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/consent-massachusetts-sexual-assault-law/">Consent in Massachusetts Rape and Sexual Assault Cases</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/anonymous-emails-stalking-harassment-prevention-order-hayes/">Proving Who Sent Anonymous Emails in a Massachusetts Stalking Case: Commonwealth v. Hayes</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/criminal-harassment-258e-first-amendment-massachusetts/">First Amendment Limits in Massachusetts Criminal Harassment and 258E Cases</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/how-to-get-258e-harassment-prevention-order-massachusetts-plaintiff/">How to Get a Harassment Prevention Order in Massachusetts Under G.L. c. 258E: The Three Acts, the Affidavit, and the Hearing</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/sandra-birchmore-matthew-farwell-federal-trial/">When the Police Protect and Serve Only Themselves: Sandra Birchmore and the Federal Trial of Matthew Farwell</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/cross-examination-massachusetts-criminal-trials/">Cross-Examination in Massachusetts Criminal Trials</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/massachusetts-text-message-phone-evidence-faqs/">Massachusetts Text Message and Phone Evidence FAQs</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/">Sexual Assault and Rape Defense in Massachusetts</a></li>

</ul>

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                <title><![CDATA[When the Police Protect and Serve Only Themselves: Sandra Birchmore and the Federal Trial of Matthew Farwell]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/sandra-birchmore-matthew-farwell-federal-trial/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/sandra-birchmore-matthew-farwell-federal-trial/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 01:27:13 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Trial Strategy and Evidence Notes]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It is based on the superseding indictment, the public rulings of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the Stoughton Police Department’s public statements about its internal affairs investigation, and&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It is based on the superseding indictment, the public rulings of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the Stoughton Police Department’s public statements about its internal affairs investigation, and published news reporting on the trial. Matthew Farwell has pleaded not guilty and is presumed innocent. An indictment is an accusation and not evidence. William Farwell and Robert Devine have not been charged with any crime and have denied wrongdoing. Reading this post does not create an attorney-client relationship. This may constitute attorney advertising.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Update, November 10, 2026: The jury found Mr. Farwell guilty on both counts. Our <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/matthew-farwell-verdict-sandra-birchmore/">post on the verdict</a> explains the evidence, the elements of each count and how the jury likely reached its verdict.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sandra Birchmore was 23 years old and eight to ten weeks pregnant when she died in her apartment in Canton on February 1, 2021. She worked as an instructional assistant at a school. She had told her friends for years that she wanted to be a mother, and she had told the man she believed was the father that she was keeping the baby.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Police found her body three days later, on February 4, 2021, with a duffel bag strap around her neck tied to a closet door handle. The State Police detectives assigned to the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office and the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner ruled her death a suicide.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Three and a half years later, on August 28, 2024, FBI agents arrested Matthew Farwell, a former Stoughton police detective, in Revere. A federal grand jury had charged him with killing Ms. Birchmore to keep her from reporting that he had been having sex with her since she was 15 years old.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">His trial is now under way in the Moakley Federal Courthouse in Boston before Chief Judge Denise J. Casper of the United States District Court. The lawyers delivered their opening statements on October 9, 2026. Testimony began on October 13, and the trial is expected to last about five weeks.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mr. Farwell has pleaded not guilty. His lawyer told the jury that he had an affair with Ms. Birchmore, that he made regrettable mistakes, and that she took her own life after he ended the relationship.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is the first in a series of posts on the trial. It describes who Sandra Birchmore was, the three Stoughton police officers who, according to the department’s own investigation, had sexual relationships with her, the telephone call a friend made to the Stoughton police twelve days before she died, the investigation that closed her death as a suicide, the federal charges that reopened it, and what the jury must decide.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is written from her side. Attorney Serpa’s view is that the men who were sworn to protect her failed her while she was alive, and that the investigators who were supposed to speak for her after her death failed her a second time.</p>



<h2 id="h-sandra-birchmore" class="wp-block-heading">Sandra Birchmore</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sandra Birchmore grew up in Stoughton and admired police officers from the time she was a child. She applied to join the Stoughton Police Explorers in March 2010, when she was 12 years old. The Explorers was a program the police department ran to teach local teenagers about careers in law enforcement. She stayed in the program until about 2016.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The officers who ran the program were her instructors and her mentors. A Stoughton police sergeant testified at the trial that she was impressionable and looked up to the police.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By 2020 she was living alone in an apartment in Canton and working as an instructional assistant at a school. Her friends testified that she talked constantly about wanting to be a mother. One friend called her phone her third hand because she was never without it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sandra spent Thanksgiving and Christmas of 2020 alone. She learned in December 2020 that she was pregnant. She believed that Mr. Farwell was the father, and she told him so. She was eight to ten weeks pregnant with a boy when she died.</p>



<h2 id="h-the-three-stoughton-officers" class="wp-block-heading">The Three Stoughton Officers</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Matthew Farwell was a volunteer with the Explorers before the Stoughton Police Department hired him in March 2012, and he became an instructor in the program when he joined the department.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In September 2022, after an 18-month internal affairs investigation, Stoughton Police Chief Donna McNamara announced that three officers of her department had sexual relationships with Ms. Birchmore. According to the department’s findings, Mr. Farwell’s sexual relationship with her began in 2013, when she was 15 and he was 27.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">His twin brother, William Farwell, who was also a Stoughton officer, and Robert Devine, a former deputy chief who had run the Explorers program when the Farwell brothers were themselves teenage participants, had sexual relationships with her when she was an adult.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">All three men resigned. Chief McNamara said that they had violated their oaths of office and should never again have the privilege of serving any community as police officers. She said the department’s investigation found that the three men misled the investigators who looked into Ms. Birchmore’s death.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">She asked the Massachusetts Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission to decertify all three. Mr. Farwell has been decertified and is barred from police work in Massachusetts. The department shut down the Explorers program in 2022. Ms. Birchmore’s estate has sued Matthew Farwell, William Farwell and Robert Devine for wrongful death.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The federal grand jury’s allegations go further than the department’s findings. The superseding indictment alleges that Mr. Farwell had sexual intercourse and other sex acts with Ms. Birchmore before she turned 16 and continued until early 2021.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It alleges that he had sex with her during shifts when the Town of Stoughton was paying him to work as a police officer and that he concealed that conduct from the department. Prosecutors told the jury that investigators recovered about 40,000 messages between the two of them from her devices, and that the relationship was built on secrecy and control.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Massachusetts, sexual intercourse with a child under 16 is <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/">rape of a child</a> under G.L. c. 265, § 23. The child’s consent is not a defense. A person convicted under § 23 faces imprisonment in state prison for life or for any term of years. The Commonwealth may indict a person for rape of a child at any time after the offense. G.L. c. 277, § 63.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office received the Stoughton Police Department’s findings in 2022. No Massachusetts prosecutor has charged Mr. Farwell with rape of a child or with any other crime.</p>



<h2 id="h-the-pregnancy-and-the-call-to-the-stoughton-police" class="wp-block-heading">The Pregnancy and the Call to the Stoughton Police</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ms. Birchmore told Mr. Farwell in December 2020 that she was pregnant and that he was the father. According to court papers filed by prosecutors, she told him that she was keeping the baby and that the birth certificate was going to be signed, and he answered that she was the worst person on the face of the earth.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Over the following weeks she sent him messages about her due date, her ultrasounds and her doctor’s appointments. A friend testified at the trial that Ms. Birchmore said Mr. Farwell shoved her to the ground when she asked whether he would sign the birth certificate, and that he refused because, he said, the child was not his.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On January 20, 2021, a friend of Ms. Birchmore’s called the Stoughton Police Department and told a department employee that Mr. Farwell had been having sex with her. The friend did the right thing. She reported the officer to his own department.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to the indictment, a department employee then told Mr. Farwell about the call. Prosecutors told the jury that Mr. Farwell decided to kill Ms. Birchmore after he learned of the call. Twelve days later she was dead.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">DNA testing after her death showed that Mr. Farwell was not the biological father of the child. The indictment does not allege that he was. It alleges that she told him he was. The federal charge depends on what he intended when he went to her apartment, not on the paternity of the child.</p>



<h2 id="h-february-1-2021" class="wp-block-heading">February 1, 2021</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mr. Farwell asked to visit Ms. Birchmore on the evening of February 1, 2021. Surveillance video from her building shows him walking into the lobby that evening and leaving about 30 minutes later.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Minutes before he left, her phone stopped moving. It stayed where it was until the battery died. Police found her body three days later. There was no suicide note.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The grand jury alleges that Mr. Farwell strangled her and then arranged her apartment to make her death look like a suicide. The defense says that he went there to end the relationship, told her the baby was not his, and left her alive.</p>



<h2 id="h-the-investigation-that-called-her-death-a-suicide" class="wp-block-heading">The Investigation That Called Her Death a Suicide</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">State Police detectives assigned to the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office and Canton police officers investigated the death. Trooper Matthew Dunne testified that he interviewed Mr. Farwell in a parking lot soon after the death and that Mr. Farwell admitted going to the apartment that night.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mr. Farwell told investigators that the affair began when Ms. Birchmore was 22 and lasted less than a year. Trooper Dunne testified that he did not treat the death as suspicious. The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner ruled the manner of death a suicide.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 2022 the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office said that its investigation found no evidence of foul play. Chief McNamara testified that she first saw the lobby video of Mr. Farwell when it was published online.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The people who loved Ms. Birchmore never accepted the ruling. Her family said that she was not suicidal and never believed that she killed herself. A friend testified that she went to the police after the death and urged them to investigate Mr. Farwell. Chief McNamara said in 2022 that her department’s investigation was not a death investigation, but that she had come to believe Ms. Birchmore’s death was probably not a suicide and that Mr. Farwell was probably responsible.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Federal investigators took up the case in 2024. A medical expert consulted by federal prosecutors found that Ms. Birchmore’s injuries were not consistent with suicide. In April 2026 the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner withdrew its suicide finding and changed the manner of death to undetermined.</p>



<h2 id="h-why-the-case-is-in-federal-court" class="wp-block-heading">Why the Case Is in Federal Court</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office prosecutes murder in Norfolk County. The office presents the case to a <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-process/indictments-and-grand-juries/">grand jury</a> and tries the indictment in Norfolk Superior Court. The office accepted the suicide ruling and brought no case.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The United States Attorney’s Office charged Mr. Farwell instead, under a federal statute that makes it a crime to kill a person in order to stop that person from reporting a federal crime. Massachusetts has its own <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/intimidation-of-a-witness-massachusetts-boston-lawyer/">witness intimidation statute</a>, G.L. c. 268, § 13B, and its own <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/strangulation-or-suffocation-massachusetts-lawyer/">strangulation statute</a>, G.L. c. 265, § 15D. The Commonwealth has used neither.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Count One charges Mr. Farwell under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) with killing a witness or victim. The jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he killed Ms. Birchmore with malice aforethought, which is the state of mind required for murder, and with the intent to prevent her, or anyone else, from telling a law enforcement officer about the commission or possible commission of a federal offense.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The indictment names three federal offenses that it alleges he wanted to hide. The first is deprivation of rights under color of law, 18 U.S.C. § 242, which punishes a police officer who uses his official position to violate a person’s constitutional rights. The second is coercion and enticement, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), which punishes an adult who uses a phone or the internet to persuade a child under 18 to engage in sexual activity that is a crime. The third is wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, based on the allegation that he collected his police pay for hours he spent with her and concealed that from the department.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The statute requires the government to prove a federal connection. The Supreme Court held in <em>Fowler v. United States</em>, 563 U.S. 668 (2011), that where a defendant kills to prevent communication with law enforcement generally, the government must show a reasonable likelihood that at least one relevant communication would have been made to a federal officer. Before trial, Judge Casper denied Mr. Farwell’s motion to dismiss the indictment, including his argument that the indictment failed to allege a federal connection.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Count Two, added by a superseding indictment on October 28, 2025, charges Mr. Farwell under the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1841, with causing the death of the child in utero during the killing. The statute does not require the government to prove that he knew she was pregnant.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If the jury convicts Mr. Farwell on either count, the judge must sentence him to life in prison. On January 20, 2026, the Department of Justice notified the court that it would not seek the death penalty. Mr. Farwell has been held without bail since his arrest, at a detention facility in Rhode Island. On October 1, 2026, Judge Casper denied his motion to move the trial to Rhode Island.</p>



<h2 id="h-what-the-jury-must-decide" class="wp-block-heading">What the Jury Must Decide</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The central dispute at trial is how Sandra Birchmore died. The government says Mr. Farwell strangled her. The defense says she hanged herself. Judge Casper ruled in September 2026 that the government’s medical experts may testify that she was strangled, that the defense may present evidence of her mental health history, and that her journals, text messages and social media posts are admissible.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Assistant United States Attorney Torey Cummings told the jury that Mr. Farwell first had sex with Ms. Birchmore when she was 15 and he was 27, that he used her admiration for police officers to control her for the rest of her life, and that he killed her after her friend’s call to the police department, because he feared that she would expose him.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">She said that Ms. Birchmore held information that could end his career and his freedom, and that he ended her life first. She told the jury that the government’s medical witnesses will testify that Ms. Birchmore’s injuries are far more consistent with homicide than with suicide, and that Mr. Farwell counted on everyone who saw a vulnerable young woman tied to a door handle to assume that she had killed herself.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Defense attorney Kimberly Stevens told the jury that Mr. Farwell had an affair with Ms. Birchmore and made regrettable mistakes, but did not kill her. She said that he went to the apartment that night to end the relationship and told her the baby was not his, and that Ms. Birchmore, alone, with a few dollars in her bank account, and abandoned by the man she loved, took her own life.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">She told the jury that no forensic evidence of Mr. Farwell was found under Ms. Birchmore’s fingernails, that FBI meeting notes recorded that federal examiners at first saw no evidence contradicting the suicide finding, and that Ms. Birchmore had attempted suicide once as a young teenager.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The jury will decide one question, whether the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Farwell killed Ms. Birchmore to silence her. The question of what the adults around her owed her is different, and the answer is already in the public record.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Stoughton Police Department’s own investigation found that a 27-year-old officer who was her instructor began a sexual relationship with her when she was 15, and that two more officers of the same department had sexual relationships with her when she was an adult.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A friend reported the relationship to the police. Someone at the department then told the officer. Police found Ms. Birchmore dead three days after that officer visited her apartment. The state investigators accepted that she had killed herself, and the Commonwealth closed the case.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Those facts are established whatever the jury decides about the night of February 1, 2021. No Massachusetts prosecutor has charged anyone for any of them.</p>



<h2 id="h-the-trial-schedule-and-what-comes-next" class="wp-block-heading">The Trial Schedule and What Comes Next</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jury selection began on October 6, 2026, from a pool of more than 400 prospective jurors who completed questionnaires. The lawyers delivered their opening statements on October 9. Testimony began on October 13 and is expected to continue into November. Federal courts do not allow cameras, so there is no video of the trial.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The witness lists include William Farwell. Later posts will cover the medical testimony on how Ms. Birchmore died, the <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/cross-examination-massachusetts-criminal-trials/">cross-examination</a> of the investigators who ruled her death a suicide, and the verdict.</p>



<h2 id="h-key-takeaways" class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Sandra Birchmore was 23 years old and eight to ten weeks pregnant when she died in Canton on February 1, 2021. State investigators and the medical examiner ruled her death a suicide. In April 2026 the medical examiner changed the manner of death to undetermined.</li>



<li>The Stoughton Police Department’s internal investigation found in 2022 that three of its officers had sexual relationships with Ms. Birchmore, whom they met through the department’s Explorers program when she was 12, and that Matthew Farwell’s relationship with her began when she was 15 and he was 27. All three resigned. No Massachusetts prosecutor has charged any of them.</li>



<li>Twelve days before she died, a friend reported the relationship to the Stoughton police. The indictment alleges that a department employee told Mr. Farwell about the call.</li>



<li>A federal grand jury charged Matthew Farwell with killing Ms. Birchmore to prevent her from reporting federal crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), and with causing the death of her unborn child, 18 U.S.C. § 1841. If the jury convicts him on either count, the judge must sentence him to life in prison. The government is not seeking the death penalty.</li>



<li>The trial before Chief Judge Denise J. Casper began with opening statements on October 9, 2026, and is expected to last about five weeks. The central dispute is whether Ms. Birchmore was strangled or died by suicide.</li>



<li>Mr. Farwell has pleaded not guilty. His lawyer concedes the affair and denies the killing.</li>
</ul>



<h2 id="h-related-serpa-law-office-resources" class="wp-block-heading">Related Serpa Law Office resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/cornell-jane-doe-doxxing-law/">The Effort to Expose Cornell’s Jane Doe: Doxing, Misogyny, and the Law</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/cornell-fraternity-rape-case-massachusetts-law/">How the Men of Cornell University Failed Jane Doe: The Cornell Fraternity Rape Case Under New York and Massachusetts Law</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/">Sexual Assault and Rape Defense in Massachusetts</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/consent-massachusetts-sexual-assault-law/">Consent in Massachusetts Rape and Sexual Assault Cases</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/intimidation-of-a-witness-massachusetts-boston-lawyer/">Intimidation of a Witness (G.L. c. 268, § 13B)</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/strangulation-or-suffocation-massachusetts-lawyer/">Strangulation or Suffocation in Massachusetts (G.L. c. 265, § 15D)</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-process/indictments-and-grand-juries/">Massachusetts Grand Jury Indictments: How Superior Court Cases Begin</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/massachusetts-opening-statements-closing-arguments/">Opening Statements and Closing Arguments in Massachusetts Criminal Trials</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/cross-examination-massachusetts-criminal-trials/">Cross-Examination in Massachusetts Criminal Trials</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/massachusetts-text-message-phone-evidence-faqs/">Massachusetts Text Message and Phone Evidence FAQs</a></li>
</ul>
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            <item>
                <title><![CDATA[Proving Who Sent Anonymous Emails in a Massachusetts Stalking Case: Commonwealth v. Hayes]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/anonymous-emails-stalking-harassment-prevention-order-hayes/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/anonymous-emails-stalking-harassment-prevention-order-hayes/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 14:57:08 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Domestic Violence and Restraining Orders]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Decisions]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Trial Strategy and Evidence Notes]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center October 16, 2026 On September 24, 2026, the Massachusetts Appeals Court upheld the convictions of a man who pursued a woman he met in high school for about fifteen years, violated the harassment prevention order she obtained against him, and threatened her family in emails sent&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>October 16, 2026</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On September 24, 2026, the Massachusetts Appeals Court upheld the convictions of a man who pursued a woman he met in high school for about fifteen years, violated the <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/massachusetts-258e-harassment-prevention-order-lawyer/">harassment prevention order</a> she obtained against him, and threatened her family in emails sent from other women’s accounts. A Middlesex Superior Court jury convicted Michael Hayes, who represented himself at trial, of <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/stalking-criminal-harassment-massachusetts/">stalking</a>, <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/massachusetts-criminal-harassment-defense/">criminal harassment</a>, <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/criminal-violation-258e-harassment-prevention-order-massachusetts/">violating a harassment prevention order</a>, witness intimidation, identity fraud, attempted identity fraud, and unauthorized access to a computer system. The decision is <em>Commonwealth v. Hayes</em>, Nos. 25-P-347 and 25-P-607 (Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 24, 2026).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On appeal, the defendant argued that the police exceeded the search warrant for his phone, that the judge’s instructions about anonymous emails lowered the Commonwealth’s burden of proof, and that a mailing he sent from jail to a witness was protected speech. The Appeals Court rejected each of those arguments. The Commonwealth separately appealed the judge’s decision, almost two years after the original sentencing, to reduce the defendant’s sentence. The Appeals Court upheld the reduction.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Contact, the Harassment Prevention Orders, and the Threats</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defendant met the woman in 2005, when they were high school juniors. She declined his request for a date and offered to be friends. He called her repeatedly, told her he loved her, waited outside her classes, and followed her around school. When she asked him to leave her alone, he yelled and swore at her until other people intervened. At a meeting with school officials and his parents, the defendant was told to leave her alone. He kept contacting her with notes and emails. After she went to college, his emails used profanity and became angry and threatening.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 2009, the woman found her car keyed from top to bottom. She reported the damage to the police and obtained an order requiring the defendant to stay away from her. A few years later he twice approached her at a gym. She gave up her membership. In December 2015, while he was hospitalized after a stroke, the defendant emailed her at work to say that he would not stalk her but would always love her. She then obtained a one-year harassment prevention order that barred all direct and indirect contact.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">During that year the woman received emails that apparently came from the defendant through anonymous addresses. The emails threatened suicide, blamed her family, and asked her to have the order lifted. The defendant also told her mother on Facebook that the order was ruining his hopes of a career in law enforcement, and that he would make the family come back to court every year to renew the order. In December 2016, the woman obtained a permanent harassment prevention order.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">After she obtained the permanent order, the woman began receiving alerts about attempts to log in to her social media accounts. In March 2019, a stranger who described himself as a hacker texted her that someone had tried to hire him to break into her Facebook and Google accounts. She reported the text to the police. In November 2019, she received five unanswered calls in quick succession, the last from a number she connected to the defendant. The police then obtained a warrant for his arrest and a search warrant for his electronic devices.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">After the police searched his devices, the defendant was charged with violating the harassment prevention order. The threats continued while that charge was pending. One email told the woman that the sender had succeeded in what he was attempting to do and would embarrass her if she did not stop going forward with the trial. Another email, sent to her mother, threatened to have the woman arrested for possession of child pornography and to ruin her teaching career. In August 2020, the mother received emails threatening to kill her and her husband.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The August 2020 emails came from the accounts of four women. Each woman testified that she did not know the defendant and did not send the emails. Each woman also had private Snapchat photographs that had been compromised. The police obtained a second arrest warrant and a second search warrant. The defendant remained in custody after that arrest. The threats to the family then stopped.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Search of the Defendant’s Phone</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The 2019 <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/massachusetts-phone-computer-digital-searches/">search warrant for the defendant’s electronic devices</a> authorized the police to search for internet search history and communication history relating to the woman or her mother, login history for email and social media applications, and data related to software that could be used to break into the woman’s accounts. The police found screenshots of login pages for other people’s accounts, including the woman’s, and screenshots of his conversations with the hacker. The Notes application held entries titled “Hacking Facebook profiles” and “Hacking Snapchats.” A pictures folder held a folder with the woman’s name and a photograph altered to make her appear partially nude.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defendant argued that the warrant did not authorize the police to search photographs, screenshots, or notes. The Appeals Court held that a search of electronic devices “may be as extensive as reasonably required to locate the items described in the warrant.” <em>Commonwealth v. Dorelas</em>, 473 Mass. 496, 502 (2016). When a warrant does not name particular files or applications, the police may search any file or application that could reasonably contain the evidence the warrant describes. <em>Commonwealth v. Henley</em>, 488 Mass. 95, 119-120 (2021).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A defendant who claims that the police exceeded a warrant bears the burden of showing that the search went beyond its terms. <em>Commonwealth v. Carleton</em>, 497 Mass. 11, 29 (2026). The Appeals Court held that the warrant’s authorization to seize login history included the screenshots of login pages. The authorization to seize communication history and data about software for breaking into accounts included the screenshots of the conversations with the hacker. The police could reasonably open a folder bearing the woman’s name, because communications can be stored in photographic form. The Notes entries about hacking fit the warrant’s description of data about breaking into her accounts.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Authentication of an Anonymous Email</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Much of the Commonwealth’s evidence consisted of emails, texts, and calls from anonymous addresses or other people’s accounts. The Commonwealth must <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/massachusetts-digital-evidence-admission-objection/">authenticate an email or a text</a>, with evidence that the defendant wrote it, before a jury may consider it as the defendant’s message. The judge first decides “whether there is evidence sufficient, if believed, to convince the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that the item in question is what the proponent claims it to be.” <em>Commonwealth v. Purdy</em>, 459 Mass. 442, 447 (2011). The jury then decides for itself, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the defendant wrote the message.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defendant argued that the jury had to decide beyond a reasonable doubt who wrote the emails, because authorship was an element of nearly every charge. Authentication, however, is a preliminary question of fact. A preliminary question of fact requires only a preponderance of the evidence, even when the question is closely tied to an element of the crime. <em>Commonwealth v. Oppenheim</em>, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 359, 366-367 (2014). The jury must still decide whether the Commonwealth proved each element of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The jurors asked the judge twice which standard applied to authorship of the emails. The judge told the jurors to decide whether it was more likely true than not true that the defendant wrote an email before considering its content. He told them to disregard any email they could not attribute to the defendant by that standard and to decide the charges on the remaining evidence. He also told them that the Commonwealth always had the burden of proving each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appeals Court held that those instructions were correct and presumed that the jury followed them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>Commonwealth v. Alden</em>, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 438, 444 (2018), the Appeals Court explained that “authenticity and identity are different legal concepts.” A defendant can still challenge an email after the judge admits it. The defendant can attack the reliability of the email and argue to the jury that someone else wrote it. The jury weighs those arguments with the rest of the evidence. <em>Commonwealth v. Meola</em>, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 303, 313 (2019).</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A Mailing From Jail as Witness Intimidation</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In March 2021, while he was in custody awaiting trial, the defendant mailed the hacker a printout of the hacker’s driver’s license information, including his date of birth and home address. The printout had a photograph of the hacker’s face with a swastika drawn on the forehead, along with handwritten insults and slurs that named people involved in the prosecution. The return address identified the defendant as an inmate at the jail. The jury convicted the defendant of <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/intimidation-of-a-witness-massachusetts-boston-lawyer/">witness intimidation under G.L. c. 268, § 13B</a> for that mailing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defendant argued that the witness intimidation statute punishes only speech that the <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/criminal-harassment-258e-first-amendment-massachusetts/">First Amendment</a> does not protect, and that the mailing was not a true threat. The Appeals Court agreed that the statute may not punish protected speech. The court held, however, that the jury could find the mailing to be a <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/threats-to-commit-a-crime-massachusetts/">true threat</a>. A court measures a true threat objectively, by asking “whether, in light of the attendant circumstances, the words justifiably caused the recipient to fear violence.” <em>Commonwealth v. Cruz</em>, 495 Mass. 110, 113 (2024).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The jury could find that the defendant targeted the hacker because the hacker had helped start the investigation. The jury could also find that the mailing showed the hacker that the defendant could obtain his personal information and send mail to his home while sitting in jail. In addition, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant was at least aware that others could regard the communication as threatening violence. The United States Supreme Court set that requirement in <em>Counterman v. Colorado</em>, 600 U.S. 66 (2023). The defendant did not raise that element on appeal.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Reduced Sentence</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">After the trial, the judge sentenced the defendant and denied his timely <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/correcting-a-massachusetts-criminal-sentence/">motion to revise or revoke the sentence</a> under Rule 29 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure. The judge treated the defendant’s later filings as a motion to reconsider that denial. The judge then asked the Probation Department for a Brief Risk Assessment for Violent Offending, known as a BRAVO report, from a program that did not exist at the original sentencing. After a hearing, almost two years after the original sentencing, the judge reduced the time the defendant had to serve in custody and revised his probation terms.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth argued that the judge could not rely on a report that did not exist at sentencing. On a motion to revise or revoke, a judge may not consider the defendant’s conduct after sentencing, which is a question for the parole board. <em>Commonwealth v. DeJesus</em>, 440 Mass. 147, 152 (2003). <em>Commonwealth v. McGuinness</em>, 421 Mass. 472, 476 n.4 (1995). The judge in <em>Hayes</em> stated that he did not rely on any rehabilitation after sentencing. He used the BRAVO report to analyze the information that existed at sentencing and to impose a just sentence. The Appeals Court held that the judge acted within his discretion.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Stalking and Harassment Prevention Order Cases After <em>Hayes</em></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Many stalking, criminal harassment, and harassment prevention order cases depend on messages from anonymous numbers, new accounts, or accounts that belong to someone else. In <em>Hayes</em>, the evidence connecting the messages to the defendant included screenshots and notes on his devices, account information on his devices for the women’s accounts that sent the threats, records of calls that matched the five missed calls, and the end of the threats once he was held in custody. A person accused of sending anonymous messages can contest each piece of that evidence, first when the judge decides whether to admit a message and again before the jury.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/how-to-get-258e-harassment-prevention-order-massachusetts-plaintiff/">person seeking a harassment prevention order</a> should keep every message, login alert, and call record, and should report each one to the police when it happens. The woman in <em>Hayes</em> reported the keyed car, the email from the hospital, the hacker’s text, the missed calls, and the threats to her family. Serpa Law Office represents both plaintiffs and defendants in harassment prevention order cases, and defends people charged with stalking, criminal harassment, and violating a harassment prevention order.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>A phone search warrant that lists categories of evidence authorizes the police to search any file or application that could reasonably contain that evidence, including photographs and notes. <em>Commonwealth v. Dorelas</em>, 473 Mass. 496, 502 (2016).</li>



<li>A defendant who claims that the police exceeded a search warrant bears the burden of showing that the search went beyond its terms.</li>



<li>A jury may consider an email or text as the defendant’s message only if the jury finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant wrote it. <em>Commonwealth v. Meola</em>, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 303, 313 (2019).</li>



<li>The Commonwealth must still prove every element of every charge beyond a reasonable doubt.</li>



<li>A mailing that uses a witness’s photograph and personal information to frighten the witness can be a true threat and witness intimidation under G.L. c. 268, § 13B.</li>



<li>On a motion to revise or revoke a sentence, a judge may use a new assessment tool to analyze the information that existed at sentencing, but may not consider the defendant’s conduct after sentencing.</li>



<li>In <em>Commonwealth v. Hayes</em>, Nos. 25-P-347 and 25-P-607 (Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 24, 2026), the Appeals Court upheld every conviction and the reduced sentence.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Related Serpa Law Office resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/cornell-jane-doe-doxxing-law/">The Effort to Expose Cornell’s Jane Doe: Doxing, Misogyny, and the Law</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/criminal-violation-258e-harassment-prevention-order-massachusetts/">Charged With Violating a Massachusetts 258E Harassment Prevention Order: Contact, Defenses, and Penalties Under G.L. c. 258E, § 9</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/stalking-criminal-harassment-massachusetts/">Massachusetts Stalking Defense (M.G.L. c. 265, § 43)</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/massachusetts-criminal-harassment-defense/">Massachusetts Criminal Harassment Defense (M.G.L. c. 265, § 43A)</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/massachusetts-digital-evidence-admission-objection/">Digital Evidence in Massachusetts Criminal Cases: Admission and Objection</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/massachusetts-text-message-phone-evidence-faqs/">Massachusetts Text Message and Phone Evidence FAQs</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/massachusetts-phone-computer-digital-searches/">Phone, Computer, and Digital Device Searches in Massachusetts</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/intimidation-of-a-witness-massachusetts-boston-lawyer/">Intimidation of a Witness (G.L. c. 268, § 13B)</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/domestic-violence-boston-massachusetts-lawyer/threats-to-commit-a-crime-massachusetts/">Threats to Commit a Crime in Massachusetts (G.L. c. 275, § 2)</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/criminal-harassment-258e-first-amendment-massachusetts/">First Amendment Limits in Massachusetts Criminal Harassment and 258E Cases</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/correcting-a-massachusetts-criminal-sentence/">Correcting a Massachusetts Criminal Sentence: Rule 29, Rule 30(a), and the Limits of Finality</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/massachusetts-258e-harassment-prevention-order-lawyer/">Massachusetts 258E Harassment Prevention Orders: Defense and Plaintiff Representation</a></li>
</ul>
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                <title><![CDATA[When Police May Frisk a Person for a Gun in Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Vihaan V.]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/when-police-may-frisk-for-gun-massachusetts-vihaan-v/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/when-police-may-frisk-for-gun-massachusetts-vihaan-v/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 14:45:01 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Decisions]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Search and Seizure]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center October 16, 2026 On September 30, 2026, the Massachusetts Appeals Court ordered the dismissal of gun charges against a juvenile whom Boston police had frisked after a 911 call reporting “three guys with guns” in a Dorchester backyard. The police ordered the juvenile out of a&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>October 16, 2026</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On September 30, 2026, the Massachusetts Appeals Court ordered the dismissal of gun charges against a juvenile whom Boston police had frisked after a 911 call reporting “three guys with guns” in a Dorchester backyard. The police ordered the juvenile out of a car at the scene, pat frisked him, and found a handgun in his waistband. The Appeals Court held that the officers had no specific facts showing that this juvenile was armed and dangerous. The frisk was therefore unlawful. The Juvenile Court judge should have suppressed the gun and the ammunition.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/juvenile-delinquency-and-youthful-offender-defense-in-massachusetts/">Juvenile Court</a> judge tried the juvenile, whom the Appeals Court calls Vihaan V., without a jury on charges of <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/carrying-possession-gun-firearm-massachusetts-lawyer/carrying-firearm-without-license-massachusetts-269-10a/">carrying a firearm without a license</a> under G.L. c. 269, § 10(a), and <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/carrying-possession-gun-firearm-massachusetts-lawyer/possession-firearm-ammunition-without-fid-card-massachusetts-269-10h/">possessing ammunition without a firearms identification card</a> under G.L. c. 269, § 10(h). A Juvenile Court judge who finds that a juvenile committed an offense adjudicates the juvenile delinquent instead of finding the juvenile guilty. The judge adjudicated Vihaan V. delinquent on both charges. The Appeals Court set aside both findings and ordered the complaint dismissed. The decision is <em>Commonwealth v. Vihaan V.</em>, No. 25-P-500 (Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 30, 2026).</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The 911 Calls in Dorchester</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At 6:33 P.M. on May 16, 2021, a woman called the Boston police, gave her name and telephone number, and reported that many people were on her Dorchester property playing dice, smoking marijuana, and riding mopeds. She was not at home, but her children were. Seven minutes later she called 911 again and reported that someone at her home had said that “three guys with guns” were in her backyard.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The caller’s son was watching from a window and describing the men to her. According to the son, all three men were Black and skinny. One wore a black Nike sweater, black jeans, and black Nike Air Force shoes, and another wore all black. Some of the people were in a gray Mercedes-Benz. The dispatcher called her back a few minutes later. The caller then reported that the men were still in the backyard, that one of them had left on a moped with a gun, and that the police should look inside the bag of the man in the orange sweater.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Frisk of the Juvenile</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two Boston police officers responded and found a large group of people who were “pretty upset and hostile” toward the police, including a man in an orange sweatshirt. The gray Mercedes-Benz was empty. One of the officers had responded to a report of shots fired in the same area three days earlier. The police pat frisked several people and found nothing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One officer then noticed four people sitting in a green Honda Accord. The back seat passenger on the driver’s side wore black Nike Air Force shoes and all black clothing, which matched one of the descriptions. The officer did not notice anyone else in the Honda who matched a description. The juvenile sat in the front passenger seat, wearing a navy blue Nike hoodie and a red face mask. The police ordered all four occupants out of the car. An officer pat frisked the juvenile and found a handgun in his waistband.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Standard for an Exit Order and the Stricter Standard for a Patfrisk</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Massachusetts courts apply one standard when police <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/massachusetts-traffic-stops-exit-orders-pretext-searches/">order a passenger out of a car</a> and a stricter standard when police pat frisk a person. Under <em>Commonwealth v. Torres-Pagan</em>, 484 Mass. 34, 38 (2020), police may order a passenger out of a car during a traffic stop when they reasonably believe that the safety of the officers or others is threatened, when they have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, or when they are searching the car on other grounds.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Police need more to justify a patfrisk than an exit order. The Supreme Judicial Court held in the same case that the police must have “a reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the suspect is armed and dangerous.” <em>Torres-Pagan</em>, 484 Mass. at 38-39. The police must have reasonable suspicion that the particular person they frisk is armed and dangerous. At a hearing on a <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/illegal-searches-and-seizures-massachusetts/">motion to suppress</a>, the Commonwealth must prove that the officers had a lawful basis for the exit order and the frisk.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Juvenile Court judge denied the juvenile’s motion to suppress. The judge ruled that once the back seat passenger matched a description, the police could reasonably order the other occupants out of the car to see whether they matched as well. The Appeals Court did not decide whether the exit order was lawful. The court held that, even if the exit order was lawful, the Commonwealth had not met the stricter standard for the frisk.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Officers’ Testimony About the Juvenile</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Neither officer described any fact at the suppression hearing suggesting that the juvenile was armed. One officer testified that the juvenile “was pretty calm” and “didn’t act in any particular way that was kind of alarming.” The Appeals Court contrasted <em>Commonwealth v. Karen K.</em>, 491 Mass. 165 (2023), in which officers saw a juvenile angle her body away from them, change direction suddenly to avoid them, and adjust her waistband. The court also contrasted <em>Commonwealth v. Johnson-Rivera</em>, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 533 (2024), in which an officer testified that the juvenile wore a cross-body bag, appeared nervous, and had open criminal charges.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Appeals Court rejected two other facts as reasons for the frisk. The juvenile was sitting in the Honda with the back seat passenger who matched a description. The court held that the juvenile’s presence in the car did not give the police reasonable suspicion that the juvenile was armed and dangerous, even if the police had reasonable suspicion about that passenger. One officer had also responded to a shots-fired report in the area three days earlier. Under <em>Commonwealth v. Sertyl</em>, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 836, 843 (2022), an unconnected report of shots fired in the area does not show that a particular person is armed and dangerous.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Commonwealth’s Three Arguments for the Frisk</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">A Report of Guns</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth argued that the 911 report involved guns, which are inherently dangerous. The Appeals Court answered with the rule stated in <em>Commonwealth v. D.M.</em>, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 211 (2021), that “a tip suggesting a concealed firearm, with nothing more, [cannot] provide reasonable suspicion for a stop.” At oral argument, the Commonwealth also relied on the officer’s testimony that a handgun can easily pass from one person to another. The court held that the police could not rely on the hypothetical possibility of a transfer, because nothing indicated that anyone had passed a gun to the juvenile.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">A General Description</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth argued that the juvenile was one of a group of young men roughly matching the reported age range, and that his navy blue clothing was close to the “all black” clothing of the second man the son described. The Appeals Court quoted the Supreme Judicial Court’s statement in <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/police-pursuit-seizure-reasonable-suspicion-palmer/"><em>Commonwealth v. Palmer</em></a>, 498 Mass. 117, 127 (2026), that “[t]he fact that an individual matches a broad, general description does not alone amount to reasonable suspicion, particularly if that description could fit many people in the area where the stop takes place.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The descriptions in the 911 calls were vague, and the clothing they described was common. The officer who conducted the frisk testified that he noticed no one else in the Honda who matched a description. On that record, the Appeals Court concluded that the police knew little more than that the juvenile was “a random [B]lack male in dark clothing,” the phrase the Supreme Judicial Court used in <em>Commonwealth v. Warren</em>, 475 Mass. 530, 540 (2016), when it held that the police in that case lacked reasonable suspicion for a stop.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Frisks of Other People</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth argued that the frisks of several other people had turned up no gun, which gave the police reason to keep frisking people, including the juvenile. The Appeals Court rejected that argument as one that “comes perilously close to saying that everyone in the area should be subject to police search.” The court pointed to the Supreme Judicial Court’s statement in <em>Commonwealth v. Johnson</em>, 454 Mass. 159, 163 (2009), that the many law-abiding people who live in, work in, or visit so-called high crime areas are entitled to protection against being stopped and frisked just because of the neighborhood.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Suppression of the Gun and Dismissal of the Complaint</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Juvenile Court judge should have suppressed the firearm and the ammunition, because the Commonwealth did not prove that the police had reasonable suspicion that the juvenile was armed and dangerous. The Appeals Court set aside both findings of delinquency and ordered the complaint dismissed. The court decided the appeal on the frisk alone and did not decide two other questions. The first is whether the police lawfully ordered the juvenile out of the Honda. The second is whether the 911 information was reliable, given that the caller was away from home and her son never identified himself to the police.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Frisk Cases in Massachusetts After <em>Vihaan V.</em></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The armed and dangerous standard applies to adults as well as juveniles. Before any patfrisk, the police must know specific facts about the person, such as the person’s movements, conduct, or statements, that give them reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous. A report of guns in the area, a companion who matches a description, an earlier shooting nearby, and frisks of other people that found nothing are not enough by themselves. The defense can move to suppress the gun, the ammunition, and any other evidence the police found during a frisk that was not based on facts about the person frisked.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A motion to suppress in a frisk case depends on what the police knew at the moment of the frisk. The record of what the police knew includes the 911 recordings, the dispatch information, the officers’ reports and testimony, and any body-worn camera video. In <em>Vihaan V.</em>, the Appeals Court reviewed the body-worn camera video itself. The court also relied on an officer’s own testimony that the juvenile was calm. An adult charged after the same kind of frisk in Dorchester would ordinarily face arraignment in <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/massachusetts-district-courts/boston-municipal-court-dorchester-division-criminal-defense/">the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court</a>, where Serpa Law Office defends <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/carrying-possession-gun-firearm-massachusetts-lawyer/">firearms charges</a>.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Police may pat frisk a person only when they have reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the person is armed and dangerous. <em>Commonwealth v. Torres-Pagan</em>, 484 Mass. 34, 38-39 (2020).</li>



<li>The standard for a patfrisk is stricter than the standard for ordering a passenger out of a car.</li>



<li>The police need facts about each person they frisk. A 911 report of guns, a companion who matches a description, an earlier shooting nearby, and frisks of other people that found nothing are not enough by themselves.</li>



<li>Matching a broad description that could fit many people in the area does not, by itself, give the police reasonable suspicion.</li>



<li>In <em>Commonwealth v. Vihaan V.</em>, No. 25-P-500 (Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 30, 2026), the Appeals Court held that the Juvenile Court judge should have suppressed the gun and the ammunition, set aside the findings of delinquency, and ordered the complaint dismissed.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Related Serpa Law Office resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/carrying-possession-gun-firearm-massachusetts-lawyer/carrying-firearm-without-license-massachusetts-269-10a/">Carrying a Firearm Without a License in Massachusetts: G.L. c. 269, § 10(a)</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/carrying-possession-gun-firearm-massachusetts-lawyer/possession-firearm-ammunition-without-fid-card-massachusetts-269-10h/">Possession of a Firearm or Ammunition Without an FID Card in Massachusetts: G.L. c. 269, § 10(h)</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/illegal-searches-and-seizures-massachusetts/">Illegal Searches and Seizures in Massachusetts: Motions to Suppress</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/massachusetts-traffic-stops-exit-orders-pretext-searches/">Massachusetts Traffic Stops, Exit Orders, and Pretext Searches: Your Rights Under Article 14</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/police-pursuit-seizure-reasonable-suspicion-palmer/">When a Police Chase Becomes a Seizure: <em>Commonwealth v. Palmer</em></a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/juvenile-delinquency-and-youthful-offender-defense-in-massachusetts/">What to Do When Your Child Is Arrested or Charged in Massachusetts: Juvenile Delinquency and Youthful Offender Defense</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/carrying-possession-gun-firearm-massachusetts-lawyer/">Massachusetts Criminal Defense of Firearms Offenses</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/massachusetts-district-courts/boston-municipal-court-dorchester-division-criminal-defense/">BMC Dorchester: A High-Volume Division, Immigration Stakes, and Firearms Defense</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/gunshot-residue-evidence-murder-trial-massachusetts-williams/">Gunshot Residue Evidence in a Massachusetts Murder Trial: <em>Commonwealth v. Williams</em></a></li>
</ul>
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                <title><![CDATA[SJC Affirms Denial of 258E Harassment Prevention Order Expungement: Piper P. v. Barron B.]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/vacated-restraining-order-expungement-massachusetts-piper-p/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/vacated-restraining-order-expungement-massachusetts-piper-p/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 17:39:35 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Domestic Violence and Restraining Orders]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Decisions]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>In Piper P. v. Barron B., the SJC affirmed denial of expungement after a fourth grader’s 258E order ended. The update examines the facts and separate opinions.</p>
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                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of expungement after a Juvenile Court judge terminated a harassment prevention order against a fourth grader. In <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2026/sjc-13854.html"><em>Piper P. v. Barron B.</em></a>, SJC-13854, decided October 5, 2026, the Court declined to recognize an exception for orders later vacated for insufficient evidence. The judge had found that the evidence did not establish harassment, but had not found fraud on the court.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Order and the School Investigation</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to the opinion, a fourth grade student sought a 258E harassment prevention order against a classmate in April 2024. A judge declined to issue an order without notice. At a two-party hearing on May 2, the plaintiff testified that the classmate pushed her into a corner during gym class, kicked her in the head, and stepped on her hand. The judge credited that testimony and issued an order through November 1, while stating that he would revisit the order after the school district completed its investigation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The school district interviewed students and staff but did not substantiate intentional physical contact or the repeated targeting required for a finding of bullying. After another hearing in July 2024, the judge terminated the harassment prevention order. He initially allowed a motion to expunge the records as well. The Massachusetts Probation Service intervened and sought reconsideration, and the judge then vacated the expungement ruling. The child appealed.</p>



<h2 id="h-what-the-sjc-decided-in-piper-p-v-barron-b" class="wp-block-heading">The Court’s Reasons for Affirming the Denial</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Justice Georges wrote for the Court. The majority concluded that G.L. c. 258E gives judges neither express nor implied authority to expunge an order from the statewide domestic violence record keeping system because later evidence fails to support it. The Court applied its reasoning in <em>Vaccaro v. Vaccaro</em>, 425 Mass. 153 (1997), which concerned the registry record of a 209A abuse prevention order.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The majority also declined to expand the courts’ inherent authority beyond the recognized exception for fraud on the court. A later failure of proof does not itself establish intentional deception. The Juvenile Court judge had expressly found no fraud, and the child did not challenge that finding on appeal. The Court therefore affirmed the denial of expungement.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Concurrence and Dissent on Proceedings Involving Children</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Justice Kafker, joined by Justice Wendlandt, concurred. They urged the Legislature to clarify the treatment of <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/258e-harassment-prevention-order-students-children-juvenile-court-massachusetts/">258E harassment prevention orders involving children under twelve</a>. The concurrence questioned how those proceedings fit with the 2018 criminal justice reform legislation, which excluded children under twelve from delinquency jurisdiction, and how violations by those children could be enforced.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chief Justice Budd dissented. She would permit a judge to consider expungement where the plaintiff is a child under twelve and the judge finds that the underlying allegations lack factual support or are untrue. Her proposed approach concerned a child who was the reporting party, rather than an adult who listed children as additional plaintiffs. Balancing the government’s interest in retaining the record against the harm to the child in this case, she would have ordered expungement.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Decision’s Effect and Further Guidance</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The majority left any broader expungement remedy to the Legislature. The decision does not create an insufficient-evidence exception for an order against a child. The statewide record continues to show the order and its termination.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The firm’s guide to <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/restraining-harassment-orders/expunge-209a-258e-order-massachusetts-registry/">expunging a Massachusetts 209A restraining order or 258E harassment prevention order</a> explains the governing standard, registry correction, motion procedure, and frequently asked questions. The separate <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/massachusetts-209a-258e-expungement-faqs/">expungement FAQ page</a> addresses additional questions about records and access.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Photographing an Unsuspecting Nude Person Must Be Intentional and Disseminating Must Be to a Third Party: Commonwealth v. Goncalves]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/goncalves-photographing-unsuspecting-nude-person-dissemination-massachusetts/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/goncalves-photographing-unsuspecting-nude-person-dissemination-massachusetts/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 14:56:46 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Decisions]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>The SJC upheld a conviction for secretly photographing a nude person and held that dissemination under § 105(c) requires sending the image to a third party.</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defendant in <em>Commonwealth v. Goncalves</em> installed a camera high on the living room wall of his basement apartment in Edgartown and aimed the camera at the couch. In December 2021, the defendant and the victim, whom the defendant had met through an online application, had a sexual encounter that began on the couch. The defendant used the camera to photograph the nude victim without the victim’s knowledge.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two weeks later, the defendant sent the victim a photograph from the encounter. The evidence at trial showed that the defendant sent the photograph only to the victim.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A jury in the Edgartown District Court found the defendant guilty of <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/hidden-camera-secret-recording-charges-massachusetts/">photographing an unsuspecting nude person</a> under G.L. c. 272, § 105(b), and of disseminating the photograph under G.L. c. 272, § 105(c). On October 6, 2026, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) decided the defendant’s appeal under two rules. <em>Commonwealth v. Goncalves</em>, No. SJC-13880 (Mass. Oct. 6, 2026).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The first rule governs the photographing. The Commonwealth must prove that the defendant photographed the victim intentionally and intended to keep the photographing secret. The SJC held that the evidence was sufficient to prove an intent to record in secret and upheld the conviction for photographing an unsuspecting nude person.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The second rule governs dissemination. The Commonwealth must prove that the defendant disseminated the image to at least one third party, meaning a person other than the person shown in the image. Sending a secretly recorded image only to the person shown in the image is not dissemination under § 105(c). The SJC reversed the dissemination conviction and directed the entry of a judgment of not guilty, because the defendant sent the photograph only to the victim.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This post explains each rule, the evidence at trial, and how defense counsel uses the decision in a pending case.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Secretly Photographing a Nude Person and Disseminating the Image Under G.L. c. 272, § 105</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Section 105(b) punishes a person who willfully photographs, videotapes, or electronically surveils another person who is nude or partially nude, with the intent to secretly conduct or hide the photographing, videotaping, or surveillance. The Commonwealth must also prove that the person photographed would reasonably expect privacy from being photographed in the place and circumstances where the photographing occurred. The photographing must have occurred without the knowledge and consent of the person photographed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A judge may sentence a person convicted under § 105(b) to up to two and one half years in a house of correction, a fine of up to $5,000, or both. The § 105(b) offense is a misdemeanor.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Section 105(c) punishes a person who willfully disseminates the visual image of another person, knowing that the image was obtained in violation of § 105(b), without the consent of the person shown in the image. Section 105 does not define the word “disseminates.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A judge may sentence a person convicted under § 105(c) to up to two and one half years in a house of correction or up to five years in state prison. The judge may also impose a fine of up to $10,000, instead of or in addition to imprisonment. Dissemination under § 105(c) is a <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/massachusetts-felonies-vs-misdemeanors/">felony</a> under G.L. c. 274, § 1, because § 105(c) provides for a state prison sentence.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Section 105 applies to video and electronic surveillance as well as to photographs. Section 105(a) defines “electronically surveils” as viewing, obtaining, or recording a person’s visual image with a camera, cell phone, computer, television, or other electronic device. The SJC used the words “photograph” and “photographing” in <em>Goncalves</em> because the witnesses and the parties used those words.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A hidden camera can also record sound. The police can apply for a complaint under the <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/massachusetts-wiretap-law-secret-recordings/">Massachusetts wiretap statute</a>, G.L. c. 272, § 99, against a person who secretly records a conversation without the prior authority of every party to the conversation.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Evidence at Trial</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defendant’s profile on the online application stated, “I will never make videos.” On December 6, 2021, the victim came to the defendant’s apartment. The sexual encounter began on the living room couch, where the victim sat nude, facing the camera. The victim did not notice the camera or any other sign of recording. After about ten minutes, the defendant and the victim moved to the defendant’s bedroom.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defendant had mounted the camera high on the living room wall, near a dark-colored pipe and a dark gap between the ceiling and the wall. The defendant had pointed the camera directly at the couch.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defendant and the victim next communicated two weeks later, when the victim sent the defendant a text message. The defendant responded with a photograph from the December 6 encounter, showing the defendant and the victim, both nude, in the living room. The victim wrote back and questioned the defendant about “secretly recording guys that come over.” The victim also raised the possibility of reporting the defendant to the Edgartown police. The defendant replied, “Block u[.] Bye.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Police later searched the apartment and saw the camera installed in the living room. The police also found the empty box in which the camera was sold, inside a dresser drawer in the defendant’s bedroom. The defendant had posted no signs in the apartment telling visitors about recording.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The police found no photograph or other recording of the victim in the defendant’s possession. The camera contained no memory card at the time of the search. The police could not open the defendant’s cell phone.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defendant later told a police officer, “So I make porno,” and laughed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A jury heard the case in the Edgartown District Court in March 2024. The defendant presented no evidence. The jury found the defendant guilty on both charges. The judge sentenced the defendant on each conviction to ninety days in a house of correction, with ten days to serve and the balance suspended for one year. The judge ordered the two sentences served at the same time and also imposed one year of administrative probation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The SJC granted the defendant’s application for direct appellate review. The SJC therefore decided the appeal without a decision from the Appeals Court.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Intent to Record in Secret Under § 105(b)</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The SJC held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant willfully photographed the victim in the nude and that the defendant intended to keep the photographing secret. The parties agreed that “willfully” means “intentional[ly] and by design[,] in contrast to that which is thoughtless or accidental.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defendant argued that the photographing was accidental. The SJC rejected the defendant’s argument that the evidence supported a finding of accident as strongly as a finding of willful photographing. The SJC pointed to five facts.</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">


<li>The jury could infer from the empty camera box in the defendant’s dresser that the defendant installed the camera while living in the apartment.</li>



<li>The defendant installed the camera high on the living room wall and pointed the camera directly at the couch where the sexual encounter began.</li>



<li>The defendant showed that he knew he had photographed the encounter when he answered the victim’s text message with a photograph from the encounter.</li>



<li>The defendant did not claim that the recording was accidental when the victim questioned him about “secretly recording guys that come over.” The defendant instead replied, “Block u[.] Bye.”</li>



<li>The defendant told the police, while laughing, that he had made “porno.”</li>


</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The SJC held that the jury could find that the defendant’s reply to the victim and the defendant’s statement to the police showed consciousness of guilt, meaning an awareness that he had done something wrong. The SJC described the statement to the police as an apparent attempt to minimize the defendant’s conduct.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The SJC also held that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that the defendant intended to keep the photographing secret. The jury could find that the defendant chose the camera’s location to make the camera less noticeable to visitors. The defendant never told the victim about the camera and never asked for the victim’s consent. Moreover, the jury could find that the defendant wrote “I will never make videos” in his profile to reassure prospective visitors.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defendant argued that evidence of his failure to seek consent could not also prove his intent to hide the photographing, because lack of consent is a separate element of § 105(b). The SJC disagreed with the defendant. The SJC held that the defendant’s failure to tell the victim about the camera, considered together with the camera’s placement, tended to prove that the defendant intended to keep the photographing secret.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Dissemination to a Third Party Under § 105(c)</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The SJC held that dissemination under § 105(c) requires dispersing the image to at least one third party. In the SJC’s words, “sending a photograph of a victim solely to the victim himself or herself does not amount to ‘disseminat[ing]’ the photograph.” The Commonwealth offered no evidence that the defendant sent the photograph to anyone other than the victim. The SJC therefore held that the Commonwealth did not prove the dissemination charge.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The SJC began with the ordinary meaning of the word “disseminates.” Dictionary definitions describe dissemination as spreading, dispersing, or scattering widely. From those definitions, the SJC concluded that the plain meaning of “disseminate” involves “spreading or dispersing material.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The SJC also relied on the penalties in § 105. The Legislature set the penalties for dissemination under § 105(c) at twice the penalties for photographing under § 105(b). The SJC read the higher penalty as the Legislature’s recognition that spreading a secretly recorded image to other people causes a distinct and greater harm than creating the image.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The SJC identified the harm of dissemination as the exposure of the image to people such as friends, family members, employers, co-workers, teachers, classmates, and strangers on the internet. Sending the image only to the person shown in the image, the SJC wrote, “while no doubt in many cases a source of intense distress to the victim, does not entail these same harms.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth argued that a victim who receives a secretly recorded image may treat the message as a veiled threat that the sender will send the image to others. The SJC responded that sending the image only to the victim does not cause the same harms as sending the image to third parties.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth also asked the SJC to apply the definition of “disseminate” in G.L. c. 272, § 31. Section 31 defines “disseminate” as to “import, publish, produce, print, manufacture, distribute, sell, lease, exhibit or display.” The SJC declined the Commonwealth’s request. The Legislature had expressly limited the § 31 definition to listed sections of chapter 272. Section 105(c) is not one of the listed sections.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under the rule of lenity, a court resolves an ambiguity in a criminal statute in the defendant’s favor. The SJC held that any ambiguity about whether sending an image only to the victim is dissemination had to be resolved in the defendant’s favor.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The SJC described the case in terms of “sending” the photograph because the defendant sent the photograph to the victim. The SJC noted that a person can also disseminate an image by other methods.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Jury Instructions on Intent and the SJC’s Model Instruction</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defendant argued for the first time on appeal that the judge’s instructions to the jury were flawed. According to the defendant, the instructions allowed the jury to convict him upon finding an intent to take photographs in general, without finding an intent to photograph the victim in the nude. The defendant’s trial counsel had not objected to the instructions. The SJC therefore applied the standard for errors that counsel did not raise at trial, asking whether any error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The SJC found no error in the instructions. The judge told the jury that the defendant’s act had to be intentional, “and not accidental or due to some inadvertence or inattentiveness,” and that the victim had to be nude or partially nude at the time. The defendant did not dispute that he was in the room with the nude victim at the time of the photograph. The SJC held that a reasonable jury would therefore have understood that a conviction required a finding that the defendant willfully photographed the victim while the victim was nude.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The SJC also set out a model jury instruction for the § 105(b) offense in an appendix to the opinion, for use in future cases. Defense counsel in a § 105(b) trial should compare the judge’s proposed instructions with the SJC’s model instruction and object at trial to any instruction that misstates an element. Counsel who objects at trial preserves the claim of instructional error for appeal.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Defending a § 105 Charge After <em>Goncalves</em></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The SJC upheld the § 105(b) conviction on circumstantial evidence of an intent to record in secret. The SJC relied on where the defendant placed the camera, where the defendant aimed the camera, what the defendant told prospective visitors in his profile, and how the defendant responded when the victim confronted him. Defense counsel in a § 105(b) case examines the same kinds of facts.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The facts to examine include who installed the camera, for what purpose, and what the camera was set to record. The facts also include whether visitors could see the camera or were told about the camera, and whether the person photographed would reasonably expect privacy from being photographed in the place where the photographing occurred.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under <em>Goncalves</em>, the Commonwealth must prove that a person charged with dissemination under § 105(c) disseminated the image to at least one third party. Defense counsel can raise the third-party requirement at three stages of a § 105(c) case.</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">


<li>At a <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/massachusetts-clerk-magistrate-hearing-lawyer/">clerk-magistrate hearing</a>, counsel can argue that a § 105(c) application describing a message only to the person shown in the image does not establish probable cause of dissemination.</li>



<li>Counsel can file a <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/massachusetts-criminal-dismissal-rules/">motion to dismiss</a> a § 105(c) count when the complaint application describes a message only to the person shown in the image.</li>



<li>At trial, counsel can move for a <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/rule-25-required-finding-of-not-guilty-massachusetts/">required finding of not guilty</a> under Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 when the Commonwealth offers no evidence that anyone other than the person shown in the image received the image.</li>


</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a dissemination case, defense counsel examines who received the image, when, and by what method. The evidence of who received the image usually includes the messages themselves, phone extraction reports, records from the messaging platform or social media account, and the testimony of anyone who claims to have received the image.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Secretly Recorded Images Sent On or After September 18, 2024</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defendant in <em>Goncalves</em> sent the photograph in December 2021. An Act to Prevent Abuse and Exploitation took effect on September 18, 2024. In that Act, the Legislature added an offense to the criminal harassment statute, G.L. c. 265, § 43A(b), for the <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/massachusetts-revenge-porn-nonconsensual-intimate-images/">nonconsensual distribution of intimate images</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Section 43A(b) punishes the knowing distribution of visual material depicting another person who is nude, partially nude, or engaged in sexual conduct. The Commonwealth must prove that the distribution caused the person depicted physical or economic injury or substantial emotional distress. The Commonwealth must also prove one of two mental states.</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">


<li>An intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten, coerce, or cause substantial emotional distress.</li>



<li>Reckless disregard of the likelihood that the person depicted will suffer harm, harassment, intimidation, threat, coercion, or substantial emotional distress, of the person’s lack of consent to the distribution, and of the person’s reasonable expectation that the material would remain private.</li>


</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Section 43A(b) contains a different word, “distributes.” Section 43A defines “distribute” as to “give, sell, transfer, disseminate, publish, upload, circulate, broadcast or engage in any other form of transmission, electronic or otherwise.” In <em>Goncalves</em>, the SJC interpreted the word “disseminates” in § 105(c), for conduct that occurred before § 43A(b) took effect. The SJC did not decide whether sending an intimate image only to the person shown in the image is distribution under § 43A.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For a secretly recorded image sent on or after September 18, 2024, the police can apply for a complaint under § 43A(b) as well as under § 105.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Attorney Joe Serpa has practiced Massachusetts criminal defense since 1995. The telephone number for Serpa Law Office is 617.936.0201.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">


<li>The Commonwealth must prove that a person charged with photographing an unsuspecting nude person under G.L. c. 272, § 105(b) photographed the person intentionally and intended to keep the photographing secret. In <em>Commonwealth v. Goncalves</em>, No. SJC-13880 (Mass. Oct. 6, 2026), the SJC held that the jury could find an intent to record in secret from the camera’s placement and aim, the defendant’s silence about the camera, and the defendant’s reply when the victim confronted him.</li>



<li>The Commonwealth must prove that a person charged with dissemination under § 105(c) disseminated the image to at least one third party. Sending a secretly recorded image only to the person shown in the image is not dissemination. The SJC set aside the dissemination verdict in <em>Goncalves</em> and directed the entry of a judgment of not guilty.</li>



<li>Dissemination under § 105(c) is a felony. A judge may sentence a person convicted of dissemination to up to five years in state prison. A judge may sentence a person convicted under § 105(b) to up to two and one half years in a house of correction.</li>



<li>The SJC set out a model jury instruction for the § 105(b) offense in an appendix to the opinion.</li>



<li>In <em>Goncalves</em>, the SJC interpreted only § 105(c). Since September 18, 2024, G.L. c. 265, § 43A(b) has also punished the nonconsensual distribution of intimate images. Section 43A defines “distribute” to include “give” and “transfer.”</li>


</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Related Serpa Law Office resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/hidden-camera-secret-recording-charges-massachusetts/">Hidden Camera and Secret Recording Charges in Massachusetts</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/massachusetts-revenge-porn-nonconsensual-intimate-images/">Massachusetts Revenge Porn and Nonconsensual Intimate Image Law</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/massachusetts-revenge-porn-nonconsensual-intimate-image-faq/">Massachusetts Revenge Porn and Nonconsensual Intimate Image FAQ</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/ai-porn-deepfake-criminal-law-massachusetts/">Massachusetts Deepfake and AI-Generated Intimate Image Defense</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/massachusetts-wiretap-law-secret-recordings/">Secret Recordings and the Massachusetts Wiretap Statute (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99)</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/massachusetts-clerk-magistrate-hearing-lawyer/">Massachusetts Clerk-Magistrate Hearing Lawyer</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/massachusetts-criminal-dismissal-rules/">How Criminal Cases Get Dismissed in the Massachusetts District and Municipal Courts</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/rule-25-required-finding-of-not-guilty-massachusetts/">Rule 25: The Motion for a Required Finding of Not Guilty in Massachusetts</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/massachusetts-felonies-vs-misdemeanors/">Felonies and Misdemeanors in Massachusetts</a></li>


</ul>
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                <title><![CDATA[When ICE Detains a Defendant With an Open Massachusetts Criminal Case]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/ice-detention-open-criminal-case-massachusetts-sjc/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/ice-detention-open-criminal-case-massachusetts-sjc/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 10:26:27 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Immigration Consequences]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>ICE has arrested and moved out of state people with pending Massachusetts criminal charges. The SJC is hearing three appeals on writs, missed trials, and dismissal.</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It is based on the Supreme Judicial Court’s public descriptions of the three appeals, the text of the statutes and rules, and news reporting. The Supreme Judicial Court has not decided the three appeals.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Federal immigration agents have arrested dozens of people who face pending criminal charges in Massachusetts courts. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) often holds these defendants in detention centers outside Massachusetts. Some are deported before their Massachusetts trials begin. The defendant cannot come to court, but the criminal case stays open. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) is now deciding what a Massachusetts judge should do with that criminal case.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Boston Globe reported on October 2, 2026 that the SJC will hear three of these appeals in the coming week. According to the Globe, the Massachusetts courts recorded 614 immigration arrests at or near courthouses in 2025, more than double the 282 recorded in 2024. This post describes the three appeals, the questions the SJC will answer, and the state law that already governs ICE detainers and courthouse arrests.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Three Appeals Before the Supreme Judicial Court</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The SJC identified the three cases when it invited friend-of-the-court briefs earlier in 2026.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>Commonwealth v. Noralus</em>, SJC-13882, ICE held the defendant in a detention center in Kentucky while his Massachusetts case was pending. The trial judge declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus to bring him to Massachusetts for trial. According to the Globe, the judge believed the court lacked authority to order his return once ICE had custody. The SJC will decide whether the trial judge erred in declining to issue the writ.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>Commonwealth v. Loredo</em>, SJC-13875, the defendant faced drug charges. ICE detained him out of state and later deported him before his trial. He had moved to compel his presence at trial or, in the alternative, to dismiss the charges because the Commonwealth did not secure his appearance. The trial judge denied that motion. According to the Globe, the judge had issued writs for the defendant to appear by video. ICE honored some of those writs before it deported him.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>Commonwealth v. Martell-Lebron</em>, SJC-13920, ICE agents arrested the defendant on March 27, 2025, during a lunch recess in his own trial at the Edward W. Brooke Courthouse in Boston. He was on trial in the Boston Municipal Court for charges arising from a driver’s license application. Judge Mark Summerville dismissed the charges with prejudice, which means the Commonwealth cannot bring them again. Judge Summerville also held the ICE agent in contempt. The Suffolk District Attorney’s Office appealed the dismissal and has stated that its prosecutors had no advance knowledge of the arrest.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Questions the SJC Will Answer</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In these three appeals, the SJC will decide what a Massachusetts judge can do when a federal agency holds a defendant who must appear for trial in a Massachusetts court. The Globe identified five questions before the SJC.</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">


<li>Whether a Massachusetts judge can order ICE to bring a detained defendant to court for trial.</li>



<li>What happens when ICE does not comply with a state court writ.</li>



<li>Whether a judge should issue an arrest warrant for a defendant who misses court because ICE is holding the defendant.</li>



<li>When a judge should dismiss the charges because the defendant cannot be brought to trial.</li>



<li>Whether prosecutors must disclose that they know ICE plans to arrest a defendant.</li>


</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Prosecutors and defense lawyers have both asked for guidance. A Bristol County assistant district attorney told the Globe that these cases “will become functionally unprosecutable” without guidance from the SJC. The Globe reported that the SJC is expected to rule within several months.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Writ of Habeas Corpus and ICE Custody</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A writ of habeas corpus to bring a prisoner to court is the ordinary order a Massachusetts judge issues when another jail or prison holds a defendant. The judge orders the custodian to deliver the defendant to the courtroom on a set date. A sheriff or a state prison complies because the Massachusetts court has authority over the sheriff and the state prison.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">ICE is a federal agency. A federal immigration detention center operates under the authority of the federal government rather than a Massachusetts court. In the <em>Noralus</em> appeal, the trial judge concluded that the court had no power to order ICE to produce the defendant. The SJC will decide whether that conclusion was correct. In the <em>Loredo</em> case, the trial judge took a second approach and ordered that the defendant be made available by video.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Speedy Trial Rule and an Unavailable Defendant</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Rule 36 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the Commonwealth to bring a defendant to trial within twelve months, after excluded periods of delay are subtracted. A defendant who is not tried within that time is entitled, on motion, to dismissal of the charges.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Rule 36(b)(2)(B) excludes delay caused by the absence or unavailability of the defendant. Under the rule, a defendant is unavailable when the defendant’s whereabouts are known but the defendant’s presence for trial “cannot be obtained by due diligence.” ICE usually holds a detained defendant at a known location. Under the text of Rule 36, the judge therefore asks what the Commonwealth did to obtain the defendant’s presence. The SJC’s decision on writs will affect what the Commonwealth must do to show due diligence when ICE holds the defendant.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What Massachusetts Law Already Says About ICE Detainers and Courthouse Arrests</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The SJC has already limited what Massachusetts officers may do for ICE. In <em>Lunn v. Commonwealth</em>, 477 Mass. 517, 537 (2017), the SJC declared that Massachusetts law gives Massachusetts court officers no authority to arrest and hold a person solely on a federal civil immigration detainer after the person is otherwise entitled to release from state custody.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Legislature added new rules in Chapter 163 of the Acts of 2026, which Governor Healey signed on August 5, 2026. The new G.L. c. 221D takes effect on November 3, 2026. Under G.L. c. 221D, no law enforcement officer may make a civil arrest in a courtroom. An officer who seeks to make a civil arrest elsewhere in a courthouse must show a judge, justice, or magistrate sitting in that courthouse a judicial warrant or judicial order authorizing the arrest. The chapter defines the courthouse to include its steps, plazas, sidewalks, walkways, and judicial branch parking lots. An ICE administrative warrant is not a judicial warrant. Serpa Law Office explains the rest of the new statute in a separate post on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-chapter-163-immigration-criminal-cases/">Chapter 163 and Massachusetts criminal cases</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chapter 221D governs arrests at courthouses only. ICE agents may still arrest a defendant at home, at work, or on the street. The three SJC appeals address the criminal case that remains open after an arrest of that kind.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Steps for a Noncitizen Defendant With a Pending Case</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A noncitizen charged with a crime in Massachusetts can face two proceedings at once. In the criminal case, a judge or jury decides whether the defendant is guilty, and a judge imposes any sentence. In federal immigration proceedings, an immigration judge decides whether the person may remain in the United States. A conviction or an admission to sufficient facts in the criminal case can lead the federal government to seek the person’s removal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Defense counsel can take several steps while the SJC appeals are pending.</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">


<li>Counsel can ask the judge to issue a writ of habeas corpus or an order for a video appearance if ICE detains the client.</li>



<li>Counsel can move to dismiss under Rule 36 when the Commonwealth has not tried to bring a detained client to court.</li>



<li>Counsel can ask the prosecutor whether the Commonwealth knows of any planned ICE action against the client.</li>



<li>Counsel can have an immigration lawyer review any plea or <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-records-outcomes/what-is-a-cwof-pretrial-probation-diversion-lawyer/">admission to sufficient facts</a> before the client offers one.</li>


</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under G.L. c. 278, § 29D, a judge must warn every defendant before accepting a guilty plea, a plea of nolo contendere, or an admission to sufficient facts. The judge warns that, for a person who is not a United States citizen, the plea or admission may lead to deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization. The same statute provides that the defendant does not have to tell the court the defendant’s immigration status at the plea. The judge gives the same general warning to every defendant. The judge’s warning does not tell a particular defendant what will happen in that defendant’s immigration case. Serpa Law Office describes the federal rules in more detail on its pages about <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/immigration-consequences/criminal-convictions-for-immigrants-and-visa-holders/">criminal convictions for immigrants and visa holders</a> and <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/immigration-consequences/padilla-motion-new-trial-massachusetts/">motions for a new trial based on immigration advice</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Attorney Joe Serpa has practiced Massachusetts criminal defense since 1995. He represents clients in the <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/massachusetts-district-courts/boston-municipal-court-criminal-defense-lawyer/">Boston Municipal Court</a>, the district courts, and the Superior Court. He also works with immigration counsel when a client’s immigration status is at stake.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">


<li>ICE has detained many people with pending Massachusetts criminal charges and has held some of them outside Massachusetts. ICE deported some of those defendants before trial.</li>



<li>The SJC is hearing three appeals, <em>Noralus</em>, <em>Loredo</em>, and <em>Martell-Lebron</em>, on writs to ICE, missed trial dates, warrants, dismissal, and prosecutors’ disclosure duties.</li>



<li>Rule 36 excludes delay from a defendant’s unavailability only when the defendant’s presence cannot be obtained by due diligence.</li>



<li><em>Lunn v. Commonwealth</em> bars Massachusetts court officers from holding a person solely on a civil immigration detainer.</li>



<li>Beginning November 3, 2026, G.L. c. 221D bars civil arrests in courtrooms and requires a judicial warrant for a civil arrest elsewhere at a courthouse.</li>



<li>A noncitizen defendant should have an immigration lawyer review any plea or admission before offering one.</li>


</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Related Serpa Law Office resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/massachusetts-chapter-163-immigration-criminal-cases/">Massachusetts Chapter 163 Changes Immigration Enforcement and Criminal Cases</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/immigration-consequences/">Immigration Consequences of Massachusetts Criminal Charges</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/immigration-consequences/criminal-convictions-for-immigrants-and-visa-holders/">Criminal Convictions for Immigrants and Visa Holders</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/immigration-consequences/padilla-motion-new-trial-massachusetts/">Motions for a New Trial Based on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Under <em>Padilla v. Kentucky</em> and <em>Commonwealth v. Clarke</em></a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/immigration-consequences/crimes-moral-turpitude-aggravated-felonies-massachusetts/">Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude and Aggravated Felonies in Massachusetts</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-process/massachusetts-bail/">Massachusetts Bail: Release, Conditions, and Review</a></li>


</ul>
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                <title><![CDATA[Voluntary Intoxication and Consent After the Cornell Case: The New York Rule and the Massachusetts Rule]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/voluntary-intoxication-consent-massachusetts-new-york-cornell/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/voluntary-intoxication-consent-massachusetts-new-york-cornell/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 17:21:59 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Trial Strategy and Evidence Notes]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It is based on published court decisions, the text of the statutes, public statements by New York officials, and news reporting. The Cornell allegations have not been proved in any court. The case&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It is based on published court decisions, the text of the statutes, public statements by New York officials, and news reporting. The Cornell allegations have not been proved in any court. The case is pending in New York under New York law.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On October 3, 2026, the Washington Post reported that the rape allegations at a Cornell University fraternity have reignited a debate over laws on intoxication and consent. The debate is about one sentence in New York’s Penal Law. Under that sentence, a person who drinks or takes drugs willingly is not “mentally incapacitated,” however impaired that person becomes, unless the substance was administered without the person’s consent.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Tompkins County District Attorney relied on that rule when he declined to charge anyone in 2024. Governor Kathy Hochul has now promised to work with the Legislature to pass a bill that removes the rule by January. The Speaker of the Assembly has appointed a working group to review the state’s rape laws by the end of the year.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Massachusetts settled the question in 1870. The Supreme Judicial Court held that year that a man who has intercourse with a woman who is too drunk to consent commits rape, and that the source of her condition makes no difference. The court restated the rule in 2008 and again in 2024. A Massachusetts jury asks whether the complainant was so impaired that she could not give or refuse consent and whether the defendant knew or reasonably should have known it. The jury does not ask who poured the drinks.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Massachusetts rule is the right rule, for the accused as well as for the complainant. This post explains why.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The New York Rule</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">New York Penal Law § 130.05 provides that every sexual offense requires lack of consent. Lack of consent results from forcible compulsion, from incapacity to consent, or, for some offenses, from the complainant’s clear expression that she did not consent. A person is incapable of consent when the person is under 17, “mentally disabled,” “mentally incapacitated,” or “physically helpless,” among other categories.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The definitions in § 130.00 create the problem. A person is “mentally incapacitated” only when the person “is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his conduct owing to the influence of a narcotic or intoxicating substance administered to him without his consent.” A person is “physically helpless” only when the person “is unconscious or for any other reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A woman who drinks ten drinks of her own choosing, takes a drug that someone hands her, and stays conscious and able to speak is not incapacitated under either definition. A prosecutor in New York must then prove forcible compulsion or a clearly expressed refusal. A woman who was too impaired to refuse clearly can supply neither.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">District Attorney Matthew Van Houten explained his 2024 decision on September 28, 2026. He said that Jane Doe’s sworn statement “described her participation in drug use and sexual conduct as voluntary, conscious, and consensual,” and that New York law requires lack of consent through forcible compulsion, incapacity, physical helplessness, or a clearly expressed refusal. He has since reopened the investigation. The Governor has since replaced him with Attorney General Letitia James as special prosecutor. He has also acknowledged, according to Newsweek, that the pending bill would have required his office to investigate further what the men knew about her condition.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Bill New York Has Not Passed</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The bill is not new. Then-Senator Alessandra Biaggi introduced it in 2019. Assemblymember Jeffrey Dinowitz sponsors it in the Assembly as A.101, and Senator Nathalia Fernandez sponsors the companion bill in the Senate. The bill would add a new ground of lack of consent to Penal Law § 130.05. Lack of consent would result when the complainant was “under the influence of any drug, intoxicant, or other substance to a degree which rendered the victim temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling such person’s conduct” and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of that condition.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Senate passed the bill in 2020, 2021, 2023, 2024, and 2025, the last time unanimously. The Assembly has never brought it to a vote. The Assembly’s Codes Committee holds it now.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">New York is one of nineteen states, by the count reported this week, that treat intoxication as incapacity only when the drug or alcohol was administered without the person’s consent. Minnesota changed its law in 2021 after its Supreme Court held that the old statute did not protect a woman who had been drinking voluntarily. Michigan and Texas changed their laws after that.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers opposes the bill as written. The association argues that the current law already allows prosecution on other theories and that a statute built on whether a person could “appraise or control” the person’s own conduct is too vague.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yung-Mi Lee of the association told Newsweek that “there has to be outward signs.” The objection is a fair one. The bill already answers part of that objection, because the bill requires proof that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the complainant’s condition. Massachusetts answered the rest of the objection eighteen years ago.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Massachusetts Rule Since 1870</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Massachusetts has no statute that defines consent or incapacity. The rule comes from the Supreme Judicial Court, beginning with <em>Commonwealth v. Burke</em>, 105 Mass. 376 (1870). The defendant in <em>Burke</em> helped another man have intercourse with a woman who was, as both men knew, “so drunk as to be utterly senseless and incapable of consenting.” The court held that the act was rape.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The court then rejected the argument that a woman who drank herself into that state deserved less protection. It wrote that “any woman in a state of utter stupefaction, whether caused by drunkenness, sudden disease, the blow of a third person, or drugs which she had been persuaded to take even by the defendant himself, would be unprotected from personal dishonor” if the rule were otherwise, and that “the law is not open to such a reproach.” 105 Mass. at 380-381.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Supreme Judicial Court modernized the rule in <em>Commonwealth v. Blache</em>, 450 Mass. 583 (2008). Intoxication by itself is not incapacity. “The question instead is whether, as a result of the complainant’s consumption of drugs, alcohol, or both, she was unable to give or refuse consent.” 450 Mass. at 591-592. The court added that “whatever the factor or factors, the question is the same,” which is whether those factors left the complainant incapable of giving or refusing consent. 450 Mass. at 592.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The model instruction the court wrote in <em>Blache</em> tells the jury that a person who is so impaired “because of the consumption of drugs or alcohol” that the person cannot consent has not consented. The instruction does not ask who supplied the drugs or the alcohol. The Supreme Judicial Court restated the rule in <em>Campbell v. Commonwealth</em>, 494 Mass. 750 (2024).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The second half of <em>Blache</em> answers the objection the New York defense bar is raising now. A prosecutor who relies on incapacity must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “knew or reasonably should have known that the complainant’s condition rendered her incapable of consenting to the sexual act.” 450 Mass. at 594.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The “outward signs” that Ms. Lee asked for are part of the Commonwealth’s burden of proof in Massachusetts. A jury that doubts whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have seen that the complainant could not consent must acquit on the incapacity theory. If the Commonwealth proves both incapacity and knowledge, the only force it must prove is the force of the penetration itself. 450 Mass. at 590-592.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What the Massachusetts Rule Does for the Accused</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Massachusetts rule protects an accused person in three ways that the New York rule does not. The Commonwealth must prove incapacity, not intoxication. The Supreme Judicial Court has said in plain terms that a person who has been drinking can still consent.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth must prove what the defendant knew or should have known, so the case is tried on what the defendant saw and heard, not on a toxicology report alone. A judge gives the incapacity instruction only when the evidence supports a finding of incapacity, so the Commonwealth cannot convert every drunken encounter into a rape prosecution by naming the theory.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A defense lawyer in Massachusetts cross-examines on all three points. The complainant’s own messages before and after the encounter, the accounts of the people who saw her walk, talk, and make decisions, the bar tab, the video, and the timing of each act all bear on whether she could consent and on what the defendant could see.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The firm’s page on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/consent-massachusetts-sexual-assault-law/">consent in Massachusetts rape and sexual assault cases</a> explains the rules on incapacity, force, and the defendant’s knowledge in full.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">How the Cornell Facts Would Be Charged in Massachusetts</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The reason the District Attorney gave for declining to charge in 2024 does not exist in Massachusetts. A Massachusetts prosecutor reading the same sworn statement would not ask whether Jane Doe drank and took the ketamine willingly. The prosecutor would ask whether she was so impaired that she could not give or refuse consent to each act, and whether each man knew or should have known of her condition.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The men who gave her the drug, the member who advertised her in the fraternity’s group chat, and the member who apologized for being too impaired “to shut it down” would answer the second question for a jury. The firm’s post on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/cornell-fraternity-rape-case-massachusetts-law/">the Cornell fraternity rape case under Massachusetts law</a> applies the Massachusetts rules to the full public record.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">My Assessment</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The New York rule is a relic of the idea that a woman who drank assumed the risk of whatever followed. Massachusetts rejected that idea in 1870, when the Supreme Judicial Court wrote that the law “is not open to such a reproach.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">New York’s Legislature has had the bill in front of it for seven years and has passed it through one chamber five times. The Cornell case shows what the delay costs. A woman who, on her own account, was given ketamine by the men in the room and could not stand by the end of the night was told by the prosecutor that the law did not cover what happened to her because she took the drug herself.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense bar’s concern about vagueness deserves an answer. Massachusetts has given that answer. Massachusetts defines incapacity as the inability to give or refuse consent, requires the prosecutor to prove that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of that incapacity, and allows the instruction only where the evidence supports a finding of incapacity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That rule has governed Massachusetts rape trials since 2008. In my experience it has not produced the wave of prosecutions built on regret that opponents of the New York bill predict.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">


<li>New York Penal Law § 130.00 treats a person as “mentally incapacitated” only when the drug or alcohol was “administered to him without his consent,” so a person who drinks or takes drugs willingly and stays conscious is not incapacitated under the statute. The Tompkins County District Attorney relied on that rule when he declined to charge anyone in the Cornell case in 2024.</li>



<li>A bill to remove the distinction has passed the New York Senate five times since 2020 and has never come to a vote in the Assembly. Governor Hochul has promised to work with the Legislature to pass a bill by January 2027. The Assembly Speaker has appointed a working group to report by the end of 2026.</li>



<li>Massachusetts has applied the opposite rule since <em>Commonwealth v. Burke</em>, 105 Mass. 376 (1870). Intercourse with a person too impaired to consent is rape whether the impairment came from drink, drugs, illness, or injury, and regardless of who caused the impairment.</li>



<li>Under <em>Commonwealth v. Blache</em>, 450 Mass. 583 (2008), the jury decides whether the complainant was unable to give or refuse consent. The Commonwealth must also prove that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of her condition. Intoxication alone is not incapacity.</li>



<li>The knowledge requirement is the safeguard that the New York defense bar is asking for. Massachusetts has had it since 2008.</li>

</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Related Serpa Law Office resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/cornell-jane-doe-doxxing-law/">The Effort to Expose Cornell’s Jane Doe: Doxing, Misogyny, and the Law</a></li>




<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/cornell-fraternity-rape-case-massachusetts-law/">How the Men of Cornell University Failed Jane Doe: The Cornell Fraternity Rape Case Under New York and Massachusetts Law</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/consent-massachusetts-sexual-assault-law/">Consent in Massachusetts Rape and Sexual Assault Cases</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/">Sexual Assault and Rape Defense in Massachusetts</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/indecent-assault-and-battery-defense-in-massachusetts/">Charged With Indecent Assault and Battery in Massachusetts: Defenses, Penalties, and the Sex Offender Registry</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/college-university-student-criminal-defense-lawyer-boston-cambridge/">College and University Student Criminal Defense Lawyer: Boston and Cambridge</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/cross-examination-massachusetts-criminal-trials/">Cross-Examination in Massachusetts Criminal Trials</a></li>

</ul>
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                <title><![CDATA[How the Men of Cornell University Failed Jane Doe: The Cornell Fraternity Rape Case Under New York and Massachusetts Law]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/cornell-fraternity-rape-case-massachusetts-law/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/cornell-fraternity-rape-case-massachusetts-law/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 16:42:26 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Trial Strategy and Evidence Notes]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It is based on the civil complaint, public statements by Cornell University and New York officials, and published news reporting, including reporting on documents from Cornell’s Title IX investigation. The complaint’s allegations have&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Attorney Joe Serpa | Georgetown University Law Center</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It is based on the civil complaint, public statements by Cornell University and New York officials, and published news reporting, including reporting on documents from Cornell’s Title IX investigation. The complaint’s allegations have not been proved in any court. The case is pending in New York under New York law. No criminal charge had been filed as of October 3, 2026. Lawyers for several of the men named in the lawsuit have denied the allegations.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Attorney Serpa examines <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/cornell-jane-doe-doxxing-law/">the doxing campaign against Cornell’s Jane Doe</a> and the related questions of privacy, harassment, gag orders, and confrontation rights in a follow-up article.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the night of October 19, 2024, a 20-year-old Cornell University sophomore walked alone to the Chi Phi fraternity house in Ithaca, New York, after drinking at her sorority house and at a downtown bar. She says that over the next seven hours fraternity members gave her ketamine and more alcohol, that one member posted in the fraternity’s group chat that there was “free” sex upstairs, and that seven members of the fraternity sexually assaulted her while she was too impaired to consent. She lost consciousness at about 5:45 a.m. She reported the night to the Cornell University Police Department nearly three weeks later.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Tompkins County District Attorney reviewed her sworn statement in November 2024 and declined to charge anyone. Cornell’s Title IX office held at least twelve hearings in May 2025. The hearing panel expelled two of the men and suspended others. In September 2026 the woman, identified in court papers as Jane Doe, sued Cornell, the fraternity, her sorority, a bar, and the seven men in the Supreme Court of the State of New York in Manhattan. Public reaction to the lawsuit was swift and angry. The District Attorney reopened the criminal investigation on September 28, 2026. On October 1, 2026, Governor Kathy Hochul removed the District Attorney from the case and appointed Attorney General Letitia James as special prosecutor.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Any criminal or civil case will be heard in New York. New York courts will decide it under New York law. New York’s rape law is similar to Massachusetts law in most respects. Both states require the prosecution to prove that the complainant did not consent. Both treat intercourse by force, and intercourse with a person incapable of consenting, as rape. The two states define incapacity differently, however. The second part of this post explains that difference.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The first part of this post is about something no court will decide, which is what the young men in that house owed Jane Doe, how they failed her, and what every man should learn from their failure. The second part examines how Massachusetts criminal law would apply if the same events had happened at a fraternity house in Massachusetts, how a college panel, a Title IX hearing, and a criminal jury apply different standards to the same night, and why a criminal courtroom is a hard place for a woman who reports a rape. Nothing in the second part predicts what New York’s special prosecutor or a New York grand jury will do. The question for a jury is whether the Commonwealth has proved a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The question of decency is different. This post takes it up first.</p>



<h2 id="h-how-the-men-of-the-cornell-fraternity-failed-jane-doe" class="wp-block-heading">How the Men of the Cornell Fraternity Failed Jane Doe</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A woman who is impaired and alone in a room with men coming into the room by profane invitation is in danger. Every man who saw Jane Doe at Cornell that night had one obligation. He had to stop what was happening. He had to intervene to help her, make sure she remained safe, and call the police.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This obligation is universal and comports with basic humanity and human decency. It was owed Jane Doe even if only one person in the house had the courage to stand up, as the others laughed at him, threatened him, and if it cost his standing in the fraternity. Stopping a sexual assault is not heroism. It is the minimum that one human being owes another. A young man who cannot meet that minimum should not be trusted in a room with a woman who has been drinking or using drugs, whether voluntarily or under duress.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Put differently, we should not live in a world where the obligation to stay safe from men is imposed on women. We should have moved beyond this long ago.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The men at Cornell that night understood that most basic decency even if they could not comport with it. One wrote two days later in pointless hindsight that he was sorry he had been too impaired “to shut it down and kick people out before it got way out of hand.” He knew right and wrong, not only because he described it, but because it is so fundamental. He knew he should have intervened. He did not. He blamed alcohol. His attention should be on his own character. His post-hoc shame is not absolution.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Others, as we know, joined the sexual assault. Yet others turned a blind eye, and one of them advertised Jane Doe as there for the taking.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Massachusetts law does little to create a legal obligation consistent with this duty of basic humanity. Under G.L. c. 268, § 40, a person who knows that another person is the victim of a rape and is at the scene must report the crime to the police as soon as reasonably practicable, as long as he can do so without danger to himself or others. A person who violates § 40 faces a fine of $500 to $2,500.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Legislature enacted that statute in December 1983, nine months after the Big Dan’s tavern rape in New Bedford, where patrons laughed and cheered while a woman was raped on a pool table and no one called the police. The statute creates a baseline of the very least a bystander must do. The criminal law does not require a person to intervene. Under the Massachusetts joint venture rule, discussed in the second part of this post, a person who stands in the room and does nothing is not guilty of the rape.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Decency requires far more than the statute does.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Standing up for a victim in that moment may mean being the odd person out. Standing up means telling the people you live with that their conduct is detestable and vile, in a setting where others have already disregarded that basic truth.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Young men should all reflect on whether they have the courage to do what is right in the face of social pressure. If they decide they do not, they should reflect on that and second-guess whether they deserve to be in the company of potential victims of sexual violence. The lesson is for all people, not only fraternity members. The same duty applies at a bar on Boylston Street, at a wedding, at an office party, or in an apartment when a friend brings home someone who is obviously incapacitated or has reduced judgment. Seeing that a person cannot protect themselves is all it takes to step in.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The obligation to step in at Cornell continued after that night. The decent response was to offer support by telling the truth. Cornell’s own survey, released in November 2025, found that 35 percent of its undergraduate women reported nonconsensual sexual contact since arriving on campus. The young men on that campus, and on every campus in Massachusetts, are solely responsible for lowering that percentage to zero.</p>



<h2 id="h-how-cornell-and-the-district-attorney-failed-jane-doe" class="wp-block-heading">How Cornell and the District Attorney Failed Jane Doe</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The men in the room were not the only ones who failed Jane Doe. Two institutions had the duty to respond to her report. Cornell’s Title IX process and the Tompkins County District Attorney’s office each had the power to act on that report. Both failed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Cornell’s failure began before the Title IX process did. On October 22, 2024, Jane Doe went to Cornell Health and reported an infection contracted in “a traumatic way.” No one there referred her for a sexual assault evidence kit. By the time Jane Doe asked for a kit at an emergency room on November 7, any DNA evidence was gone.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Title IX office opened a formal investigation in January 2025 and held its hearings in May 2025. The panel expelled two of the men, found two not responsible, and suspended two others for multiple semesters. The two suspended men can return to Cornell when their suspensions end. Cornell could not sanction the seventh man at all because he had already graduated. Jane Doe is the person who left Cornell.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The District Attorney’s office did less than Cornell did. The office reviewed Jane Doe’s six-page sworn statement in November 2024 and decided not to charge anyone. The Cornell police had more evidence. The investigator had interviewed other witnesses and had the transcript of the interview in which Jane Doe said, “I can say with 100% confidence I was raped.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Records that the New York Times obtained and reported in October 2026 show that the investigator offered the District Attorney’s office more than the sworn statement in November 2024. The investigator’s notes record that a member of the District Attorney’s staff said the office had no interest in additional interviews and that criminal charges would not be pursued in the case.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The District Attorney has said that the office never received the transcript. The District Attorney told the New York Times that the additional records were “not pertinent to our analysis.” The Governor removed the District Attorney from the case on October 1, 2026. A prosecutor who wants to know whether a crime occurred reads every page the police have.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In my view Cornell’s failures and the District Attorney’s failures are not separate accidents. The conduct of the men that night, the outcome of Cornell’s Title IX process, and the District Attorney’s refusal to look at more evidence all reflect an institutional, structural imperative to protect boys and men, especially those privileged to attend a school like Cornell. Cornell had seven of its own students and its own reputation to protect. The District Attorney chose not to read the evidence against seven Cornell students. Jane Doe had no institution on her side.</p>



<h2 id="h-a-victim-s-minimization-after-a-sexual-assault" class="wp-block-heading">A Victim’s Minimization After a Sexual Assault</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jane Doe’s messages over three weeks record a woman who first described the night as something she had done to herself. Over time she saw that it was something that had been done to her. In my experience, victims of sexual assault often minimize the assault afterward, to themselves and to others, for reasons that have nothing to do with whether it happened. Some minimize to preserve a friendship or a social world they cannot afford to lose. A sophomore in a Greek system at a university far from home is in exactly that position.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Others minimize because admitting the truth means becoming a victim in their own eyes. Some minimize because they were drunk or drugged and blame themselves for being there. Some minimize because the men involved are telling them, in friendly texts, that it will “blow over soon.” The Supreme Judicial Court recognized this in <em>Commonwealth v. King</em>, 445 Mass. 217, 242 (2005), when it abolished the requirement of a “fresh” complaint and wrote that “victims often do not promptly report a sexual assault for a variety of reasons that have nothing to do with the validity of the claim of assault.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The sexual double standard is another reason women stay silent. Within two days, the rumor at Cornell was that Jane Doe was promiscuous in vile terms. She first accepted the label. “Unfortunately they are true,” she wrote. By contrast, no one at Cornell used slurs against the men. She found a lifeline for what had happened to her only when an anonymous stranger on a forum named it. “That’s the first time I had ever heard the narrative change that I wasn’t a whore and that I was assaulted.” A woman who expects to be judged about having sex rather than protected from the assault has too much reason not to come forward. The people who shamed her gave her that reason.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Shortly after her assault, the fraternity told her she was no longer welcome. This was a new and atrocious insult after severe injury. The disinvitation from a fraternity Halloween party made her silence more likely. She understood what the chapter president’s call meant and said so. “Yall aren’t my friends. Yall are covering your asses.” The fraternity made clear whose reputation the men in the house intended to protect.</p>



<h2 id="h-what-the-public-record-shows" class="wp-block-heading">What the Public Record Shows</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The complaint alleges that Jane Doe drank vodka at her sorority house beginning at about 8:30 p.m., then drank more at a downtown bar even though she was under 21, and had consumed about ten standard drinks in three hours by the time she arrived at Chi Phi at about 11 p.m. to meet a friend who was a member. The friend gave her a beer and took her inside. Upstairs, according to the complaint, members pressured her to snort a white powder they said was ketamine, gave her marijuana and high-proof liquor, and began sexual activity with her.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Transcripts of her interviews, reported by CBS News, show that she described the first sexual encounter, with two men she knew, as something she “was OK with” at the time, even though she was heavily intoxicated. At 1:42 a.m. a fraternity member posted in a Snapchat group called “Chi Phi Actives” that there was “free” sex upstairs, using a vulgar word for a woman’s body. Another member asked whether the “shop” was “still open” and was told that it was. Jane Doe says that more men came into the room, that she was pressured to take more ketamine until she was “completely incapacitated,” and that she was struck during the night. She told investigators, “I’m a naked woman and they are getting in bed with me.” She lost consciousness at about 5:45 a.m.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Over the next three weeks her messages changed. On October 21 she told her sorority “big sister” that rumors calling her a slut were “unfortunately” true. She told her roommates, “If anyone asks about this, say it didn’t happen.” The same day one of the men texted an apology “for how things went down the other night” and wrote that he felt terrible for being “too under the influence of drugs and alcohol to shut it down and kick people out before it got way out of hand.” She answered that “non[e] of the sexual stuff was illegal.” On October 23 she texted that the night was “RUINING my life temporarily” and, in another message, “My reputation is destroyed and I’m utterly ashamed.” One of the men told her that Chi Phi “is your house and you are welcome here.” The chapter president then called to tell her not to come to the fraternity’s Halloween party, “for her own good.” She wrote back, “I knew this was going to happen. The woman will always get the short end of the stick. Yall aren’t my friends. Yall are covering your asses.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Late in October she saw an anonymous post on a campus forum that said the fraternity’s members “do drugs and gang r*ped a sophomore.” She later told investigators, “That’s the first time I had ever heard the narrative change that I wasn’t a whore and that I was assaulted.” On November 3 she texted one of the men that “90% of what happened that night was not consensual.” She had gone to Cornell Health on October 22 and reported an infection contracted in “a traumatic way,” but no one referred her for a sexual assault evidence kit. She asked for one at an emergency room on November 7. By then any DNA evidence was gone. On November 8 she reported the assault to the Cornell University Police Department. On November 14 she signed a six-page sworn statement and told the officer, “I can say with 100% confidence I was raped.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Cornell suspended the chapter and the seven men on an interim basis the same week. The university’s Title IX office opened a formal investigation in January 2025, interviewed 32 witnesses, and held at least twelve hearings in May 2025. According to CBS News, the panel expelled two of the men, suspended two for multiple semesters, found two not responsible, and could not sanction one who had already graduated. Cornell has said that it did not offer any of the men an essay as his only sanction. The Chi Phi national organization says it expelled the accused members from the fraternity within days of her report and later closed the chapter. Jane Doe withdrew from Cornell.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">District Attorney Matthew Van Houten explained his 2024 decision in a statement on September 28, 2026. He said that her sworn statement “described her participation in drug use and sexual conduct as voluntary, conscious, and consensual,” and that under New York Penal Law § 130.05 a sex crime requires lack of consent through forcible compulsion, incapacity, physical helplessness, or a clearly expressed refusal. He also said that his office never received the transcript of the interview in which she said she was raped. He reopened the investigation the same day. Three days later the Governor replaced him with the Attorney General, who now decides whether to present the case to a grand jury.</p>



<h2 id="h-four-standards-for-one-night-the-college-code-title-ix-the-criminal-law-and-basic-human-decency" class="wp-block-heading">Four Standards for One Night: the College Code, Title IX, the Criminal Law, and Basic Human Decency</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Cornell judged the men under its own code of conduct. New York requires every college in the state to adopt the same definition of consent, which the statute calls affirmative consent and defines as “a knowing, voluntary, and mutual decision among all participants to engage in sexual activity.” N.Y. Education Law § 6441. Under that definition, silence or lack of resistance is not consent, consent to one act is not consent to another, consent may be withdrawn at any time, and a person who is incapacitated by alcohol or drugs cannot consent. A college panel decides whether the responding student violated the code, usually by a preponderance of the evidence. The most severe sanction a college can impose is expulsion.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Title IX is the federal law that requires a college receiving federal funds to respond to sexual harassment, including sexual assault, as sex discrimination. The regulations in force for a college disciplinary case are the 2020 regulations, which the Department of Education restored and formally re-adopted on September 29, 2026. Under those regulations a college must give the accused student notice and a presumption that he is not responsible, must share the evidence with both sides, must hold a live hearing, and must let each party’s advisor cross-examine the other party and the witnesses. The college chooses whether it will decide the case by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence. The college also writes its own definition of consent, because the federal regulations do not impose one.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Massachusetts adds its own campus statute. G.L. c. 6, § 168E requires every public and private college in the Commonwealth to adopt a sexual misconduct policy, to designate a confidential resource provider trained in trauma-informed response, to tell students that they have the right to notify the police or to decline to notify the police, and to let a student pursue the college’s disciplinary case and a criminal case at the same time. The policy must presume the responding student not responsible until the panel decides, must state the standard of evidence the college uses, and must prohibit the two students from questioning each other directly. The statute does not define consent. Each Massachusetts college writes its own definition, and <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/college-university-student-criminal-defense-lawyer-boston-cambridge/">a student’s case</a> depends on the definition in that college’s policy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The criminal law is a separate system with a separate decision-maker. A college panel decides whether a student violated a policy. A grand jury decides whether to indict, and a trial jury decides whether the Commonwealth has proved a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The district attorney decides whether to seek an indictment, what to charge, and what plea to offer. The complainant does not control those decisions. A college can expel a student. A judge can sentence a man convicted of rape to state prison for up to twenty years, or for life if the rape was aggravated.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The most fundamental human decency is the fourth standard. No panel enforces it. The first part of this post is about that decency.</p>



<h2 id="h-how-massachusetts-defines-rape" class="wp-block-heading">How Massachusetts Defines Rape</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">From this point on, this post treats the Cornell allegations as if the fraternity house stood in Massachusetts and a Massachusetts district attorney, rather than a New York prosecutor, were reviewing them. New York law governs the real case. Massachusetts defines <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/">rape</a> in G.L. c. 265, § 22(b). The Commonwealth must prove that the defendant had sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with the complainant, and that he compelled her to submit by force and against her will, or by threat of bodily injury. The Supreme Judicial Court treats “by force” and “against her will” as two separate elements, so the Commonwealth must prove both force and lack of consent. <em>Commonwealth v. Lopez</em>, 433 Mass. 722, 726-727 (2001). Any penetration, however slight, is sexual intercourse under the statute. The jury decides whether the woman consented at the moment of each act of penetration, so consent to one act is not consent to the next. A person convicted of rape under § 22(b) faces up to twenty years in state prison.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Section 22(a) defines aggravated rape. The Commonwealth proves aggravated rape when it proves a rape that caused serious bodily injury, a rape committed during certain other felonies, or a rape “committed by a joint enterprise.” A person convicted of aggravated rape faces imprisonment in state prison for life or for any term of years. An allegation that several men raped one woman together is, in Massachusetts, an allegation of aggravated rape against each man who participated. The Commonwealth has fifteen years from the date of the rape to indict a defendant for rape. G.L. c. 277, § 63.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth does not have to prove that the defendant knew the woman was not consenting. Rape is a general intent crime. The Commonwealth proves it by proving that the defendant intended intercourse by force and that the woman did not in fact consent. <em>Lopez</em>, 433 Mass. at 727-728. The Supreme Judicial Court in <em>Lopez</em> declined to recognize a defense of honest and reasonable mistake about consent, reasoning that “[p]roof of the element of force, therefore, should negate any possible mistake as to consent.” 433 Mass. at 729. The court left the question open for a future case in which a claim of reasonable mistake is “at least arguably supported by the evidence.” 433 Mass. at 732. The defendant in <em>Lopez</em> testified that the complainant consented. The court held that his claim of actual consent did not entitle him to a mistake instruction. The court reaffirmed the rule in <em>Commonwealth v. Urban</em>, 450 Mass. 608 (2008), decided the same day as <em>Blache</em>, and wrote that Massachusetts does not require the Commonwealth to prove in every rape case that the defendant lacked a reasonable and good faith belief in the complainant’s consent. The Appeals Court has since restated the rule. Massachusetts does not recognize mistake of fact about consent as a defense to rape, except to the extent that <em>Blache</em>, discussed next, recognizes it in incapacity cases. <em>Commonwealth v. Butler</em>, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 223, 230-231 (2020).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The “mistaken belief in consent” that lawyers in other states treat as a defense is therefore, in a Massachusetts case built on force, an argument about the facts rather than a separate defense. The defendant argues that the woman consented. The jury must acquit if it has a reasonable doubt about force or about consent. The exception is the case in which the Commonwealth relies on the woman’s incapacity rather than on force, which is exactly the kind of case the Cornell facts present. The firm’s page on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/consent-massachusetts-sexual-assault-law/">consent in Massachusetts rape and sexual assault cases</a> covers the rules on force, incapacity, age, mistaken belief, and withdrawn consent in full.</p>



<h2 id="h-alcohol-ketamine-and-the-capacity-to-consent" class="wp-block-heading">Alcohol, Ketamine, and the Capacity to Consent</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A woman who is so impaired by alcohol or drugs that she cannot give or refuse consent cannot consent. Massachusetts applies that rule whether or not she took the alcohol or the drugs willingly. The Supreme Judicial Court set out the rules in <em>Commonwealth v. Blache</em>, 450 Mass. 583 (2008). Intoxication by itself is not incapacity. “The question instead is whether, as a result of the complainant’s consumption of drugs, alcohol, or both, she was unable to give or refuse consent.” 450 Mass. at 591-592. The complainant does not have to have been unconscious or nearly so. A jury that finds beyond a reasonable doubt that she was so impaired as to be incapable of consenting has found lack of consent. The Commonwealth then needs to prove only the force needed to accomplish the penetration itself. 450 Mass. at 590-592.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Blache</em> protects the defendant as well. A prosecutor who relies on incapacity must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “knew or reasonably should have known that the complainant’s condition rendered her incapable of consenting to the sexual act.” 450 Mass. at 594. The knowledge requirement is the Massachusetts form of the mistaken-belief defense. A man who had sex with a woman who was in fact too impaired to consent is not guilty of rape on an incapacity theory if the jury has a reasonable doubt about whether he knew or should have known of her condition. A man who ignored a woman’s clear refusal cannot make that argument. <em>Commonwealth v. Kennedy</em>, 478 Mass. 804, 811 (2018).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">New York defines incapacity more narrowly than Massachusetts does. Under New York Penal Law § 130.00, a person is “mentally incapacitated” only when a drug or intoxicant was “administered to him without his consent,” and a person is “physically helpless” only when she is unconscious or otherwise physically unable to communicate unwillingness. A woman who willingly drinks ten drinks and willingly snorts ketamine, and who remains conscious and able to speak, is not incapacitated under those definitions, however impaired she is. The District Attorney said that her 2024 statement described none of the circumstances that New York law requires. New York legislators have had a bill to remove that distinction in front of them since 2019. The Governor has promised to work with the Legislature to pass the bill by January. The firm’s post on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/voluntary-intoxication-consent-massachusetts-new-york-cornell/">voluntary intoxication and consent</a> explains the New York rule, the bill, and the Massachusetts rule that has applied since 1870.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A Massachusetts jury answers a different question. The source of the impairment is irrelevant under <em>Blache</em>. The jury decides whether the woman was so impaired that she could not give or refuse consent, and whether the man knew or should have known of her condition. On the facts Jane Doe alleges, a Massachusetts prosecutor would point to about ten drinks in three hours before she arrived, repeated doses of ketamine that the men themselves gave her, a roommate’s account that she told one of the men her “eyes were crossed” from the drug when he had sex with her, the group-chat invitation to other members, and the apology text from a participant who wrote that he had been too impaired “to shut it down and kick people out before it got way out of hand.” The men gave her the drug, which is evidence of what they knew about her condition. The evidence of her drinking and her drugging bears on her capacity. The men’s own messages bear on their knowledge.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense would answer with her own words. She told the police that she “was OK with” the first encounter. She texted one of the men two days later that “non[e] of the sexual stuff was illegal.” She told the police that she swatted away hands she did not want on her, which the Commonwealth would offer as evidence of refusal but which a defense lawyer would offer as evidence that she was capable of refusing. She agreed to the first encounter. She remembers parts of the night in detail. A Massachusetts jury would have to decide whether she was capable of consenting act by act and man by man. A woman who was capable of consenting at midnight can be incapable of consenting at 4:00 a.m. The jury judges a man who joined the room at 4:00 a.m. on what he saw and knew at 4:00 a.m.</p>



<h2 id="h-drugging-a-person-for-sexual-intercourse" class="wp-block-heading">Drugging a Person for Sexual Intercourse</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Massachusetts also makes it a separate crime to drug a person for sex. G.L. c. 272, § 3 punishes anyone who “applies, administers to or causes to be taken by a person any drug, matter or thing with intent to stupefy or overpower such person so as to thereby enable any person to have sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with such person.” A person convicted under § 3 faces imprisonment in state prison for life or for any term of years not less than ten. The statute applies to a man who gives a woman a drug so that another man can have sex with her, because it covers enabling “any person” to have intercourse. The Commonwealth would have to prove the intent to stupefy or overpower her for that purpose. The men’s own messages would be the prosecutor’s evidence of that intent.</p>



<h2 id="h-joint-venture-liability-and-aggravated-rape-by-joint-enterprise" class="wp-block-heading">Joint Venture Liability and Aggravated Rape by Joint Enterprise</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Massachusetts punishes a man who helps or encourages a rape as a participant in the rape. The jury may convict a defendant who “knowingly participated in the commission of the crime charged, alone or with others, with the intent required for that offense.” <em>Commonwealth v. Zanetti</em>, 454 Mass. 449, 468 (2009). Under the model instruction in the appendix to <em>Zanetti</em>, participation includes personally committing the act, aiding another in it, or “asking or encouraging another person to commit the crime.” Mere presence is not enough. A man who stood in the room, knew what was happening, and did nothing is not guilty of rape under Massachusetts law. Knowing about the crime and failing to prevent the crime is not participation in the crime. A man who posted a message inviting his fraternity brothers upstairs to a woman he knew was impaired has done more than stand there. A prosecutor would argue that the message was encouragement. The jury would then decide whether the man who sent it knew her condition and intended that others have sex with her.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Participation by several men also makes the crime aggravated rape. Rape “committed by a joint enterprise” is aggravated rape under § 22(a), punishable by life or any term of years. In the Big Dan’s tavern case, which arose in New Bedford in 1983, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the aggravated rape convictions of men who raped a woman on a pool table while other patrons, according to the trial testimony, laughed and cheered. <em>Commonwealth v. Cordeiro</em>, 401 Mass. 843 (1988). In <em>Cordeiro</em> the court stated the same rule that <em>Lopez</em> later confirmed. The Commonwealth “is not required to prove either that the defendant intended the sexual intercourse be without consent or that he had actual knowledge of the victim’s lack of consent.” 401 Mass. at 851 n.11.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The jury judges each man separately. The Commonwealth must prove each defendant’s own participation and intent. The jury judges a man who had consensual sex with Jane Doe early in the evening and left on that act alone. The jury judges a man who came upstairs in response to the message on what he did and on what he knew when he did it. Cornell’s panel found two of the seven not responsible under the university’s own standard of evidence, which shows how differently the evidence can come out against different men in the same room.</p>



<h2 id="h-consent-given-earlier-in-the-night-and-consent-withdrawn" class="wp-block-heading">Consent Given Earlier in the Night and Consent Withdrawn</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jane Doe says she initially agreed to sex with two men she knew and did not agree to what followed. Massachusetts law treats the two parts of the night separately. The jury decides whether the woman consented at the moment of each act of penetration, so a woman’s consent to intercourse with one man at midnight is not consent to intercourse with a different man at 3:00 a.m. For the men who came into the room later, the Commonwealth would have to prove that she did not consent to each act at the time it occurred.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A victim need not fight back for the jury to find that they did not consent. <em>Lopez</em>, 433 Mass. at 729. For the two men Jane Doe first agreed to be with, the question is whether she withdrew her consent and whether they continued anyway. The Supreme Judicial Court held in <em>Commonwealth v. Sherman</em>, 481 Mass. 464, 473-475 (2019), that intercourse that begins with consent becomes rape when the woman withdraws consent, reasonably communicates the withdrawal, and the man continues by the force needed to continue. The communication need not be in words. “Physical gestures, such as trying to push the defendant away or attempting to move in a way that would require the defendant to end the penetration, may suffice,” the court wrote, as long as a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have understood them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth does not have to prove that the defendant understood the withdrawal. The requirement that the victim communicate the withdrawal applies only to an act they consented to at first. For an act they never consented to, the Commonwealth does not have to prove that there was a communicated refusal at all. Jane Doe told the police that several men approached her and that she swatted them away. A Massachusetts jury would treat that gesture as a communicated withdrawal of consent.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A sexual touching without intercourse is a separate crime. Indecent assault and battery on a person fourteen or older, G.L. c. 265, § 13H, punishes an intentional, indecent touching without consent. A person convicted under § 13H faces up to five years in state prison or up to two and one-half years in a house of correction. Lack of consent is an element the Commonwealth must prove. The <em>Blache</em> rules on intoxication also apply to this charge, as the firm’s page on <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/indecent-assault-and-battery-defense-in-massachusetts/">indecent assault and battery</a> explains. Because the Commonwealth does not have to prove force for this charge, the appellate courts have discussed whether a defendant may be entitled to a mistake-of-fact instruction in a case where the evidence supports an honest and reasonable belief that the complainant consented. They have refused the instruction where the complainant said no and where the evidence did not support the claim. <em>Kennedy</em>, 478 Mass. at 811. <em>Butler</em>, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 230-231.</p>



<h2 id="h-the-burden-of-proof-and-cross-examination-in-a-massachusetts-rape-trial" class="wp-block-heading">The Burden of Proof and Cross-Examination in a Massachusetts Rape Trial</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A Massachusetts jury may convict only when the Commonwealth has proved every element beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge tells the jury that proof beyond a reasonable doubt leaves them with “an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, that the charge is true,” and that “it is not enough for the Commonwealth to establish a probability, even a strong probability, that the defendant is more likely to be guilty than not guilty.” <em>Commonwealth v. Russell</em>, 470 Mass. 464, 477-478 (2015). The reasonable doubt standard is the same for every crime, but it is harder to meet in a rape case built on the word of a complainant who was intoxicated, who remembers parts of the night and not others, and who waited nearly three weeks to report. A college panel that found two men responsible under the university’s standard of evidence was answering an easier question than a jury would answer.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under the Sixth Amendment and Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the accused has the right to confront the witnesses against him. His lawyer <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/cross-examination-massachusetts-criminal-trials/">cross-examines the complainant</a> directly. Title IX hearings assign that questioning to an advisor. In Massachusetts, G.L. c. 6, § 168E forbids the two students in a college case from questioning each other at all. A criminal trial puts no one between the complainant and the defense lawyer’s questions. Jane Doe would face a defense lawyer whose job is to show the jury every reason to doubt her account.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The cross-examination would be built from her own messages. A witness’s prior inconsistent statement is admissible to impeach her. The defense would read her texts to the jury in her own words. She wrote that “non[e] of the sexual stuff was illegal,” that she “really liked being” with two of the men, and that her roommates should “say it didn’t happen” if anyone asked.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">She described the night to the first people she spoke with in terms that did not describe a rape. Under the <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/">first complaint doctrine</a>, the first person a complainant told that she was sexually assaulted may testify to what she said and when. The jury may consider the timing of the complaint and the circumstances in which it was made in weighing her credibility. <em>King</em>, 445 Mass. at 242-245.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The civil lawsuit seeks compensatory and punitive damages. The defense would argue that the money is her motive. A defendant has a constitutional right to cross-examine a complainant about bias and motive to lie. <em>Commonwealth v. Joyce</em>, 382 Mass. 222, 229-231 (1981). Defense counsel may also ask a judge for access to her counseling records under the protocol in <em>Commonwealth v. Dwyer</em>, 448 Mass. 122 (2006), which lets counsel inspect privileged records under a protective order after a judge finds them relevant and necessary.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Massachusetts law would protect Jane Doe in several ways. The rape shield statute, G.L. c. 233, § 21B, bars nearly all evidence of a complainant’s past sexual conduct. The statute likewise bars evidence of her specific sexual conduct with anyone other than the defendant unless the conduct explains a physical condition the Commonwealth relies on. Even evidence of past sexual conduct with the defendant can be admitted only after a non-jury hearing on a written motion and a finding by the judge that its weight and relevancy outweigh its “prejudicial effect to the victim.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The constitutional right to show bias can override the rape-shield statute, but a judge must limit that evidence as far as possible without infringing the right. <em>Joyce</em>, 382 Mass. at 231. A victim’s name in court and police records is not open to public inspection. G.L. c. 265, § 24C. Their communications with a sexual assault counselor at a rape crisis center are privileged and are not subject to discovery without their written consent. G.L. c. 233, § 20J. A jury would hear from the judge that sexual assault complainants “may delay reporting the crime for a variety of reasons,” because the first complaint instruction says so. <em>King</em>, 445 Mass. at 247-248. The Commonwealth could call an expert, moreover, to explain in general terms why victims delay reporting and why they may stay in contact with the men who assaulted them, although the expert may not testify about Jane Doe herself or say that she was assaulted. <em>Commonwealth v. Mamay</em>, 407 Mass. 412, 421-422 (1990).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My assessment is that a Massachusetts prosecutor would have a stronger legal basis to charge the men than the Tompkins County District Attorney believed he had under New York’s definitions. Under <em>Blache</em>, impairment, not how a victim becomes impaired, creates non-consent. The group-chat message and the apology text are evidence of knowledge and intent. The same prosecutor would face a hard trial, because the Commonwealth’s case would rest on the memory of a woman who was drugged and impaired. They would also need to confront the victim’s messages in which she minimized what happened to her for nearly three weeks. A young woman deciding whether to report deserves to hear all facets of the prosecution, good or bad.</p>



<h2 id="h-key-takeaways" class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Attorney Serpa’s position is that every man in that house owed Jane Doe the simple decency of stopping what was happening and getting her to safety, even as the odd man out, and that the same duty applies to every man, in every setting, who sees a woman who cannot protect herself. Massachusetts law requires only that a bystander at the scene of a rape report it. G.L. c. 268, § 40. Decency requires more.</li>



<li>Jane Doe alleges that seven Chi Phi members at Cornell sexually assaulted her over seven hours on October 19 and 20, 2024, after giving her ketamine and alcohol, and that one of them advertised her in the fraternity’s group chat. The Tompkins County District Attorney declined to charge in 2024, reopened the case on September 28, 2026, after she sued, and was replaced three days later by New York Attorney General Letitia James as special prosecutor. New York law governs the case. This post examines how Massachusetts law would apply if the same events had happened in Massachusetts.</li>



<li>A college panel, a Title IX hearing, and a criminal jury apply different standards to the same night. Cornell’s panel applied New York’s affirmative consent definition under the university’s own standard of evidence and expelled two men. A criminal jury must find every element proved beyond a reasonable doubt.</li>



<li>In Massachusetts, a woman who is so impaired by alcohol or drugs that she cannot give or refuse consent cannot consent, whether or not she took the alcohol or drugs willingly. The Commonwealth must also prove that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of her condition. <em>Commonwealth v. Blache</em>, 450 Mass. 583 (2008). New York’s definition of “mentally incapacitated” covers only a drug administered without the person’s consent.</li>



<li>Massachusetts does not recognize an honest and reasonable mistake about consent as a defense to forcible rape. <em>Commonwealth v. Lopez</em>, 433 Mass. 722 (2001). The Commonwealth must prove the defendant’s knowledge only in an incapacity case, under <em>Blache</em>.</li>



<li>A rape committed by a joint enterprise is aggravated rape under G.L. c. 265, § 22(a), punishable by life or any term of years. A man who encourages others to join is a participant under <em>Commonwealth v. Zanetti</em>, 454 Mass. 449 (2009). Drugging a person for sexual intercourse is a separate crime under G.L. c. 272, § 3, punishable by life or any term of years not less than ten.</li>



<li>A criminal trial is hard for an accuser. Defense counsel cross-examines her directly, her texts minimizing the assault are admissible to impeach her, her civil lawsuit is evidence of motive, and the Commonwealth must prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The rape shield statute, the confidentiality of her name under G.L. c. 265, § 24C, and the first complaint instruction protect her in part.</li>



<li>Victims commonly minimize an assault afterward, out of shame, self-preservation, and the sexual double standard. Massachusetts law recognizes that delay in reporting is consistent with a true account. <em>Commonwealth v. King</em>, 445 Mass. 217 (2005).</li>
</ul>



<h2 id="h-related-serpa-law-office-resources" class="wp-block-heading">Related Serpa Law Office resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/sandra-birchmore-matthew-farwell-federal-trial/">When the Police Protect and Serve Only Themselves: Sandra Birchmore and the Federal Trial of Matthew Farwell</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/consent-massachusetts-sexual-assault-law/">Consent in Massachusetts Rape and Sexual Assault Cases</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/voluntary-intoxication-consent-massachusetts-new-york-cornell/">Voluntary Intoxication and Consent After the Cornell Case: The New York Rule and the Massachusetts Rule</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/">Sexual Assault and Rape Defense in Massachusetts</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/criminal-charges-defense/greater-boston-rape-assault-attorney/indecent-assault-and-battery-defense-in-massachusetts/">Charged With Indecent Assault and Battery in Massachusetts: Defenses, Penalties, and the Sex Offender Registry</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/college-university-student-criminal-defense-lawyer-boston-cambridge/">College and University Student Criminal Defense Lawyer: Boston and Cambridge</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/rights-legal-concepts/cross-examination-massachusetts-criminal-trials/">Cross-Examination in Massachusetts Criminal Trials</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/massachusetts-student-criminal-defense-faqs/">Massachusetts Student Criminal Defense FAQs</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/massachusetts-text-message-phone-evidence-faqs/">Massachusetts Text Message and Phone Evidence FAQs</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/testifying-209a-hearing-criminal-case-pending/">Testifying at a 209A Restraining Order Hearing While the Criminal Case Is Pending</a></li>
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                <title><![CDATA[Lindsay Clancy Hearing on September 29, 2026 and the Retrial Question]]></title>
                <link>https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-september-29-hearing-double-jeopardy/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-september-29-hearing-double-jeopardy/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Attorney Joe Serpa]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 19:01:22 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Massachusetts Criminal Law Updates | Serpa Law Office]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Trial Strategy and Evidence Notes]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Judge William Sullivan held a hearing on the morning of September 29, 2026, in Plymouth Superior Court in the murder case against Lindsay Clancy. The hearing was the first since Judge Sullivan declared a mistrial on September 4, 2026. Judge Sullivan set arguments on the defense motion to dismiss for November 2. The Plymouth County&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge William Sullivan held a hearing on the morning of September 29, 2026, in Plymouth Superior Court in the murder case against Lindsay Clancy. The hearing was the first since Judge Sullivan declared a <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/massachusetts-mistrial-double-jeopardy-retrial/">mistrial</a> on September 4, 2026. Judge Sullivan set arguments on the defense motion to dismiss for November 2. The Plymouth County District Attorney’s Office has not announced whether it will retry Ms. Clancy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth charges Ms. Clancy with murder in the deaths of her three children in Duxbury on January 24, 2023. The jury deliberated for seven days before the mistrial. News reports describe the jury as divided 11 to 1.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What Happened at the Hearing</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ms. Clancy appeared in court with her attorneys, including Kevin Reddington, for the first time since the mistrial. Judge Sullivan set November 2 for arguments on the motion to dismiss. According to CBS Boston, prosecutors needed more time to prepare their response to that motion.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Sullivan described the defense motion about the holdout juror as one that “addresses a lot of issues that we need to resolve sooner rather than later.” He added, “I’m trying to move this as fast as we can.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Edward Paltzik, the attorney for the holdout juror, told the court that he lacked access to the impounded materials he needed to file a response. Coverage of the juror motion differs on the date. CBS Boston reported that Judge Sullivan set it for November 2. WRGA reported that Mr. Reddington and the Commonwealth agreed to continue the motion out of professional courtesy, and it did not report a new date.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The District Attorney’s Office filed an opposition to the renewed defense motion for a required finding of not guilty. The opposition argues that the court should evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence “based solely on the evidence presented at trial.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commonwealth also asked Judge Sullivan to enter a gag order restricting extrajudicial statements by the attorneys. The Commonwealth’s motion asserts that defense statements have “tainted any further venire.” Judge Sullivan deferred a ruling on that motion to November 2.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Defense Motion to Dismiss on Double Jeopardy Grounds</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense filed the motion to dismiss on September 22, 2026, with Martin Weinberg as co-counsel. The motion argues that no manifest necessity justified the mistrial because Judge Sullivan did not adequately investigate the holdout juror before declaring it. The defense therefore contends that a second trial would violate the double jeopardy protection of the Fifth Amendment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Fifth Amendment and Massachusetts law generally bar a second trial of a defendant whose first trial ends over the defendant’s objection without a conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court stated that rule in <em>Ray v. Commonwealth</em>, 463 Mass. 1, 3 (2012). A second trial is permitted when the trial judge declared the mistrial because of <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/massachusetts-mistrial-double-jeopardy-retrial/">manifest necessity</a>. A jury that cannot agree on a verdict is the traditional example of manifest necessity. <em>Commonwealth v. Troila</em>, 410 Mass. 203, 206 (1991).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The trial judge decides whether to declare a mistrial, and a reviewing court asks whether the judge abused that discretion. Two principles guide the review. Counsel must have had a full opportunity to be heard, and the judge must have given careful consideration to alternatives to a mistrial. <em>Ray</em>, 463 Mass. 1. The Supreme Judicial Court also identified factors that often apply, including statements by the jury that it cannot agree, and the length of deliberations compared with the length of the trial and the complexity of the factual disputes. <em>Ray</em>, 463 Mass. 1.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Supreme Judicial Court applied those principles to Karen Read’s case in February 2025. The trial judge in that case directed the jury to continue deliberating after the first note. The judge gave the Tuey-Rodriquez instruction after the second note, which encourages a deadlocked jury to give more serious consideration to opposing points of view. The judge declared a mistrial after a third note stating that further deliberation would be futile. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the mistrial was manifestly necessary and that double jeopardy did not bar a retrial. <em>Read v. Commonwealth</em>, 495 Mass. 312 (2025). Ms. Read was later acquitted of murder at her retrial.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The record of what Judge Sullivan did before the mistrial is public. The jury reported on the fourth day of deliberations that it could not reach a unanimous verdict. Judge Sullivan sent the jurors back to continue deliberating. After a second report on September 2, 2026, Judge Sullivan gave the Tuey-Rodriquez instruction. On September 3, the jury foreperson told Judge Sullivan that one juror had refused to follow the law on reasonable doubt. On September 4, the foreperson submitted a note stating, “It is with a heavy heart that we report we are unable to come to a unanimous decision.” Judge Sullivan then declared the mistrial. According to PBS NewsHour, Mr. Reddington had asked Judge Sullivan to give the instruction again and to continue deliberations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/lawyers/joe-serpa/">Attorney Joe Serpa</a>’s assessment is that the motion to dismiss is unlikely to succeed. Judge Sullivan took steps similar to those of the trial judge in Ms. Read’s case. He sent the jury back to deliberate after the first report, gave the Tuey-Rodriquez instruction after the second report, and declared the mistrial only after the foreperson’s final note. The Supreme Judicial Court held in <em>Read</em> that those steps made the mistrial manifestly necessary.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The jury deliberated for seven days. The Supreme Judicial Court reviews a mistrial only for abuse of discretion. The decision whether to give the Tuey-Rodriquez instruction belongs to the trial judge even when the parties request it. <em>Ray</em>, 463 Mass. 1. The defense claim about the holdout juror asks the court to inquire into what happened in the jury room, and the court in <em>Read</em> refused a posttrial inquiry of that kind.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Holdout Juror Motion</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense asked Judge Sullivan to investigate the <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-juror-removal-massachusetts-law/">holdout juror</a>. According to news reports, the defense alleged that the juror scrolled on a cellphone during deliberations and disregarded the instructions on reasonable doubt. The defense also requested the juror’s cellphone records and jury selection questionnaire.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Massachusetts courts protect the secrecy of jury deliberations. The Supreme Judicial Court has called that secrecy a “bedrock of our judicial system.” <em>Commonwealth v. Moore</em>, 474 Mass. 541, 548 (2016). In Ms. Read’s case, the court refused to permit a posttrial inquiry into what the jurors privately agreed on, and it cited the prohibition on probing the content of deliberations. <em>Read</em>, 495 Mass. 312.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Sullivan has not yet ruled on whether to order any inquiry of the juror. Mr. Paltzik now represents the juror and told the court that he required access to the impounded materials before responding.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Renewed Motion for a Required Finding of Not Guilty</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mr. Reddington renewed the defense motion for a <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-required-finding-motion-after-mistrial/">required finding of not guilty</a> under <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/rule-25-required-finding-of-not-guilty-massachusetts/">Rule 25(b)(2)</a> of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rule allows a defendant to renew that motion after the jury is discharged.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The motion is governed by the standard of <em>Commonwealth v. Latimore</em>, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). Under that standard, the judge views the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and asks whether any rational jury could find each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth opposed the motion and argued that the trial evidence meets that standard. Mr. Reddington argued that the Commonwealth had failed to prove criminal responsibility because all six experts who testified agreed that Ms. Clancy suffered a serious mental illness.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Sullivan already denied the defense motion for a required finding of not guilty twice during the trial, once after the Commonwealth rested and again before deliberations began, according to Boston.com. The renewed motion asks Judge Sullivan to reverse those rulings on the same trial evidence.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Attorney Serpa’s assessment is that the renewed motion is unlikely to succeed. Under <em>Latimore</em>, the judge views every disputed inference in the Commonwealth’s favor and asks only whether any rational jury could find that the Commonwealth proved criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt. The weight of the expert testimony is a question for the jury. The Commonwealth presented evidence of planning and of Ms. Clancy’s conduct afterward. Judge Sullivan has twice found that evidence sufficient to send the case to the jury.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Sullivan’s ruling on this motion can end the prosecution. The Supreme Judicial Court applied its double jeopardy rule for hung juries in <em>Ray</em> where the defendant made no claim that the trial evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial when a conviction is reversed because the evidence was insufficient. <em>Commonwealth v. Tinsley</em>, 487 Mass. 380, 389 (2021).</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Whether the Commonwealth Can Retry Ms. Clancy</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The District Attorney’s Office decides whether the Commonwealth retries Ms. Clancy, offers a plea, or seeks a different resolution. Plymouth County District Attorney Tim Cruz stated after the mistrial that he would not make an immediate decision. As of the September 29 hearing, the office had not announced one.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Sullivan must first rule on the double jeopardy motion, the holdout juror motion, and the renewed motion for a required finding. A defendant who loses a double jeopardy motion in the trial court can petition the Supreme Judicial Court before a retrial begins, as Ms. Read and the petitioner in <em>Ray</em> did. <a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-november-2-hearing-double-jeopardy/">The November 2 hearing</a> is the next scheduled date in Ms. Clancy’s case.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Judge William Sullivan heard the first post-mistrial hearing in the Clancy case on September 29, 2026, and set November 2 for arguments on the defense motion to dismiss.</li>


<li>The defense argues that a second trial violates double jeopardy because Judge Sullivan did not adequately investigate the holdout juror before declaring the mistrial. Attorney Joe Serpa’s assessment is that the motion is unlikely to succeed, because Judge Sullivan took steps similar to those the Supreme Judicial Court upheld in <em>Read</em>.</li>


<li>The Supreme Judicial Court has held that a mistrial for a deadlocked jury is manifestly necessary when the judge gave counsel a full opportunity to be heard and carefully considered alternatives. It applied that rule in <em>Ray</em> and in <em>Read</em>.</li>


<li>The renewed motion for a required finding of not guilty asks Judge Sullivan to rule that the trial evidence was legally insufficient. He denied the same motion twice during the trial, and Attorney Serpa’s assessment is that the renewed motion is unlikely to succeed. The Commonwealth has filed an opposition.</li>


<li>The Plymouth County District Attorney’s Office has not announced whether it will retry Ms. Clancy.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Related Serpa Law Office Resources</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/massachusetts-mistrial-double-jeopardy-retrial/">Mistrials in Massachusetts Criminal Cases</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/rule-25-required-finding-of-not-guilty-massachusetts/">Rule 25: The Motion for a Required Finding of Not Guilty in Massachusetts</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-required-finding-motion-after-mistrial/">After the Mistrial: The Renewed Motion for a Required Finding of Not Guilty in the Clancy Case</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-juror-nondisclosure-new-trial/">The Clancy Mistrial and the Juror Questionnaire</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/criminal-defense-practice-areas/court-practice/juror-nondisclosure-misrepresentation-massachusetts/">Juror Nondisclosure and Misrepresentation in Massachusetts Criminal Trials</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-juror-removal-massachusetts-law/">The Lindsay Clancy Jury Dispute: When Massachusetts Law Permits Removal of a Deliberating Juror</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/lindsay-clancy-prosecution-tactical-error/">The Lindsay Clancy Trial: A Cruel, Insensitive, and Out-of-Touch Prosecution</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.serpalaw.com/boston-criminal-law-updates/filming-jurors-lindsay-clancy-trial-witness-intimidation/">Filming Jurors in the Lindsay Clancy Trial and Massachusetts Witness Intimidation Law</a></li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It is based solely on public court proceedings, public reporting, and published decisions and does not reflect any non-public information. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. This may constitute attorney advertising.</em></p>
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