Defense Lawyer
Disorderly Conduct and Resisting Arrest in Massachusetts
Disorderly conduct and resisting arrest are separate offenses under separate statutes. The two offenses are frequently charged together after a public encounter with police.
A disorderly conduct charge under M.G.L. c. 272, § 53 concerns what the accused did in a public setting, before or after the police arrived. A resisting arrest charge under M.G.L. c. 268, § 32B concerns what the accused did while an officer was attempting an arrest. The Commonwealth may fail to prove one charge even if it can prove the other.
These charges arise from bars and nightlife areas, concerts and events, demonstrations, campus incidents, street encounters, and traffic stops. The evidence may include officer and civilian testimony, body-worn camera footage, and other recordings. Recordings may establish when the officer attempted the arrest, what the accused did in response, and what force the officer used.
A case in which the police did not arrest the accused and instead applied for a criminal complaint may begin with a private clerk-magistrate hearing before any complaint or arraignment.
Attorney Joe Serpa has practiced Massachusetts criminal defense since 1995 and defends these cases in the Boston Municipal Court, the District Courts, and the Superior Court. Serpa Law Office can be reached at 617.936.0201.
The Elements of Disorderly Conduct
Section 53 provides penalties for “disorderly persons and disturbers of the peace” without defining the terms. The same section punishes indecent exposure, which the firm explains on its page on open and gross lewdness and indecent exposure. The courts defined the terms. Model Jury Instruction 7.160 states the following elements, which the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The defendant engaged in fighting or threatening, engaged in violent or tumultuous behavior, or created a hazardous or physically offensive condition by an act that served no legitimate purpose of the defendant’s.
- The defendant’s actions were reasonably likely to affect the public.
- The defendant either intended to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.
The model instruction identifies four distinct acts that the law forbids. The first is conduct involving the use of force or violence. The second is threats involving the immediate use of force or violence. The third is tumultuous and highly agitated behavior that causes riotous commotion and excessively unreasonable noise, amounting to a public nuisance. The fourth is conduct creating a hazard to public safety or a physically offensive condition by an act serving no legitimate purpose.
The defense can contest each element separately. Loud, rude, or angry behavior that produced no riotous commotion, created no hazard, and involved no threat of immediate force does not satisfy the first element merely because an officer found it objectionable.
Speech and Expressive Conduct
Speech alone cannot support a disorderly conduct conviction unless it consists of fighting words, meaning words that “by their very utterance tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” The Commonwealth must still prove the statutory conduct and public elements beyond a reasonable doubt when it relies on conduct rather than speech alone.
Arguing with an officer, questioning the basis for a stop, swearing, criticizing the police, or objecting loudly does not by itself establish disorderly conduct. The Commonwealth must prove that the accused’s words were fighting words, or identify separate conduct satisfying the statute, if it relies on those words.
The Public Element
The accused’s actions must have been reasonably likely to affect the public, meaning persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group has access.
An incident inside a private residence, in a private office, or in a location where no member of the public was present or likely to be present raises a question on this element. A sidewalk or another location open to the public ordinarily satisfies the location requirement. The question whether a parking lot, bar, common hallway, or campus area qualifies depends on who may enter and whether members of the public were present or likely to be present.
Students and the School Provision
Section 53(b) contains a provision that protects students. The provision states that an elementary or secondary school student shall not be adjudged a delinquent child for a violation of that subsection for conduct within school buildings, on school grounds, or in the course of school-related events.
The provision applies to elementary and secondary students. The provision does not apply to college and university students, who face the ordinary charge and may also face a separate campus disciplinary proceeding. See student criminal defense.
The Penalties for Disorderly Conduct
A first offense is punishable by a fine of not more than $150. A person convicted of a first offense cannot be sentenced to jail.
A second or subsequent offense is punishable by imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than six months, a fine of not more than $200, or both.
A first offense is punishable by a fine only. A second or later offense is punishable by up to six months in jail. The CORI statute excludes offenses that are not punishable by incarceration. G.L. c. 6, § 167. An arraignment still creates a court record. The person’s own CORI report lists offenses that are not punishable by incarceration, unless the record has been sealed or expunged. A student, licensed professional, or noncitizen may also face a separate school, licensing, or immigration consequence.
The Elements of Resisting Arrest
Section 32B provides that a person commits resisting arrest by knowingly preventing or attempting to prevent a police officer, acting under color of official authority, from effecting an arrest of the accused or another, by either of the following means.
- Using or threatening to use physical force or violence against the officer or another.
- Using any other means that creates a substantial risk of causing bodily injury to the officer or another.
The statute defines two terms used in the offense. An officer acts under color of official authority when, in the regular course of assigned duties, the officer makes a good faith judgment based on the surrounding facts that an arrest should be made. The term “police officer” means an officer in uniform, or an out-of-uniform officer who identified themselves by exhibiting credentials while attempting the arrest.
Resisting arrest is punishable by imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than two and a half years, a fine of not more than $500, or both.
The Commonwealth must prove that an officer was effecting an arrest rather than conducting a stop, detention, or inquiry. The Commonwealth must also prove that the accused knowingly prevented or attempted to prevent the arrest. Pulling an arm away reflexively, tensing, or failing to comply immediately with a confusing instruction is not the same as knowingly using force to prevent an arrest.
Flight
Section 32B(a)(2) governs flight that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury. In Commonwealth v. Montoya, 457 Mass. 102 (2010), the Supreme Judicial Court held that the provision covers a defendant’s flight where the circumstances expose pursuing officers to that risk. In that case the defendant ran at night and went over a fence above a deep canal.
The analysis depends on the risk the fleeing person created, so the officers’ decision not to follow into the danger does not defeat the charge. The analysis likewise does not depend on the officers’ subjective fear.
The Court observed that mere flight was not at issue in Montoya. The defense contests the element of a substantial risk of bodily injury when the Commonwealth’s evidence shows only that the accused ran, without circumstances that exposed anyone to that risk.
An Unlawful Arrest and Excessive Force
A claim that the arrest was unlawful differs from a claim that the officer used excessive force. The statute treats the two claims differently.
An unlawful arrest is not, by itself, a defense. Section 32B(b) provides that it is not a defense that the officer was attempting to make an unlawful arrest, if the officer was acting under color of official authority.
The statute provides an exception for excessive force. Under the same subsection, the unlawfulness of the arrest is not a defense only where the officer, in attempting the arrest, “was not resorting to unreasonable or excessive force giving rise to the right of self-defense.” Evidence that the officer used unreasonable or excessive force may raise self-defense. The ordinary limits of self-defense apply once the evidence raises self-defense. The Commonwealth must then prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in lawful self-defense.
Prosecutors often charge resisting arrest together with assault and battery on a police officer under G.L. c. 265, § 13D. A defendant charged with assault and battery on a police officer may also claim self-defense against an officer’s excessive force.
An unlawful stop or arrest may support a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the violation, even though the illegality is not itself a defense to resisting arrest. The Commonwealth may be unable to proceed on an underlying charge if the judge suppresses the evidence that the Commonwealth needs to prove that charge. See illegal searches and seizures in Massachusetts.
Video and Digital Evidence
Body-worn camera footage, cruiser video, business surveillance, and bystander recordings may provide direct evidence of the sequence, distance, words, and force used.
Counsel should request this material early because agencies and private businesses may retain recordings for limited periods, and private recordings may be overwritten or deleted. Counsel can request body-worn camera footage and dispatch recordings in discovery, identify businesses and residences with cameras facing the location, and send appropriate preservation requests.
Authentication and admissibility are separate questions. The firm’s page on digital evidence in Massachusetts criminal cases addresses both questions.
The Clerk-Magistrate Hearing
Under M.G.L. c. 218, § 35A, a court ordinarily must give a person who was not arrested notice and an opportunity to be heard before it issues process on a misdemeanor complaint application, subject to the statute’s exceptions. Disorderly conduct and resisting arrest are both misdemeanors.
The question whether a clerk-magistrate hearing occurs depends on how the case began and on the statutory exceptions. A case in which police arrested the person at the scene ordinarily proceeds to arraignment without a clerk-magistrate hearing. A case in which police released the person and later applied for a misdemeanor complaint ordinarily proceeds to a § 35A hearing before a complaint issues.
No complaint, arraignment, or CORI entry results from a complaint application that the clerk-magistrate denies. A police report of the incident can still exist in the department’s files. The arrest and booking record can also remain in a case that involved an arrest.
See Massachusetts clerk-magistrate hearings and the clerk-magistrate hearing FAQs.
Arraignment, the Record, and Collateral Consequences
A charge that is punishable by incarceration, such as resisting arrest or a second disorderly conduct offense, enters CORI once the case proceeds to arraignment. What the entry shows and who can access it depend on the disposition and any sealing order. A standard CORI report, which most employers and landlords receive, does not include a dismissed case.
A not-guilty finding must be sealed under M.G.L. c. 276, § 100C unless the defendant objects. After a dismissal or nolle prosequi, the defendant may petition the court for sealing under § 100C without a waiting period. The judge may order the record sealed when substantial justice would best be served. An otherwise eligible conviction may be sealed under § 100A after the applicable statutory waiting period. Sealing changes what the Commissioner of Probation reports. See criminal records and outcomes and sealing and expungement.
Three groups may face proceedings or disclosure questions beyond the criminal case. A university student may face a campus disciplinary proceeding under the institution’s own schedule and standard. A licensed professional may face a profession-specific reporting rule. See criminal defense for licensed professionals. A noncitizen should obtain immigration advice before accepting a disposition. See immigration consequences.
How Disorderly Conduct and Resisting Arrest Cases End
Disorderly conduct and resisting arrest cases end at one of several stages. A case that ends at an earlier stage creates less of a record. The paragraphs below describe the stages in their ordinary sequence.
At the clerk-magistrate hearing. A case that begins with an application rather than an arrest ends before any complaint issues if the clerk-magistrate denies the application. The section above on the clerk-magistrate hearing explains when the hearing occurs and what happens after a denial.
Before arraignment. Ending the case after a complaint has issued but before the arraignment prevents the CORI entry that arraignment creates. The possibility of ending the case before arraignment depends on the court, the prosecutor, and the strength of the application materials.
On a pretrial motion. After arraignment, the defense may move to suppress evidence or to dismiss a count for lack of probable cause in the complaint application. Dismissal of the resisting arrest count changes the plea negotiations on the remaining charges, because resisting arrest is punishable by a longer sentence than disorderly conduct.
By negotiated disposition. A continuance without a finding, pretrial probation, or diversion can resolve the case without a conviction. Each of these dispositions creates a different record. The defendant and counsel should consider the collateral consequences described above when choosing among them.
At trial. Officers commonly charge disorderly conduct and resisting arrest for conduct that the statutes do not cover. The recordings often do not show everything that the police report describes. Trial can be the right choice when the Commonwealth’s evidence does not prove the public element or conduct beyond protected speech.
How the Defense Prepares the Case
Counsel should begin preserving and organizing the evidence as soon as possible.
Counsel obtains the recordings. Counsel requests body-worn camera footage, cruiser video, booking video, business surveillance, and bystander recordings before an agency or private business overwrites them.
Counsel establishes the sequence of events. Counsel reconstructs what the officer saw before intervening, what each person said, when the officer attempted an arrest, and what force each person used. Dispatch logs and radio recordings can establish the timing.
Counsel checks the evidence on the public element. The defense identifies who was present, whether members of the public were likely to be present, and whether the location was open to the public or a substantial group.
Counsel separates speech from conduct. Counsel identifies precisely what the Commonwealth claims was disorderly and whether the evidence proves conduct beyond protected speech.
Counsel examines the arrest. The defense determines whether an arrest was being effected, when it began, and whether the officer used unreasonable or excessive force.
Counsel finds the witnesses. Counsel identifies staff members, security personnel, companions, and other witnesses before memories fade or contact information is lost.
Counsel reviews the accused’s statements and protects the accused’s right to remain silent. Counsel determines what the accused said at the scene and during booking. The accused should make no further statement about the incident before receiving legal advice. See the right to remain silent.
The Massachusetts disorderly conduct and resisting arrest FAQs answer common questions about the charges, hearings, records, and possible collateral proceedings.
Serpa Law Office can be reached at 617.936.0201 for a free and confidential consultation. The Boston office is at 20 Park Plaza #400A. The Quincy Office is at 500 Victory Road, Suite 400A.
Frequently Asked Questions About Disorderly Conduct and Resisting Arrest in Massachusetts
A defendant convicted of a first offense of disorderly conduct under G.L. c. 272, § 53 pays a fine of up to $150 and cannot be sentenced to jail. A defendant convicted of a second or later offense faces up to six months in a house of correction, a fine of up to $200, or both. Because a first offense is not punishable by incarceration, the CORI statute keeps it off the record that employers and landlords receive, although the arraignment still creates a court record and the person’s own CORI report lists it until the record is sealed.
A defendant convicted of resisting arrest under G.L. c. 268, § 32B faces up to two and one-half years in a house of correction, a fine of up to $500, or both. Resisting arrest is a misdemeanor, but it is punishable by incarceration, so an arraignment on the charge creates a CORI entry that employers with standard access can see while the case is pending. A conviction stays on the record until it is sealed, which a person may seek under G.L. c. 276, § 100A after the three-year waiting period for a misdemeanor.
Tumultuous behavior is one of the four kinds of conduct the courts have read into the word disorderly in G.L. c. 272, § 53. It means highly agitated behavior that causes riotous commotion and excessively unreasonable noise, amounting to a public nuisance. Loud talking, arguing, or swearing does not meet that definition by itself. The Commonwealth must prove behavior that disturbed the public in the way a riot or a brawl would. Defense counsel reads the police report and the video for what the person did, not for how the officer described it, because reports often label an argument as tumultuous.
No. G.L. c. 268, § 32B requires the Commonwealth to prove that the officer was effecting an arrest at the time. A person who pulls away during a stop, a detention, or an inquiry has not resisted an arrest, because no arrest was under way. The officer must have decided to arrest and must have begun to carry it out. The person must have known it. Defense counsel reconstructs the moment the arrest began from the body-worn camera video and the officer’s own words, because an officer who said nothing about an arrest cannot prove that the person knowingly resisted one.
Not by itself. The statute requires knowingly preventing or attempting to prevent an arrest by using or threatening physical force against the officer, or by using another means that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the officer or someone else. Pulling an arm away reflexively, tensing up, or failing to comply at once with a confusing instruction is not a knowing use of force to stop an arrest. The Commonwealth must prove that the person understood an arrest was under way and used force or created a substantial risk of injury to stop it. Video often shows the difference.
The statute defines a police officer, for this offense, as an officer in uniform or an officer out of uniform who identified himself or herself by exhibiting credentials while attempting the arrest. A plainclothes officer who never showed a badge and never said who he was cannot support a resisting arrest conviction, because the person had no way to know that the man grabbing him was a police officer. The officer must also have been acting under color of official authority, meaning in the regular course of assigned duties, making a good faith judgment that an arrest should be made.
Often. Assault and battery on a police officer under G.L. c. 265, § 13D is a separate charge that the Commonwealth adds when it claims the person struck, pushed, or kicked the officer during the arrest. A defendant convicted under § 13D faces 90 days to two and one-half years in a house of correction, a fine of $500 to $5,000, or both. The same excessive force rule applies: a person who used force against an officer who was using unreasonable force may claim self-defense. A jury may convict on one count and acquit on the other, because the two charges have different elements.
Only for conduct the statute covers. Protected speech, signs, chanting, and criticism of the police cannot support a disorderly conduct conviction, because the statute applies to speech only when the words are fighting words that by their very utterance tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. A protester who blocks a roadway, fights, or creates a hazard to public safety can be charged for that conduct. The Commonwealth must prove the conduct, the public element, and the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or reckless creation of that risk, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Counsel requests the body-worn camera footage, cruiser video, booking video, and dispatch recordings in discovery as soon as the case begins, because departments keep recordings for limited periods. Counsel identifies businesses and homes with cameras facing the scene and sends preservation letters before the recordings are overwritten. Bystander video is gathered from witnesses and social media and must be authenticated before trial. The recordings show when the officer attempted the arrest, what each person said, and what force was used, which is why the defense obtains them before the first court date rather than after.
Both offenses come from G.L. c. 272, § 53. Disorderly conduct covers fighting, threatening, violent or tumultuous behavior, or creating a hazardous or physically offensive condition, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. Disturbing the peace covers conduct that most people would find unreasonably disruptive, such as loud and persistent noise, that did in fact disturb at least one person. Disturbing the peace does not require the violent or tumultuous conduct that disorderly conduct requires. The penalties are the same: a fine only on a first offense and up to six months on a later offense.
No. Massachusetts has no crime of public drunkenness. A person who is incapacitated by alcohol in public may be taken into protective custody under G.L. c. 111B, § 8 and held at a police station or a treatment facility for up to 12 hours, but protective custody is not an arrest and creates no criminal charge or CORI entry. Police sometimes charge disorderly conduct instead when an intoxicated person fights, threatens, or creates a hazard. Intoxication alone, without that conduct, does not support the charge.
Yes. G.L. c. 272, § 54 permits a police officer to arrest without a warrant a person found in the act of violating § 53, which covers disorderly conduct and disturbing the peace. The officer must have seen the conduct. A person who was not arrested at the scene and later receives a complaint application for disorderly conduct is entitled to a clerk-magistrate hearing under G.L. c. 218, § 35A before any complaint issues. A person arrested at the scene goes directly to arraignment. The lawfulness of the arrest can be litigated afterward through a motion to suppress.
Yes. Resisting arrest is a separate offense. The statute states that the unlawfulness of the arrest is not a defense when the officer was acting under color of official authority. A jury may acquit on the underlying charge and convict on resisting arrest. The one exception is excessive force: when the officer used unreasonable or excessive force in making the arrest, the person may claim self-defense. The Commonwealth must then prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person did not act in lawful self-defense. An unlawful arrest can still support a motion to suppress evidence found afterward.










