AI Deepfake and Explicit Image Charges Against Massachusetts Students

A Massachusetts student accused of creating or sharing an AI-generated explicit image of a classmate faces two proceedings at once. The first proceeding is a criminal case, most often a delinquency complaint in the Juvenile Court under G. L. c. 265, § 43A, as amended by St. 2024, c. 118, or under G. L. c. 272, § 29D.

The second proceeding is a school discipline case under G. L. c. 71. The two proceedings follow different rules and run on different schedules. Evidence from each proceeding can be used in the other. A family that treats either proceeding casually can damage the student’s defense in both proceedings.

This page explains the statutes, which of them applies to a synthetic image, and the forms of diversion the law provides for minors. The page also covers the April 2026 letter from the Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education and the defense of a student deepfake case.

The Criminal Statutes That Address a Deepfake

St. 2024, c. 118, “An Act to prevent abuse and exploitation,” added the distribution of explicit images to the criminal harassment statute. G. L. c. 265, § 43A (b) criminalizes knowingly distributing visual material, including material produced by digitization, that depicts another identifiable person who is nude, partially nude, or engaged in sexual conduct. The offense requires that the distribution cause physical or economic injury or substantial emotional distress.

The distribution must be made either with the intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten, coerce, or cause substantial emotional distress, or with reckless disregard of the three circumstances specified in § 43A (b). Under the reckless disregard alternative, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant recklessly disregarded three things together, namely the likelihood of that harm, the depicted person’s lack of consent, and the depicted person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

The statute expressly covers digitized and computer-generated depictions. The statute’s definition of digitization contains an additional element, which requires that the material appear, falsely, to a reasonable person to be an authentic representation of the person depicted. An obviously synthetic or cartoonish image may not meet the requirement of apparent authenticity, even though the image is offensive.

A first offense is punishable by up to two and one half years in the house of correction, a fine of up to $10,000, or both. Section 43A (c) applies to a second or subsequent offense. A second or subsequent offense is punishable by up to two and one half years in a house of correction or up to ten years in state prison, a fine of up to $15,000, or both. The same penalties apply to a § 43A offense committed after a stalking conviction.

The adult offense is treated in full on the firm’s deepfake and AI-generated intimate image defense page and on the Massachusetts revenge porn and nonconsensual intimate image law page. The related harassment offenses are treated on the criminal harassment defense page.

A student can face more serious charges when the person depicted is under 18. Dissemination of sexually explicit material depicting a minor, with lascivious intent, is a felony under G. L. c. 272, § 29B, and knowing possession of such material is a felony under G. L. c. 272, § 29C. A person convicted under either section faces imprisonment in state prison.

St. 2024, c. 118 created G. L. c. 272, § 29D, a separate offense for a minor who possesses or distributes material in violation of § 29B or § 29C. The act also directed that cases under § 29D be handled in the Juvenile Court. Section 29D (e) provides affirmative defenses, including where the material depicts only the juvenile who possesses it, and where the material depicts a person 16 or older, was created and provided consensually, and was not distributed beyond the original sender.

The § 29D (e) defenses apply to a juvenile charged under § 29A, § 29B, or § 29C as well, not only under § 29D. A juvenile adjudicated under § 29D is not required to register as a sex offender and is eligible for expungement. Under § 29D, the Commonwealth may still bring other applicable charges.

Section 29D also contains a reporting safe harbor for a minor who shows or gives the material to a parent, guardian, teacher, principal or other school personnel, to the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, or to law enforcement. The minor must show or give the material for a purpose within the recipient’s role. A minor’s disclosure within the safe harbor is not dissemination under § 29D. A student who received an image and brought it to an adult is protected by the safe harbor. The family should raise the safe harbor early.

Lesser conduct in the same episode is often charged separately. Repeated unwanted messages may be charged as criminal harassment under § 43A (a). Harassing electronic communications may be charged as a misdemeanor under G. L. c. 269, § 14A, which requires that harassment be the sole purpose of the repeated contact. The family of the student depicted may also apply for a harassment prevention order under the process described on the 258E harassment prevention order page. Violating such an order is a separate crime, explained on the page on criminal violation of a 258E harassment prevention order.

Which Statute Covers a Wholly Synthetic Image

The Supreme Judicial Court has construed the child pornography statutes to require real children. In Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Mass. 840 (2007), the Court held that “depiction by computer” in § 29C refers to the method by which the image is possessed, not its content. The statute cannot reasonably be interpreted to cover images created without the use of real children. The Court rejected the same argument about the word “simulation.” The constitutional background is Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), which holds that wholly virtual child pornography is protected speech.

Three consequences follow for a deepfake case. First, a wholly AI-generated image of a child who does not exist is outside §§ 29B and 29C, as the Supreme Judicial Court construed those sections in Kenney. Section 29D applies only to material possessed or distributed in violation of § 29B or § 29C, so a wholly AI-generated image is outside § 29D as well. Second, the statute that expressly covers a synthetic explicit image of an identifiable person is § 43A (b), because § 43A (b) alone includes material produced by digitization.

Third, the diversion mandate of G. L. c. 119, § 54B applies to charges under §§ 29B, 29C, and 29D. Diversion of a charge under § 43A (b) is governed by the general juvenile diversion statute, § 54A, described below.

The typical school deepfake, a real, identifiable classmate’s face on a synthetic or borrowed body, does not fit clearly into either of Kenney’s two categories. The Supreme Judicial Court did not decide in Kenney whether a morphed image of a real minor violates §§ 29B and 29C. No Massachusetts appellate court has decided the morphed-image question.

The defense moves to dismiss under Kenney when the Commonwealth charges §§ 29B, 29C, or 29D on AI-generated material. Defense counsel decides deliberately whether to file the motion to dismiss. A student who wins the motion may then face a § 43A (b) charge, for which diversion is available under § 54A, instead of a charge subject to mandatory diversion under § 54B. Defense counsel assesses case by case which form of diversion serves the client. Counsel therefore has a reason to be heard on the charging decision before the complaint issues.

Diversion for a Charged Minor

The Legislature paired the new juvenile offense with a mandatory program. G. L. c. 119, § 54B applies when a child is charged under G. L. c. 272, §§ 29B, 29C, or 29D. Before arraignment, the court shall indefinitely stay the arraignment and direct the child to enter and complete an educational diversion program.

The district attorney may object, but only in writing. The judge then considers the objection and decides whether to stay the arraignment. The case does not proceed against the child during the program while the arraignment is stayed. No CORI entry for an arraignment is created if the child is never arraigned.

The program is the Attorney General’s Youth Diversion Program, developed under G. L. c. 12, § 36. The Attorney General developed the program in consultation with the Office of the Child Advocate, the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, the Department of Youth Services, the Committee for Public Counsel Services, and others. As of this writing the Attorney General describes the program as operating in an interim phase through the Department of Youth Services’ regional diversion coordinators, with an online education system planned. Families should confirm how the program is delivered in their county.

Under § 54B, the court brings the case forward, arraigns the child, and restores the complaint if the child does not complete the program. The court must first give both the district attorney and defense counsel an opportunity to be heard. For a child arraigned before counsel was involved, the court shall, in consultation with defense counsel, place the child on pretrial probation under G. L. c. 276, § 87, with program completion as a condition.

One caution is for counsel rather than the family. The statements a child makes inside the § 54B program are treated differently from statements made in a § 54A assessment. The protections of Mass. G. Evid. § 529 are drawn from the § 54A and c. 276A diversion schemes. Section 54B contains no use-immunity clause of its own. Counsel addresses the missing use-immunity protection, by protective order or written agreement where needed, before the child discusses the incident in the program.

A Juvenile Court judge and the district attorney are the two officials who divert children under G. L. c. 119, § 54A. A judge may divert a child after hearing the district attorney and defense counsel. Section 54A(g) limits judge-ordered diversion to offenses outside the list in G. L. c. 277, § 70C.

The second sentence of § 70C names chapter 265 as a whole rather than enumerating sections. Section 54A(g) excepts from the § 70C list only c. 265, § 13A(a) and c. 268, §§ 13A and 13C. Section 43A is in chapter 265 and is not on the list of exceptions in § 54A(g). The district attorney therefore decides whether to divert a child charged with a deepfake offense under § 43A. Under § 54A(d), the district attorney may divert any child for whom there is probable cause to issue a complaint, with or without the court’s permission.

The district attorney decides whether to divert a child both for a first offense under § 43A(b) and for a second or subsequent offense under § 43A(c). Diversion is discretionary for a § 43A offense and for every other juvenile offense except a charge under §§ 29B, 29C, or 29D, which is subject to mandatory diversion under § 54B. No child is guaranteed diversion.

Two further protections apply before a complaint ever issues. A juvenile summonsed rather than arrested on a misdemeanor delinquency complaint has a mandatory right to be heard in opposition to the complaint under G. L. c. 218, § 35A, which applies to the Juvenile Court by its own terms. A first offense under § 43A (b) is a misdemeanor, so a juvenile summonsed on that charge has the § 35A right to be heard.

For a felony application the hearing is held where the applying officer requests it or in the clerk-magistrate’s discretion. The court must also examine the complainant and any witnesses under oath before a delinquency complaint issues. G. L. c. 119, § 54.

The hearings on a complaint application are the earliest opportunity for the defense to end the case, in the same way an adult contests a complaint at the clerk-magistrate hearing described elsewhere on this site.

A narrower doctrine applies only to the least serious charge discussed on this page. A first offense of a misdemeanor punishable by no more than six months cannot proceed as a delinquency case at all. The Juvenile Court holds a hearing at which the Commonwealth must prove a prior offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Wallace W. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789 (2019).

Of the charges on this page, the first-offense exclusion applies to a standalone charge under c. 269, § 14A, because the maximum sentence for that charge is three months. The principal deepfake charges are punishable by more than six months, so the first-offense exclusion does not apply to them.

The April 2026 DESE Guidance

On April 15, 2026, the Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education issued a letter to superintendents and school leaders on AI-generated deepfake images and videos. The guidance directs schools to investigate reports promptly, to stop the conduct, to protect affected students and staff, and to educate students on the harm that deepfake abuse causes.

The letter reminds districts that creating an AI-generated nude image of a minor is a criminal offense. The letter directs schools to act consistent with their obligations under the state anti-bullying and anti-discrimination laws and under federal Title IX requirements. The letter also encourages districts to work closely with legal counsel and community partners.

The guidance is a Commissioner’s letter, not a regulation. The Governor’s announcement described the letter as reinforcing state law. The obligations the letter recites come from the statutes that already govern schools, chiefly the anti-bullying law described below. For an accused student, the letter means that the school will open its own investigation quickly and will not keep its findings within the school.

School Discipline Under Chapter 71

Separate statutes govern the school case. Under G. L. c. 71, § 37O, every district must maintain a bullying prevention and intervention plan. Bullying under § 37O includes expression by electronic means. The principal investigates each report and notifies the parents of the students involved. A principal who determines that bullying or retaliation occurred and believes criminal charges may be pursued notifies law enforcement. The plan must also permit anonymous reports. The statute provides that no student may be disciplined solely on the basis of an anonymous report.

School discipline depends on the grade of the charge. Under G. L. c. 274, § 1, a crime punishable by a state prison sentence is a felony, and every other crime is a misdemeanor. A first offense under § 43A(b) is punishable by imprisonment in a house of correction for not more than two and one half years, a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.

A first offense under § 43A(b) is a misdemeanor, so school discipline proceeds under G. L. c. 71, § 37H¾. Under § 37H¾, the student receives written notice and meets with the principal before a suspension takes effect. No suspension or expulsion under § 37H¾ may exceed 90 school days.

A second or subsequent offense under § 43A(c) is punishable by up to two and one half years in a house of correction or up to 10 years in the state prison, a fine of up to $15,000, or both. A second or subsequent offense is therefore a felony. Upon issuance of a felony delinquency complaint, the principal may suspend the student under G. L. c. 71, § 37H½.

The suspension requires the principal’s written determination that the student’s continued presence would have a substantial detrimental effect on the general welfare of the school. A suspension under § 37H½ remains in effect pending appeal to the superintendent. After an adjudication of delinquency, the principal may expel the student on the same kind of written determination.

Charges under G. L. c. 272, §§ 29B or 29C are felonies, so the principal may act under § 37H½ in the same way.

The procedures under § 37H¾ and § 37H½ differ. The defense can use the differences. Under § 37H¾, the school must first employ and document alternative remedies, such as mediation, conflict resolution, restorative justice, or collaborative problem solving, or document why they are unsuitable, before excluding the student.

Notice goes to the student and parent in English and in the home’s primary language. A student excluded for more than 10 school days, consecutively or cumulatively in a school year, may appeal to the superintendent. At the superintendent’s hearing, the student may present testimony, cross-examine witnesses, and appear with counsel. The superintendent issues a written decision within five calendar days.

Under § 37H½, the appeal to the superintendent must be claimed in writing within five calendar days. The superintendent then holds the hearing within three calendar days of the request. The student has the right to counsel at the superintendent’s hearing. The suspension stays in effect while the appeal is pending.

Educational services continue in either case. A district that suspends or expels a student under § 37H½ must continue educational services during the exclusion. For any exclusion of more than ten consecutive school days, G. L. c. 76, § 21 requires an education service plan and the opportunity to make academic progress, make up assignments, and earn missed credits.

The Interaction of the Two Cases

The school case and the court case are formally separate. The formal separation of the two cases is dangerous for an unrepresented family. A student has no right to counsel in the principal’s office, but the student does have a statutory right to counsel at the superintendent appeal, under § 37H½ and § 37H¾ alike. The family should use the student’s right to counsel at the superintendent appeal.

Statements made to school administrators are generally admissible in the delinquency case. School officials investigating a school matter are not required to give Miranda warnings. A trip to the principal’s office is not custody. Commonwealth v. Ira I., 439 Mass. 805 (2003); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 413 Mass. 521 (1992).

The rule that school officials are not required to give Miranda warnings has limits that apply in deepfake cases. Miranda applies when a school official questions a student as an instrument or agent of the police. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 402 Mass. 275 (1988). The defense has a basis for the agent-of-the-police argument when a school resource officer is in the room or when the questioning takes place after the principal has already made the § 37O referral to law enforcement. Every statement must still be voluntary to be admissible.

A student’s apology letter, statements in a discipline meeting, and posts in a group chat routinely become central evidence in the delinquency case. Section 37O directs schools to refer a deepfake incident to the police once the principal makes the required findings. A student who is not a citizen faces additional exposure from any juvenile or criminal disposition, described on the immigration consequences page.

The defense therefore coordinates the two proceedings from the first day. Counsel prepares the student and the family for every school meeting and seeks to schedule the school hearing in light of the criminal court dates. Counsel works to resolve the court case, through § 54B diversion or § 54A diversion depending on the charge, before the school imposes a long exclusion.

School Searches and Police Searches

A public-school official may search a student under the school-specific framework of New Jersey v. T.L.O. The search must be justified at its inception by reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of law or school rules and must be reasonably related in scope to that justification. The reduced school standard, however, is an accommodation for school authorities acting on their own educational authority. The ordinary Fourth Amendment rules govern a search that police conduct. Under those rules, reasonable articulable suspicion may justify a patfrisk, while a search for evidence requires probable cause. Commonwealth v. Villagran, 477 Mass. 711 (2017).

In a deepfake investigation, the judge’s decision whether to suppress the evidence depends on whether a school official or the police conducted the search. A principal who independently receives concrete information that a particular student created or circulated a particular image may have reasonable grounds to investigate the student’s device within a scope tied to that information. Police cannot invoke the school setting to make the same evidentiary search on less than probable cause.

The investigation record should identify who originated the allegation, who decided to seize or inspect the phone, whether an officer directed the school official, and the precise facts tying the device to the suspected offense. A later police search should be supported by a warrant unless a recognized exception applies.

Police who seize a phone must establish a nexus between the phone and the alleged offense. Generalized police experience that phones often contain evidence does not establish probable cause to seize a student’s phone. Officers need particularized facts connecting the student’s phone to the alleged conduct. Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583 (2016).

Under Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), police generally need a warrant to search digital information on an arrestee’s phone. Courts applying T.L.O., however, have distinguished Riley’s search-incident-to-arrest rule from a school official’s independently justified school search. In re Rafael C., 245 Cal. App. 4th 1288 (2016). The asserted school purpose and the scope of any device review must nonetheless be specifically documented, because of the substantial privacy concerns recognized in Riley.

Private schools present a threshold state-action issue. Private-school officials are not state actors merely by operating a school, so neither the Fourth Amendment nor art. 14 constrains their independent searches. The T.L.O. standard therefore does not govern a search that a private-school official conducts independently. Commonwealth v. Considine, 448 Mass. 295 (2007). The police still may not use a private school as an instrument to evade constitutional limits. Evidence that the police directed or controlled the search, or acted jointly with the school, therefore remains relevant.

Questioning a Child in Custody

For a child under fourteen subjected to custodial police interrogation, an effective Miranda waiver ordinarily requires meaningful consultation with an informed, interested adult, normally a parent or relative who understands the warnings and can assist the child. A minor sibling is not an adequate substitute absent an exceptional showing of the child’s sophistication. Commonwealth v. Guyton, 405 Mass. 497 (1989).

Merely asking a child whether the child wants a parent is not enough for an effective waiver. The adult must in fact be informed and given a meaningful opportunity to consult at the interrogation site. Commonwealth v. Alfonso A., 53 Mass. App. Ct. 279 (2001).

Accordingly, police must pause the questioning once a school investigation becomes a police-directed custodial interview, so that a qualifying adult is notified, given the warnings, and afforded an opportunity for private consultation. The defense can challenge a statement that police took without first notifying a qualifying adult, giving the adult the warnings, and affording an opportunity for private consultation.

There is a narrow public-safety exception where questions are necessary to meet an immediate danger, such as locating a firearm near a school, but it is not a general investigative exception for evidence of a completed digital-image offense. Commonwealth v. Dillon D., 448 Mass. 793 (2007). Police may address safety first when an objectively urgent threat exists. Police may not use a routine school interview as a means of avoiding juvenile Miranda protections.

The School’s Title IX Duties

Under the 2020 Title IX framework, actionable sexual harassment includes unwelcome conduct determined to be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies equal access to education. Institutional liability depends on actual knowledge by an appropriate official, substantial control over the context and respondent, and a response that is deliberately indifferent. State of New York v. United States Department of Education, 477 F. Supp. 3d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

A single digitally altered sexually explicit image can satisfy the 2020 Title IX standard for actionable sexual harassment. In the deepfake context, the speed and scale of digital dissemination may make one creation or posting severe enough to deny educational access, rather than ordinary teasing that becomes actionable only through repetition. M. v. Sequoia Union High School District, No. 3:25-cv-09255 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2026).

The analysis is based on the image’s sexualized nature, apparent authenticity, audience, persistence and redistributability, effect on the targeted student’s school access, and the school’s practical ability to address dissemination through its systems or student discipline.

A school with actual knowledge must respond in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances. The 2020 framework requires supportive measures and prescribed grievance procedures before discipline. A school cannot simply defer its response to law enforcement while known harassment continues. State of New York v. United States Department of Education, 477 F. Supp. 3d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); S.C. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 579 F. Supp. 3d 999 (M.D. Tenn. 2022).

The prescribed grievance procedures are the process the school owes an accused student before the school imposes discipline. The school’s obligation is to respond to known sex-based harm, not to guarantee a particular disciplinary result.

Youthful Offender Prosecution and Transfer

A student accused of conduct at age twelve through seventeen ordinarily faces a delinquency complaint in the Juvenile Court. G.L. c. 119, § 52. The Commonwealth may instead indict a student as a youthful offender when the student was at least fourteen and the offense is punishable by imprisonment in state prison. The Commonwealth must also show that the student has a prior commitment to the Department of Youth Services or that the offense involved the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm.

The Commonwealth may instead show that the offense is a firearm offense specified in G.L. c. 119, § 52. A student who allegedly committed the offense before turning eighteen and is apprehended after turning eighteen but before turning nineteen is treated as a child under eighteen. G.L. c. 119, § 72(a). The Commonwealth may still seek a youthful offender indictment against a student apprehended at age eighteen, before the student’s nineteenth birthday. Commonwealth v. Cole C., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 653, 660-662 (2018).

The defense therefore checks the youth’s age at apprehension and at indictment, the offense’s statutory eligibility, and the rehabilitative value of Juvenile Court before anyone assumes adult-style prosecution is available.

A Juvenile Court judge must hold a hearing under G.L. c. 119, § 72A before any trial of a person who allegedly committed an offense before turning eighteen and was not apprehended until after turning nineteen.

A judge who finds probable cause at the § 72A hearing either discharges the person, when discharge is consistent with the protection of the public, or dismisses the delinquency complaint and causes an adult criminal complaint to issue. The Commonwealth may not replace the § 72A hearing with a grand jury proceeding or indict the person as a youthful offender. Commonwealth v. Nanny, 462 Mass. 798, 802-806 (2012).

At the § 72A hearing, the court considers probable cause and whether transfer serves the statutory purposes. Relevant evidence includes the offense’s seriousness, family, school and social history, prior treatment efforts, maturity, rehabilitation, public safety, and risk of recidivism. Commonwealth v. Donovan, No. SJC-13799 (Mass. Mar. 31, 2026). The judge should make the transfer decision on a developed, individualized record of the relevant factors, not solely on the alleged image’s offensiveness.

The record consequences of a youthful offender case also differ from those of an adult criminal case. A youthful offender proceeding is public. The judge may impose an adult sentence. However, the sealing of a youthful offender record in a noncapital case is governed by the juvenile sealing statute, G.L. c. 276, § 100B, not by the adult sealing statute, § 100A.

Matter of an Impounded Case (No. 2), 493 Mass. 470 (2024). The Supreme Judicial Court relied on the Legislature’s direction that children in the Juvenile Court be treated not as criminals but as children in need of aid, encouragement, and guidance. G.L. c. 119, § 53.

The firm’s page on juvenile delinquency and youthful offender defense explains the wider Juvenile Court procedure, including the age limits, the first-offense rule, the parent’s role, confidentiality, and record sealing.

The Defense of Student Deepfake Cases

The defense of a student deepfake case has four parts. The first part is attribution. An account name on a screenshot is not proof of authorship. The Commonwealth must connect the image to the accused student’s device or account. The forensic issues, including metadata, extraction reports, and the limits of what a screenshot proves, are the same issues treated on the Massachusetts phone, computer, and digital searches page. The family preserves the devices and the message threads unaltered from the first day, because deleted or edited threads weaken the argument that someone else was responsible.

The second part is the statutory elements. Section 43A (b) requires an identifiable person, a qualifying depiction, distribution, physical or economic injury or substantial emotional distress, and the required mental state. For digitized material the Commonwealth must also prove the image would falsely appear to a reasonable person to be authentic. The Commonwealth’s proof can fail on any element.

Under Kenney, the defense can move to dismiss a charge brought under §§ 29B, 29C, or 29D on synthetic material. Counsel weighs the motion against the diversion consequences described above. In a case where a student forwarded an image once, the outcome often depends on the lascivious intent element of § 29B, a state of mind in which sexual gratification or arousal is an objective.

The third part is the use of the statutory provisions that permit a child to avoid an adjudication. Those provisions are the § 29D (e) affirmative defenses, the § 54B program for §§ 29B, 29C, and 29D charges, and district attorney diversion under § 54A(d) for § 43A charges. Defense counsel invokes each provision early and in writing. A prosecution under § 29C may not be continued without a finding or placed on file. In a § 29C case, the § 54B program and outright dismissal therefore replace the continuance without a finding that is available in other cases.

The fourth part is the school hearing itself. A § 37H¾ hearing is a real hearing, with notice, evidence, an appeal, and counsel at the superintendent stage. Counsel prepares a presentation for the § 37H¾ hearing to protect both the student’s enrollment and the student’s defense in the criminal case. The defense seeks to seal or expunge the record under the standards described on the sealing and expungement page when the case ends in a dismissal or a stayed arraignment.

The Commonwealth often brings related charges for the same event. The firm’s Massachusetts revenge porn and nonconsensual intimate image FAQ answers common questions about the nonconsensual intimate image offense.

Who Attorney Serpa Represents

Attorney Serpa represents middle school, high school, and college students across Greater Boston who are accused of creating or sharing deepfake or explicit images, of cyberbullying, and of the companion charges brought after a school investigation, along with their parents. He represents students at every stage. He represents a student before any charge when the school first calls, at the clerk-magistrate hearing or the first-offense hearing, through diversion, and at trial where a trial is necessary. A parent whose child is under investigation at school or has been charged can contact Attorney Serpa at 617.936.0201 for a confidential consultation.

Massachusetts Courts Where Attorney Serpa Tries Student Deepfake Cases

Student deepfake cases begin in the Juvenile Court divisions serving Greater Boston. The companion adult cases are heard in the Boston Municipal Court and in the district courts across Eastern Massachusetts. Attorney Serpa has tried cases in these courts since 1995.

Related Serpa Law Office resources

The recurring questions are answered in the student AI deepfake and explicit image FAQs and in the broader Massachusetts student criminal defense FAQs. The harassment statute that contains the image-distribution offense is treated on the criminal harassment defense page. The civil orders that often accompany deepfake accusations are covered on the 258E harassment prevention order page.

A case that begins with a summons is contested first at a clerk-magistrate hearing. The digital attribution issues are examined on the phone, computer, and digital searches page and in the firm’s post on Commonwealth v. Watson and postconviction digital forensic analysis. College and university students face the additional exposure treated on the college and university student criminal defense page. The distinction between the felony and misdemeanor levels of the deepfake offenses is explained on the felonies versus misdemeanors page.