Expunging a Massachusetts Restraining Order: Removing a 209A or 258E Order from the Registry

When a Massachusetts court issues an abuse prevention order under G.L. c. 209A or a harassment prevention order under G.L. c. 258E, the clerk transmits the order to the Commissioner of Probation for entry in the statewide domestic violence record keeping system, the registry created by St. 1992, c. 188, § 7. Clients and courts use several names for the same instrument: restraining order is the everyday term, abuse prevention order and 209A order describe the c. 209A form, and harassment prevention order and 258E order describe the c. 258E form. Whatever the name, a record of the order remains in that system even after the order expires or is vacated. Expungement of the entry exists as a remedy, but the standard is among the most demanding in Massachusetts practice, civil or criminal: the defendant must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the order was obtained through fraud on the court. Commissioner of Probation v. Adams, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 737 (2006). The burden is severe, and the appellate courts have enforced it strictly for twenty years. This page explains where the record is kept, who sees it, how it differs from a criminal record, what the expungement standard requires, and what can still be done when the standard cannot be met.

Why 209A and 258E Orders Stay in the Statewide Registry

The registry exists so that judges act on complete information. When someone applies for a 209A order, the statute directs that the judge “shall cause a search to be made of the records contained within the statewide domestic violence record keeping system.” G.L. c. 209A, § 7. Chapter 258E contains the same command for harassment prevention complaints: the court orders a review of the court activity record information system and the domestic violence record keeping system before acting, and the clerk transmits information about the order to the Commissioner of Probation for filing in those systems. G.L. c. 258E, § 9. Every prior order involving the parties, active or expired, extended or vacated, appears in that search, and since July of 2022 the entries carry status codes that include closed-denied, so even an application a judge refused leaves a labeled entry.

The Supreme Judicial Court confirmed the permanence of these records in Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 425 Mass. 153 (1997). Nothing in the 1992 statute or in c. 209A permits a record to be removed or authorizes a judicial order directing expungement, and the court read that silence as a deliberate legislative decision that all records, inactive as well as active, remain available to judges and to other authorized agencies with a legitimate need to see them. Id. at 156, 157. The statutes direct only one form of destruction, and it is narrow: when an order is vacated, the court notifies the appropriate law enforcement agency in writing and directs the agency to destroy its record of the vacated order. G.L. c. 209A, § 7; G.L. c. 258E, § 9. The police copy is destroyed. The probation registry entry stays. The 2024 amendments added coercive control to the definition of abuse, so more conduct now supports an order, and every new order creates another permanent entry.

A 209A or 258E Order Is Not a Criminal Record: CORI, Sealing, and Expungement Compared

Clients ask about the registry in the vocabulary of criminal records, but the registry and the criminal record are different systems with different rules. A criminal record, CORI, is the record of criminal court appearances governed by G.L. c. 6, §§ 167 to 178B. Employers and landlords obtain CORI through the Department of Criminal Justice Information Services at defined access levels. A 209A or 258E restraining order is a civil order. It is not a criminal court appearance, it does not create a CORI entry, and a standard employer background check does not return it. The advantages end there.

The criminal record system includes several forms of relief. A dismissed or nolle prossed charge can be sealed by a judge under G.L. c. 276, § 100C on a showing of good cause under the balancing test of Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296 (2014). Convictions seal under G.L. c. 276, § 100A on the person’s own petition to the Commissioner of Probation, filed after waiting periods of 7 years for a felony and 3 years for a misdemeanor. The Commissioner must grant a petition that meets the statutory conditions, so the decision involves little discretion, but no record seals without a petition. Since 2018, the expungement statute, G.L. c. 276, §§ 100E to 100U, permits actual destruction of certain records: time-based expungement under §§ 100F to 100H for qualifying offenses committed before age 21, and reason-based expungement under § 100K where the record resulted from false identification, conduct that is no longer criminal, error by law enforcement or court staff, or fraud perpetrated upon the court. In the criminal system, the passage of time makes relief available.

The registry has none of those remedies. There is no time-based sealing, no waiting period after which the entry seals or expires, no petition form, and no judicial balancing of interests in which rehabilitation and the passage of time can control the outcome. The courts have no general equitable power to remove records: where the Legislature has provided a remedy or deliberately withheld one, judges cannot expunge in the interests of justice. Commonwealth v. Boe, 456 Mass. 337, 345 (2010); Matter of Expungement, 489 Mass. 67, 74 to 76 (2022). For the registry the Legislature provided nothing, and Vaccaro held that the silence was the point. The single recognized ground is fraud on the court. The criminal statute’s closest analogue, § 100K, likewise lists fraud perpetrated upon the court among its grounds and demands the same clear and convincing proof; the registry rule is that ground standing alone, without the statute’s other grounds.

One more distinction matters. If the plaintiff alleges a violation of the order, that accusation is prosecuted as a crime under G.L. c. 209A, § 7 or G.L. c. 258E, § 9, and the criminal docket it creates is a CORI entry like any other charge, visible to employers at their access level, sealable under § 100C after a dismissal or acquittal, and governed by the ordinary criminal record rules. A defendant can therefore carry two records from one dispute: a criminal record of the violation charge that sealing can address, and a civil registry entry for the order itself that sealing cannot touch.

Where a Massachusetts Restraining Order Record Appears

Several different systems hold the record, and each has its own access rule.

Court Files and the Remote Access Exclusion

The case file at the clerk’s office is a public court record, with the plaintiff’s address and certain filings impounded. The public cannot browse these cases from home: under Rule 5 of the Trial Court Uniform Rules on Public Access to Court Records, abuse prevention and harassment order proceedings “shall not be available by remote access,” an exclusion that follows the federal Violence Against Women Act. The docket is therefore absent from the public masscourts.org portal, but anyone who walks into the courthouse can request the file at the counter.

The Probation Registry and the Court Activity Record Information System

The order is entered in the statewide domestic violence record keeping system and the court activity record information system maintained by the Commissioner of Probation. G.L. c. 258E, § 9; St. 1992, c. 188, § 7. Judges must search the registry at every later 209A or 258E application, G.L. c. 209A, § 7, and probation officers see the history whenever they prepare a record for a criminal session.

Bail and Dangerousness Hearings Under G.L. c. 276, § 58A

The history follows a defendant into bail and dangerousness proceedings by statute: in a detention hearing under G.L. c. 276, § 58A, the judge weighs “whether the person has any history of orders issued against him pursuant to” c. 209A and the related abuse prevention statutes. A years-old order, never violated, is still a listed factor when a later, unrelated case puts release at issue.

Custody and Parenting Time in the Probate and Family Court

The same history is before Probate and Family Court judges when custody and parenting time are contested. A prior order, even one that expired without a violation, becomes part of the record each side argues from, and a parent facing both a 209A application and a custody dispute should assume that each proceeding will be read alongside the other. Attorney Serpa coordinates with family law counsel when an order and a custody case run at the same time.

Police Department Records and the Criminal Justice Information System

The issuing court transmits the order to the police department where the defendant lives or works, and officers responding to any later call query the state criminal justice information system and see the order history. When an order is vacated, the statute requires the police department to destroy its record of that order, G.L. c. 209A, § 7, which is why accuracy in the surviving registry entry matters so much.

FBI National Crime Information Center Protection Order File

Massachusetts orders, including ex parte temporary orders, are entered into the Protection Order File of the FBI’s National Crime Information Center, the national system that lets an officer in any state confirm and enforce the order under the full faith and credit provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2265. The federal retention rule is broader than most defendants expect: when an order expires or is cleared, the record does not vanish from NCIC. It becomes inactive and remains in the file, retrievable by criminal justice agencies, for the remainder of the calendar year plus 5 years. A firearms dealer’s background check through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System searches NCIC, including the Protection Order File. 28 C.F.R. § 25.6.

Customs, Border Crossings, and International Travel

Customs and Border Protection officers screening travelers at ports of entry work from systems with access to NCIC records, which is why an active order can produce questions at an international arrival. Routine domestic airline screening does not query NCIC, so an order does not surface at an ordinary TSA checkpoint, but an international crossing is a different event.

Massachusetts Firearms Licensing Under G.L. c. 140, § 121F, and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)

While an order is active the consequences are statutory and immediate. A person “currently subject to” a temporary or permanent 209A order, a 209A suspension and surrender order, a 258E harassment prevention order, or a similar order from another jurisdiction is a prohibited person under G.L. c. 140, § 121F, and the order itself requires surrender of all firearms and license cards under G.L. c. 209A, § 3B. Federal law adds its own prohibition: 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) forbids possession by a person subject to a qualifying order issued after a hearing with notice that protects an intimate partner and includes the required findings or prohibitions. These prohibitions lift when the order ends, but at any later licensing determination the chief of police reviewing suitability sees the history the registry preserves.

Immigration Consequences Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)

The issuance of a 209A or 258E order is not, by itself, a ground of removability. The risk comes from violations: under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), a noncitizen is deportable if a court determines that the person engaged in conduct violating the portion of a protection order that protects against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury. A judge’s finding at a violation hearing, even a civil finding, can carry that consequence, which is one more reason a noncitizen should never treat a restraining order hearing as informal.

The Fraud on the Court Standard for Expunging a 209A or 258E Order

In Commissioner of Probation v. Adams, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 725 (2006), the Appeals Court recognized a single, narrow exception to the rule of Vaccaro. A judge has the inherent authority to expunge a 209A record from the registry “in the rare and limited circumstance that the judge has found through clear and convincing evidence that the order was obtained through fraud on the court.” Id. at 737. The Supreme Judicial Court adopted the same limit in Silva v. Carmel, 468 Mass. 18, 24 to 25 (2014): absent that showing, records of abuse prevention orders are not to be expunged from the registry.

The definition of fraud on the court comes from Rockdale Mgt. Co. v. Shawmut Bank, N.A., 418 Mass. 596, 598 (1994). A fraud on the court occurs where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate a matter, by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party’s claim or defense. Every word of that definition carries weight in these motions. The scheme must be sentient, meaning deliberate and knowing. It must be unconscionable, more than an exaggeration or a one-sided account. It must also be calculated to corrupt the adjudication itself, not merely to win it.

The facts of Adams show what satisfies the standard. The District Court judge found that the plaintiff there had made nineteen separate false statements under oath in four different affidavits, that the application was part of a larger pattern of harassment, and that the same person had filed false complaints against the defendant, an attorney, with the Board of Bar Overseers. 65 Mass. App. Ct. at 730 to 731. That is the benchmark: a documented, deliberate campaign of perjury, found by the judge after an evidentiary hearing, with proof clear and convincing.

Expungement Arguments the Massachusetts Appellate Courts Have Rejected

The decisions since Adams are mostly a catalogue of arguments that failed, and anyone considering an expungement motion should read them first. The first rejected argument is that a false accusation, standing alone, is enough. In M.C.D. v. D.E.D., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 337 (2016), a Probate and Family Court judge found by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff had lied under oath to obtain the order, and ordered expungement. The Appeals Court vacated the expungement. A single false allegation in an ex parte proceeding is not the same as a deliberate scheme, typically involving others in the court system and combined with a larger pattern of harassment, and something considerably more systemic or egregious is required. Id. at 343 to 344. False testimony alone, without more egregious conduct, does not constitute fraud on the court. Wojcicki v. Caragher, 447 Mass. 200, 210 to 211 (2006).

The second rejected argument is that the plaintiff’s allegations were false without being deliberate. In B.C. v. F.C., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 345 (2016), both parties agreed that the order rested on fantastical representations made by a plaintiff suffering a psychotic episode with delusions, and both parties, joined by the judge, wanted the record expunged. The Appeals Court held there was no authority to do it. Delusional statements are not a sentient scheme, so they are not fraud on the court, and the court declined to carve a broader exception. Id. at 350 to 351.

The third rejected argument is that the order should never have issued. In Silva v. Carmel, 468 Mass. 18 (2014), the ex parte order was legally improper from the start because the parties were not household members within the statute, and the Supreme Judicial Court still denied expungement. In Quinn v. Gjoni, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 408, 414 (2016), the Appeals Court reiterated that even a defendant who was denied adequate process is not entitled to expungement absent fraud. Winning the appeal does not erase the entry: where an ex parte order is terminated after the hearing with notice, the appeal is dismissed as moot precisely because no further relief, including expungement, would be available. Allen v. Allen, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 403, 406 to 407 (2016).

The fourth point is that the same rules govern harassment prevention orders. In J.S.H. v. J.S., 91 Mass. App. Ct. 107 (2017), the Appeals Court held that expungement of a c. 258E order is available only in the rare and limited circumstance that the order was obtained through fraud on the court, proved by clear and convincing evidence, the same standard that governs c. 209A records.

Correcting the Registry Entry: Closed-Denied, Closed-Expired, and Closed-Vacated

One form of relief remains available, and it is correction rather than removal. For years the registry recorded terminated orders under a single status of “closed,” which did not distinguish an order a judge vacated from an order that simply expired. In Xarax X. v. Yale Y., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 699 (2023), a defendant whose orders had been vacated in 2003 showed that a parole document decades later still described them as expired rather than vacated. While the appeal was pending, in July of 2022, the Massachusetts Probation Service and the Trial Court added three status codes to the system: closed-denied, closed-expired, and closed-vacated. The correction claim became moot because the entries could finally say what happened, and the court affirmed the denial of expungement on the usual ground.

The practical lesson is that a defendant who cannot meet the fraud standard can still insist that the registry be accurate. A judge who reads closed-vacated sees that a court reviewed the order and ended it. A judge who reads closed-expired sees nothing of the kind. A motion to correct the record, directed to the issuing court with notice to the Massachusetts Probation Service as keeper of the record, is the realistic remedy in most cases, and it matters at every later hearing where the search required by § 7 puts the history in front of a judge.

How the Motion to Expunge Is Decided: Judicial Procedure, Not the Criminal Expungement Statutes

Registry expungement is judicial from start to finish, and in that respect it resembles the reason-based side of criminal expungement rather than any administrative process. There is no standard court form and no petition routed through an agency. The defendant files a motion in the court that issued the order, whether that is a District Court, the Boston Municipal Court, or the Probate and Family Court. The Commissioner of Probation, as keeper of the registry, has a cognizable interest and responds to these motions, so the moving defendant should expect an opposing brief from the Massachusetts Probation Service even when the plaintiff takes no position. Vaccaro, 425 Mass. at 153 n.1. The motion must do more than argue; it must prove. The defendant needs an evidentiary record, which usually means documentary proof that the sworn allegations were knowingly fabricated: records, messages, recordings, travel and location evidence, and where possible proof that the falsehoods extended beyond one affidavit into a broader campaign. The judge holds an evidentiary hearing, makes findings on clear and convincing evidence, and the findings must survive appellate review under the Adams and M.C.D. line.

The comparison with the criminal statutes is instructive in both directions. Reason-based criminal expungement under G.L. c. 276, § 100K also runs through a judge, also permits a hearing when the petitioner or the district attorney requests one, and also requires clear and convincing evidence, with fraud upon the court among its enumerated grounds. Time-based criminal expungement under §§ 100F to 100H adds an administrative layer, a petition the Commissioner of Probation certifies for eligibility before a judge exercises discretion, and it is limited to qualifying offenses committed before age 21. The registry has none of these mechanisms: no waiting period after which sealing can be requested, and no § 100A petition to the Commissioner of Probation. For the civil entry there is a single remedy, it is judicial, and the only recognized ground is fraud on the court.

SJC-13854: The Expungement Question Now Before the Supreme Judicial Court

The fraud on the court rule may be tested this year. In a pending impounded case, SJC-13854, the Supreme Judicial Court solicited amicus briefs in its 2025 to 2026 announcements on whether a Juvenile Court judge who expunged a c. 258E harassment prevention order, after finding the allegations underlying it unsupported, had authority to do so even absent fraud on the court, and whether the judge properly revoked that expungement order. The case squarely presents the question the Appeals Court declined to revisit in B.C.: whether fraud is the only ground. Until the Supreme Judicial Court rules, fraud on the court remains the only recognized basis for expunging a 209A or 258E record, and any motion should be built on that standard.

Winning the Restraining Order Hearing: The Best Protection Against a Permanent Record

The strict expungement standard changes how a defendant should treat the order itself. Because the registry entry survives almost everything, the ten day hearing after notice is the moment that decides what the permanent record looks like. An order denied at that hearing enters the registry as closed-denied. An order terminated after a contested hearing can be recorded as closed-vacated. An order allowed to extend by default reads as a year long order against you, forever, in every database described above. Contesting the order on the merits, with evidence and cross-examination, is worth more than any motion filed afterward, and a defendant who also faces a related criminal charge needs the two proceedings coordinated, because testimony given at a 209A or 258E hearing can be used in the criminal case.

Federal Records and the Limits of Registry Relief

Registry expungement, where it is available at all, operates on the Massachusetts registry. Any federal record connected to the same events, an entry drawn from the order while it was active, a record created by an arrest, or a file generated at the border, sits outside the reach of every Massachusetts remedy, because no state judge can order a federal database changed. Federal law itself offers little: there is no general federal expungement statute, and United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2007), forecloses federal expungement on purely equitable grounds in the First Circuit. The narrow federal routes, and the correction procedure for inaccurate entries under 28 C.F.R. § 16.34, are covered on the firm’s page on the FBI’s copy of a Massachusetts record, which explains that no Massachusetts court can order the FBI to change its file and that the request runs instead through G.L. c. 276, § 100T.

Who Attorney Serpa Represents

This page covers the civil order registry. For the criminal-case records that usually accompany an order, the police file, CORI, and the section 56A abuse designation, see the firm’s companion page on how domestic violence cases create records.

Attorney Serpa represents defendants seeking to contest, terminate, or expunge 209A and 258E restraining orders, defendants whose registry records are inaccurate, and clients facing the criminal consequences that follow these orders, including violation charges and firearms surrender. He also advises clients on what the registry, probation, and national databases will show at bail hearings, licensing determinations, and border crossings, and noncitizen clients on the immigration exposure a violation finding creates. Call Serpa Law Office at 617.936.0201 for a confidential consultation.

Massachusetts Courts Where Attorney Serpa Tries These Cases

209A and 258E orders issue in every division of the District Court and the Boston Municipal Court, and expungement motions return to the court that issued the order. Attorney Serpa appears regularly in the BMC divisions and the district courts of Greater Boston, including Quincy, Dedham, Newton, Somerville, Cambridge, and Brookline, and has tried cases in these buildings for thirty years.

Related Serpa Law Office resources

The firm’s pages on 209A abuse prevention orders and 258E harassment prevention orders explain how the orders issue and how the hearings work, and the page on terminating and modifying a 209A order covers the motions that remain available while an order is active. Common questions are answered in the 209A and 258E expungement FAQs, and the firm’s post on the registry and the fraud standard follows the pending Supreme Judicial Court case. The 209A and 258E violation FAQs and the pages on criminal violation of a 258E order and violation of a 209A order address the criminal cases these orders generate. For the criminal record rules this page contrasts, see expunging or sealing your criminal record, the Massachusetts sealing and expungement standards, and the sealing and CORI FAQs. The Fifth Amendment in civil cases page explains testimony risks at these hearings, and the dangerousness hearing page covers the detention proceedings where order history is a statutory factor.