Massachusetts Restraining Order Expungement FAQs: 209A and 258E

In everyday use, yes. Restraining order is the common name; the statutes use abuse prevention order for an order under G.L. c. 209A and harassment prevention order for an order under G.L. c. 258E. A 209A order requires a qualifying family, household, or dating relationship, while a 258E order does not, but the record keeping is the same: both are entered in the statewide registry, both remain there after the order ends, and everything in these FAQs about expungement and correction applies to both forms.

Only in one rare circumstance. A judge has inherent authority to expunge the record of an abuse prevention or harassment prevention order from the statewide registry only on a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the order was obtained through fraud on the court. Commissioner of Probation v. Adams, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 737 (2006); Silva v. Carmel, 468 Mass. 18, 24 to 25 (2014). No statute authorizes removal, and the Supreme Judicial Court has read that silence as deliberate. Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 425 Mass. 153, 156 (1997). The burden falls on the defendant, and the appellate courts have vacated expungement orders that rested on anything less.

The registry keeps records of all orders, inactive as well as active, so that judges deciding future applications see the complete history. Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 425 Mass. 153, 157 (1997). When an order is vacated, G.L. c. 209A, § 7 and G.L. c. 258E, § 9 direct the police department to destroy its record of the order, but that directive does not extend to the probation registry. Since July of 2022 the entry can at least be labeled accurately, as closed-vacated rather than closed-expired, which is a correction worth pursuing.

It is the registry the Legislature created in 1992, St. 1992, c. 188, § 7, maintained by the Commissioner of Probation, recording every 209A and 258E order issued in the Commonwealth. A judge considering a new 209A complaint is required to search it, G.L. c. 209A, § 7, and a judge considering a 258E complaint orders the same review along with court activity records, G.L. c. 258E, § 9. The registry exists so that no application is decided without the parties’ full order history in front of the judge.

The registry is available to judges, probation, and other authorized agencies with a legitimate need to review it, not to the general public. Because a 209A or 258E order is civil, the order itself is not an entry on the criminal record an employer obtains through standard CORI access. The record matters most inside the court system: it appears whenever a new order is sought, when an extension is contested, and in later proceedings where a restraining order history is relevant, and an active order requires firearms surrender under G.L. c. 209A, § 3B.

The definition comes from Rockdale Mgt. Co. v. Shawmut Bank, N.A., 418 Mass. 596, 598 (1994): a party must have sentiently set in motion an unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate the matter. The proof must be clear and convincing. In Adams, the benchmark case, the judge found nineteen false statements under oath across four affidavits, a larger pattern of harassment, and false complaints to the Board of Bar Overseers. 65 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 730 to 731 (2006). The standard describes a deliberate campaign to corrupt the proceeding, not a dispute about who told the truth.

By itself, no. In M.C.D. v. D.E.D., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 337, 343 to 344 (2016), the trial judge found by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff had lied under oath to obtain the order, and the Appeals Court still vacated the expungement, holding that a single false allegation is not the systemic, egregious scheme the doctrine requires. False testimony alone does not constitute fraud on the court without more egregious conduct. Wojcicki v. Caragher, 447 Mass. 200, 210 to 211 (2006). A successful motion usually needs proof of a broader fabricated campaign, documented beyond the affidavit itself.

No. In B.C. v. F.C., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 345, 350 to 351 (2016), both parties and the judge agreed the order rested on the delusional statements of a plaintiff in a psychotic episode, and the Appeals Court held there was no authority to expunge because delusion is not a sentient scheme. In Silva v. Carmel, 468 Mass. 18, 24 to 25 (2014), the ex parte order was improper from the start because the parties were not household members, and expungement was still denied. Even a defendant denied adequate process is not entitled to expungement. Quinn v. Gjoni, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 408, 414 (2016).

Yes. In J.S.H. v. J.S., 91 Mass. App. Ct. 107 (2017), the Appeals Court held that expungement of a c. 258E harassment prevention order is available only in the rare and limited circumstance that the order was obtained through fraud on the court, proved by clear and convincing evidence, the same rule that governs c. 209A records. The registry treatment is also the same: 258E orders are transmitted to the commissioner of probation for filing under G.L. c. 258E, § 9.

Yes, and for most defendants correction is the realistic remedy. In July of 2022 the Massachusetts Probation Service and the Trial Court added three status codes to the registry: closed-denied, closed-expired, and closed-vacated. The change followed the litigation in Xarax X. v. Yale Y., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 699 (2023), where orders vacated in 2003 were still described in later official documents as expired. A motion in the issuing court, with notice to the Massachusetts Probation Service as keeper of the record, can ensure the entry states what happened, and the difference between closed-vacated and closed-expired matters at every later hearing where a judge reads the history.

No. The expungement statute, G.L. c. 276, §§ 100E to 100U, addresses criminal and juvenile records and does not authorize removal of a civil restraining order from the registry, and courts have no general power to expunge records in the interests of justice where the Legislature has not provided it. Matter of Expungement, 489 Mass. 67, 74 to 76 (2022). If a 209A or 258E order produced a separate criminal charge for violating it, that criminal docket has its own rules, including sealing under G.L. c. 276, § 100C after a dismissal or a not guilty.

Possibly. In an impounded case docketed as SJC-13854, the Supreme Judicial Court solicited amicus briefs in its 2025 to 2026 announcements on whether a Juvenile Court judge had authority to expunge a 258E order after finding its allegations unsupported, even absent fraud on the court, and whether the judge properly revoked his own expungement order. A decision recognizing broader authority would be the most significant development in this area since Adams in 2006. Unless and until that happens, fraud on the court remains the only recognized ground.

Not on a standard one. A 209A or 258E order is civil, so it is not a criminal court appearance and does not create a CORI entry, and the CORI report an employer obtains through the Department of Criminal Justice Information Services does not include it. The distinction matters: if you are charged criminally with violating the order, that charge is a CORI entry like any other, visible at the employer’s access level and governed by the ordinary sealing rules. One dispute can therefore create two different records, a civil registry entry no employer sees and a criminal docket employers can see.

No. Under Rule 5 of the Trial Court Uniform Rules on Public Access to Court Records, abuse prevention and harassment order proceedings are excluded from remote access, an exclusion that follows the federal Violence Against Women Act, so the case does not appear on the public online docket portal. The paper file remains a public court record at the clerk’s office, with the plaintiff’s address impounded, and anyone can request it in person at the courthouse. Inside the court system the record is fully visible: judges and probation see the registry entry at every later application and in later criminal proceedings.

It can come up at the border. Massachusetts orders, including ex parte orders, are entered into the Protection Order File of the FBI’s National Crime Information Center so that police in any state can enforce them under 18 U.S.C. § 2265, and Customs and Border Protection officers screening travelers at ports of entry work from systems with access to NCIC records. An expired or cleared order remains in the file as an inactive record, retrievable by criminal justice agencies, for the remainder of the calendar year plus 5 years. Routine domestic airline screening does not query NCIC, so an order does not surface at an ordinary TSA checkpoint, but international arrivals and border crossings are a different matter.

While the order is active, the consequences are automatic. The order requires surrender of firearms and license cards under G.L. c. 209A, § 3B, and a person currently subject to a temporary or permanent 209A order or a 258E harassment prevention order is a prohibited person under G.L. c. 140, § 121F. Federal law adds 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) for qualifying orders issued after a hearing with notice that protect an intimate partner, and firearms dealer background checks through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System search NCIC, including the Protection Order File. 28 C.F.R. § 25.6. When the order ends the prohibitions lift, but the history remains visible to the licensing authority at any later suitability determination.

The issuance of an order is not, by itself, a ground of removability. The exposure comes from violations: under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), a noncitizen is deportable if a court determines that the person engaged in conduct violating the portion of a protection order that protects against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury. That determination can arise from a violation proceeding, which is why a noncitizen should treat every restraining order hearing, civil or criminal, as a proceeding with immigration consequences and should coordinate defense counsel accordingly.

Yes, by statute. In a dangerousness hearing under G.L. c. 276, § 58A, the factors the judge weighs include whether the person has any history of orders issued under c. 209A and the related abuse prevention statutes, and judges setting bail see the same history in the probation record. This is one of the concrete ways a years-old order, never violated, follows a defendant into a later, unrelated case, and it is a reason to contest an unjustified order at the first hearing rather than let it enter by default.

They are different systems with different rules. Criminal records seal and expunge along statutory routes: judicial sealing of dismissed charges under G.L. c. 276, § 100C on the good cause balancing of Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296 (2014), sealing of convictions by petition to the Commissioner of Probation under § 100A after 7 years for a felony and 3 for a misdemeanor, and expungement under §§ 100E to 100U, including reason-based expungement under § 100K on clear and convincing evidence. The civil registry has no time-based sealing, no petition to the Commissioner of Probation, and no balancing test, and courts have no general power to expunge records the Legislature chose to preserve. Matter of Expungement, 489 Mass. 67, 74 to 76 (2022). The single recognized ground is fraud on the court.

The best protection is to win the hearing. Because the registry entry remains through expiration, termination, and appeal, the hearing after notice, usually ten days after the ex parte order, is where the permanent record is decided. An order denied after a contested hearing enters the registry as denied; an order a defendant ignores becomes a year long order and often an extended one. Preparation means evidence, witnesses, and cross-examination, and coordination with counsel if a criminal case arises from the same allegations, because testimony at the civil hearing can be used in the criminal case. Attorney Serpa defends these hearings and the criminal cases that follow them. Call 617.936.0201 for a confidential consultation.