Massachusetts Restraining Order and Harassment Prevention Order Expungement FAQs: 209A and 258E

In everyday use, yes. Restraining order is the common name for an order under M.G.L. c. 209A, which the statute calls an abuse prevention order. An order under M.G.L. c. 258E is a harassment prevention order. A 209A restraining order requires a qualifying family, household, or dating relationship, while a 258E harassment prevention order does not. The record keeping, however, is the same for both orders. Each order is entered in the statewide registry and remains there after the order ends. Everything in these FAQs about expungement and correction applies to both orders.

The statewide domestic violence record keeping system is the registry the Legislature created in 1992, St. 1992, c. 188, § 7. The Commissioner of Probation maintains the registry, which contains a record of every 209A restraining order and 258E harassment prevention order issued in the Commonwealth. A judge considering a new complaint for a 209A restraining order is required to search the registry, M.G.L. c. 209A, § 7. A judge considering a complaint for a 258E harassment prevention order directs a review of the registry and of court activity records, M.G.L. c. 258E, § 9. The registry exists so that a judge deciding an application sees the parties’ full order history.

Only in one rare circumstance. A judge has inherent authority to expunge the record of an abuse prevention or harassment prevention order from the statewide registry only on a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the order was obtained through fraud on the court. Commissioner of Probation v. Adams, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 737 (2006); Silva v. Carmel, 468 Mass. 18, 24 to 25 (2014). No statute authorizes removal. The Supreme Judicial Court has read the Legislature’s silence as deliberate. Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 425 Mass. 153, 156 (1997). The defendant bears the burden of proof. The appellate courts have vacated expungement orders based on less than clear and convincing proof of fraud on the court.

The registry keeps records of all orders, inactive as well as active, so that judges deciding future applications see the complete history. Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 425 Mass. 153, 157 (1997). M.G.L. c. 209A, § 7 and M.G.L. c. 258E, § 9 direct the police department to destroy its record of a vacated order, but the directive does not apply to the probation registry. Since July of 2022 the entry can at least be labeled accurately, as closed-vacated rather than closed-expired, which is a correction worth pursuing.

Yes for the databases and federal records. No for the police record. Massachusetts statutes require the court to notify the appropriate law-enforcement agency when an order under c. 209A or c. 258E is vacated or terminated. The statutes also require the court to direct the agency to destroy its record of the order. Massachusetts appellate courts have held, however, that statewide probation and registry records are generally not expunged. The statewide records instead remain available, including as inactive history. The statewide court and probation systems keep the record and show the order as terminated after a denial at the 10-day hearing, a voluntary dismissal, or an extension or continuance.

Yes. An NCIC Protection Order File entry may remain after the order is vacated or expires. The entering agency should update its active status. Under FBI policy, an expired or cleared entry remains in the file as an inactive record for the rest of the year in which the entry expired or was cleared, plus five years. The entry is then retired and is no longer generally accessible to ordinary NCIC users.

The registry is available to judges, probation, and other authorized agencies with a legitimate need to review it, not to the general public. A 209A restraining order or 258E harassment prevention order is civil, so the order itself is not an entry on the criminal record an employer obtains through standard CORI access. Inside the court system, the record appears whenever a new order is sought, when an extension is contested, and in later proceedings where a protective order history is relevant. An active order can also require firearms surrender under M.G.L. c. 209A, §§ 3B and 3C for a 209A restraining order and under M.G.L. c. 258E, §§ 4A and 4B for a 258E harassment prevention order.

The definition of fraud on the court comes from Rockdale Mgt. Co. v. Shawmut Bank, N.A., 418 Mass. 596, 598 (1994). To commit fraud on the court, a party must have sentiently set in motion an unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate the matter. The proof must be clear and convincing. In Adams, the judge found nineteen false statements under oath across four affidavits, a larger pattern of harassment, and false complaints to the Board of Bar Overseers. 65 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 730 to 731 (2006). The standard describes a deliberate campaign to corrupt the proceeding, not a dispute about who told the truth.

By itself, no. In M.C.D. v. D.E.D., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 337, 343 to 344 (2016), the trial judge found by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff had lied under oath to obtain the order. The Appeals Court still vacated the expungement, holding that a single false allegation is not the systemic, egregious scheme required for fraud on the court. False testimony alone does not constitute fraud on the court without more egregious conduct. Wojcicki v. Caragher, 447 Mass. 200, 210 to 211 (2006). A successful motion usually needs proof of a broader fabricated campaign, documented beyond the affidavit itself.

No. In B.C. v. F.C., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 345, 350 to 351 (2016), both parties and the judge agreed that the order was based on the delusional statements of a plaintiff in a psychotic episode. The Appeals Court held that the judge had no authority to expunge the record because delusion is not a sentient scheme. In Silva v. Carmel, 468 Mass. 18, 24 to 25 (2014), the ex parte order was improper from the start because the parties were not household members. Expungement was still denied. Even a defendant denied adequate process is not entitled to expungement. Quinn v. Gjoni, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 408, 414 (2016).

Yes. In J.S.H. v. J.S., 91 Mass. App. Ct. 107 (2017), the Appeals Court held that expungement of a c. 258E harassment prevention order is available only in a rare and limited circumstance. The party seeking expungement must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the order was obtained through fraud on the court. The same rule applies to c. 209A records. The registry treatment is also the same. A 258E harassment prevention order is transmitted to the commissioner of probation for filing under M.G.L. c. 258E, § 9.

Yes. For most defendants, correction is the realistic remedy. In July of 2022, the Massachusetts Probation Service and the Trial Court added the status codes closed-denied, closed-expired, and closed-vacated to the registry. The change followed the litigation in Xarax X. v. Yale Y., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 699 (2023), where orders vacated in 2003 were still described in later official documents as expired. A defendant can ask the issuing court, by motion with notice to the Massachusetts Probation Service as keeper of the record, to correct the entry so that it states what happened. At every later hearing, a judge who reads the history can take into account whether the entry says closed-vacated or closed-expired.

No. The expungement statute, M.G.L. c. 276, §§ 100E to 100U, addresses criminal and juvenile records. The statute does not authorize removal of a civil restraining order or harassment prevention order from the registry. Courts have no general power to expunge records in the interests of justice where the Legislature has not provided that power. Matter of Expungement, 489 Mass. 67, 74 to 76 (2022). The criminal docket for a separate charge of violating a 209A restraining order or 258E harassment prevention order has its own rules, including sealing under M.G.L. c. 276, § 100C after a dismissal or a not guilty.

No. The Supreme Judicial Court decided Piper P. v. Barron B., SJC-13854. A Juvenile Court judge had terminated a 258E harassment prevention order against a nine year old defendant after a school investigation did not substantiate the allegations, but found no fraud on the court. The Court held that no statute authorizes a judge to expunge the record of a 258E harassment prevention order and that a judge has no inherent authority to do so without proof of fraud on the court. The Court left any broader remedy to the Legislature. Fraud on the court remains the only recognized ground.

Not on a standard one. A 209A restraining order or 258E harassment prevention order is a civil order. The order creates no CORI entry. Therefore, the CORI report an employer receives through the Department of Criminal Justice Information Services does not contain any entry regarding a 209A restraining order or 258E harassment prevention order. A criminal charge for violating that order is a CORI entry like any other, visible at the employer’s access level and governed by the ordinary sealing rules. One dispute can therefore create two records, a civil registry entry no employer sees and a criminal docket employers can see.

No. Under Rule 5 of the Trial Court Uniform Rules on Public Access to Court Records, abuse prevention and harassment prevention order proceedings are excluded from remote access. The exclusion conforms to the federal Violence Against Women Act. The case therefore does not appear on the public online docket portal. The paper file remains a public court record at the clerk’s office, with the plaintiff’s address impounded. Anyone can request the file in person at the courthouse. Inside the court system, the record is fully visible to judges and probation, who see the registry entry at every later application and in later criminal proceedings.

The order can come up at the border. Massachusetts orders, including ex parte orders, are entered into the Protection Order File of the FBI’s National Crime Information Center so that police in any state can enforce them under 18 U.S.C. § 2265. Customs and Border Protection officers who screen travelers at ports of entry work from systems with access to NCIC records. An expired or cleared order remains in the file as an inactive record, retrievable by criminal justice agencies, for the remainder of the calendar year plus 5 years. Routine domestic airline screening does not query NCIC, so TSA officers at an ordinary checkpoint do not see the order. Customs and Border Protection officers can see the order at an international arrival or a border crossing.

The state licensing prohibition applies automatically while the order is active. An order issued without notice also requires surrender of firearms and license cards under M.G.L. c. 209A, § 3B for a 209A restraining order and under M.G.L. c. 258E, § 4A for a 258E harassment prevention order. After notice, the judge orders or continues the surrender if the judge determines that returning the firearms would present a likelihood of abuse or harassment to the plaintiff, under M.G.L. c. 209A, § 3C or c. 258E, § 4B. A person currently subject to a temporary or permanent 209A restraining order or a 258E harassment prevention order is a prohibited person under M.G.L. c. 140, § 121F. Federal law adds 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) for qualifying orders issued after a hearing with notice that protect an intimate partner or a child of the partner or of the defendant. Firearms dealer background checks through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System search NCIC, including the Protection Order File. 28 C.F.R. § 25.6. The prohibitions end when the order ends, but the history remains visible to the licensing authority at any later suitability determination.

The issuance of an order is not, by itself, a ground of removability. The immigration risk comes from violations of the order. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), a noncitizen is deportable if a court determines that the person engaged in conduct violating the portion of a protection order that protects against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury. A court can make that determination in a violation proceeding. A noncitizen should therefore treat every hearing on a 209A restraining order or 258E harassment prevention order, civil or criminal, as a proceeding with immigration consequences and should coordinate defense counsel accordingly.

Yes, by statute. In a dangerousness hearing under M.G.L. c. 276, § 58A, the factors the judge weighs include whether the person has any history of orders issued under c. 209A and the related abuse prevention statutes. Judges setting bail see the same history in the probation record. A judge in a later, unrelated case can consider an order issued years earlier, even one that the defendant never violated. A defendant therefore has a reason to contest an unjustified order at the first hearing rather than let the judge enter the order by default.

The civil registry and criminal records are different systems with different rules. Criminal records are sealed and expunged under statutory procedures. For judicial sealing of dismissed charges under M.G.L. c. 276, § 100C, the judge applies the good cause balancing of Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296 (2014). A person may petition the Commissioner of Probation under § 100A to seal a conviction after 7 years for a felony and 3 for a misdemeanor. Expungement under §§ 100E to 100U includes reason-based expungement under § 100K on clear and convincing evidence. The civil registry has no time-based sealing, no petition to the Commissioner of Probation, and no balancing test. Courts have no general power to expunge records the Legislature chose to preserve. Matter of Expungement, 489 Mass. 67, 74 to 76 (2022). The single recognized ground is fraud on the court.

Winning the hearing protects the defendant better than any later remedy. The registry entry remains through expiration, termination, and appeal. At the hearing after notice, usually ten days after the ex parte order, the judge decides whether to extend the order. The registry keeps a permanent record of the judge’s decision. An order denied after a contested hearing is entered in the registry as denied. An order that a defendant ignores becomes a year-long order and often an extended one. Preparation for the hearing includes evidence, witnesses, and cross-examination. A defendant who also faces a criminal case arising from the same allegations should coordinate with counsel, because testimony at the civil hearing can be used in the criminal case. Attorney Serpa defends clients at 209A restraining order and 258E harassment prevention order hearings and in the related criminal cases. Call 617.936.0201 for a confidential consultation.