Larceny Over $1,200 and Financial Crimes Defense in Massachusetts

Massachusetts Financial Crime Charges, Defenses, and Professional Consequences

A Massachusetts financial crime case may involve larceny over $1,200, false pretenses, embezzlement, identity fraud, credit or debit card fraud, insurance fraud, or unauthorized computer access. The charged statute and the amount allegedly obtained set the potential sentencing range. Evidence of intent often determines whether the Commonwealth can prove the offense, while the defendant’s profession or immigration status may create separate consequences outside court.

This page explains the principal statutes and penalties, then addresses the principal defense and pretrial-resolution subjects: valuation, criminal intent, digital evidence, restitution, civil compromise, and clerk-magistrate hearings. It also explains the reporting and disciplinary concerns that can arise for lawyers, physicians, financial professionals, security clearance holders, commercial drivers, and noncitizens.

Attorney Joe Serpa has practiced Massachusetts criminal defense since 1995. He represents defendants in the Boston Municipal Court, Massachusetts District Courts, and Superior Courts across Eastern and Central Massachusetts. To discuss a financial crime allegation, call 617.936.0201 for a free consultation.

Massachusetts Financial Crime Charges

Larceny Over $1,200 Under M.G.L. c. 266, § 30

M.G.L. c. 266, § 30 punishes larceny of property valued above $1,200 by up to five years in state prison, or by a fine of up to $25,000 and up to two years in jail. Because the statute authorizes a state prison sentence, the offense is a felony. If the property is not a firearm and its value does not exceed $1,200, the maximum sentence is one year in jail or a fine of up to $1,500.

Value determines the available punishment, not whether the Commonwealth proved the underlying act of larceny. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 181, 183-186 (1987). When the parties dispute value, the factfinder must decide whether the Commonwealth proved that the property was worth more than $1,200. If the Commonwealth does not prove that amount, the court must sentence within the lower range.

Section 30 does not define how the factfinder should measure value. The prosecution may rely on an owner’s testimony, purchase records, retail prices, or other evidence. Defense counsel may respond with the property’s age and condition, comparable sales, an independent appraisal, or evidence that the prosecution used replacement cost or sentimental value instead of a reliable measure of what the property was worth. A finding that the value did not exceed $1,200 limits the court to the lower statutory sentencing range.

Larceny by False Pretenses Under M.G.L. c. 266, § 30

Larceny by false pretenses occurs when a defendant knowingly makes a false statement of fact with the intent that another person rely on it, and that person relies on the statement and parts with property. Commonwealth v. Mills, 436 Mass. 387, 396-397 (2002). The prosecution must prove the false statement, the defendant’s knowledge, the intent to induce reliance, actual reliance, and the transfer of property.

The required reliance distinguishes false pretenses from other forms of larceny. In an ordinary taking, the owner does not consent. In a false-pretenses case, the owner transfers the property, but the Commonwealth alleges that the defendant obtained that consent through fraud.

These allegations can arise from a contractor’s receipt of a deposit, an online sale, an application for employment or benefits, a rental transaction, or a business representation. A broken promise or failed transaction does not by itself prove that the defendant made a false statement or intended to defraud when the parties entered the transaction. Defense counsel examines what the defendant said, whether the statement concerned an existing fact or present intention, what the recipient understood, and why the recipient transferred the property.

Embezzlement Under M.G.L. c. 266, § 30(1)

Massachusetts prosecutes ordinary embezzlement as larceny under § 30(1). The Commonwealth generally proceeds on an embezzlement theory when property came under the defendant’s control through a position of trust or confidence and the defendant allegedly converted it with the intent to steal or embezzle. A debtor-creditor relationship alone does not establish embezzlement. Commonwealth v. Mills, 436 Mass. 387, 394-395 (2002).

The general larceny penalties apply and turn on whether the value exceeds $1,200. Workplace allegations may involve register receipts, payroll entries, expense reimbursements, client funds, inventory, or electronic transfers. Defense counsel must identify which transactions the defendant had authority to make, whether the accounting includes legitimate payments, and whether the evidence proves fraudulent intent.

Chapter 266 also contains separate embezzlement statutes for particular positions. Those statutes do not govern an ordinary workplace allegation unless the defendant occupies the position the statute names.

• M.G.L. c. 266, § 50 applies to a person employed in the treasury of the Commonwealth. It authorizes a fine of up to $2,000 or imprisonment in state prison for life or for any term of years.
• M.G.L. c. 266, § 51 applies to a county, city, or town officer who embezzles or fraudulently converts property belonging to, or possessed by, that county, city, or town. It authorizes up to ten years in state prison, or a fine of up to $1,000 and up to two years in jail.
• M.G.L. c. 266, § 52 applies to an officer, director, trustee, agent, or employee of a bank as defined in M.G.L. c. 167, § 1. It authorizes up to fifteen years in state prison, or a fine of up to $2,000 and up to two and one-half years in jail. A person who knowingly aids, counsels, or procures the larceny faces the same punishment.
• M.G.L. c. 266, § 57 applies to a trustee under an express trust, guardian, conservator, executor, or administrator who embezzles or fraudulently converts covered property. It authorizes up to ten years in state prison, or a fine of up to $2,000 and up to two years in jail.

Prosecutors may charge separate transactions in separate counts when the evidence supports treating them as distinct acts. In Attorney Serpa’s experience, prosecutors also commonly seek a grand jury indictment in substantial, multi-transaction embezzlement cases, including cases alleging losses above $25,000.

Identity Fraud Under M.G.L. c. 266, § 37E

M.G.L. c. 266, § 37E defines several forms of identity fraud. One provision applies when a person, with intent to defraud and without express authorization, poses as another person and uses that person’s identifying information to obtain or attempt to obtain money, credit, goods, services, another thing of value, or identification, or to harass another person. Another applies when a person obtains identifying information without express authorization and intends to pose as that person, or help someone else do so, to obtain money, credit, goods, services, another thing of value, or identification, or to harass another person. The statute also prohibits possessing a tool, instrument, or other article adapted, designed, or commonly used to access another person’s listed financial account number, code, password, electronic signature, or biometric data under circumstances showing intent or knowledge that someone will use it to commit larceny.

The statute defines personal identifying information broadly. It includes names, addresses, telephone numbers, driver’s license numbers, Social Security numbers, financial account information, employment information, and computer passwords.

Section 37E authorizes a fine of up to $5,000, up to two and one-half years in a house of correction, or both. Because the statute authorizes no state prison sentence, identity fraud under § 37E is a misdemeanor. After a guilty finding, the court must order restitution for the victim’s financial loss.

Prosecutors often charge identity fraud together with larceny or another fraud offense. Identity fraud remains a misdemeanor, but a defendant may face felony sentencing on a related larceny count if the Commonwealth proves that the amount obtained exceeded $1,200.

Credit and Debit Card Fraud Under M.G.L. c. 266, §§ 37A, 37B, and 37C

Chapter 266 uses the term “credit card” broadly. Section 37A defines it to include an instrument, device, identifying code, or account number used to obtain money, goods, services, or another thing of value on credit or by debit from a cash account. Sections 37B and 37C can therefore apply to qualifying credit card, debit card, and ATM activity even though the statutes use the term “credit card.”

Sections 37B and 37C prohibit several distinct acts. Section 37B includes procuring a card through material false statements, taking or retaining a card with fraudulent intent, unauthorized sale, purchase, or signing, unlawful use or acceptance, false vendor billing, receipt of proceeds, and falsely reporting a card lost or stolen. For the conduct that §§ 37B and 37C divide by value, § 37B applies when the relevant value does not exceed $1,200. It authorizes a fine of up to $2,500, up to one year in jail or a house of correction, or both.

When the relevant value exceeds $1,200, § 37C applies to that value-dependent conduct. Section 37C separately prohibits falsely making or embossing a card and possessing specified card-reproduction equipment. It authorizes a fine of up to $10,000, up to two and one-half years in a jail or house of correction, up to five years in state prison, or both a fine and imprisonment. Possession or control of four or more falsely embossed cards creates a presumption of a violation of § 37C(c), but the Commonwealth must prove the facts required to invoke that presumption.

The evidence may include transaction records, surveillance video, device extractions, IP logs, account-access records, and testimony about who possessed or used a card. Defense counsel examines whether the Commonwealth can authenticate each record, identify the person who performed the transaction, and account for shared cards, shared devices, authorized access, and third-party use.

Insurance Fraud Under M.G.L. c. 266, § 111A

M.G.L. c. 266, § 111A authorizes up to five years in state prison, a jail sentence of at least six months and no more than two and one-half years, a fine of at least $500 and no more than $10,000, or both the fine and the jail sentence. Allegations may involve automobile claims, property damage, workers’ compensation, or healthcare billing.

The Insurance Fraud Bureau often investigates these cases with law enforcement and a district attorney’s office. Investigators may obtain medical, employment, repair, and financial records before police or prosecutors file a charge. A person who learns of an investigation may therefore have an opportunity to retain counsel before any complaint or indictment issues.

Unauthorized Computer Access Under M.G.L. c. 266, § 120F

M.G.L. c. 266, § 120F applies when a person knowingly accesses a computer system without authorization, or gains access and fails to stop after learning that the access is unauthorized. Section 120F authorizes up to thirty days in a house of correction, a fine of up to $1,000, or both. The prosecution does not need to prove an intent to commit another crime. Section 120F treats a password or other authentication requirement as notice that access is restricted to authorized users.

These allegations may involve access to an employer’s system after termination, another person’s email or social media account, a financial account, or confidential business data. When police search a phone, computer, or cloud account, defense counsel examines the warrant’s probable-cause showing, particularity, scope, and execution. The firm’s page on digital search warrants explains those warrant requirements. Its broader guide to illegal searches and seizures explains when unlawfully obtained evidence may be suppressed.

Defenses and Pretrial Resolution Options in Financial Crime Cases

Valuation and the $1,200 Threshold

When the value of the property or alleged loss determines the penalty, defense counsel should test the prosecution’s calculation against the underlying records. An owner’s estimate may rely on retail price, replacement cost, or an incomplete accounting. An independent appraisal, comparable sales, inventory records, bank records, and an expert accountant’s analysis can show that the amount does not exceed $1,200 or that the prosecution included legitimate transactions in its total.

In a multi-transaction case, counsel should trace each disputed entry. That review may identify authorized payments, reimbursements, returned property, duplicate entries, or transactions attributable to another person. Those findings may affect the charged offense, the number of counts, restitution, and the available sentence.

Intent, Ownership, and Good-Faith Belief

The Commonwealth must prove the mental state required by the charged statute. Depending on the charge, that may include intent to steal, intent to embezzle, intent to defraud, knowledge that access was unauthorized, or knowledge that a device would be used for larceny. The same mental state does not govern every financial crime.

An honest belief that the defendant owned or was entitled to property can negate the intent to steal, even if the belief was mistaken. Commonwealth v. Liebenow, 470 Mass. 151, 156-162 (2014). The factfinder may consider whether the belief was reasonable when deciding whether the defendant honestly held it, but reasonableness is not a separate legal requirement.

A claim of ownership or entitlement may arise from disputed compensation, expense reimbursement, shared accounts, partnership property, or family finances. Counsel must separate a genuine ownership or accounting dispute from evidence of criminal intent. The Commonwealth cannot prove larceny merely by showing a failed business transaction or an inaccurate statement. It must prove every element of the charged theory beyond a reasonable doubt.

Digital Evidence, Attribution, and Search Warrants

Financial crime prosecutions often depend on transaction records, account logs, email, text messages, device extractions, surveillance video, and cloud data. Defense counsel should determine whether police obtained the evidence lawfully, whether the Commonwealth can authenticate a complete and unaltered item, and whether the Commonwealth can attribute the specific act or communication to the defendant.

Shared accounts, shared devices, stored passwords, remote access, and delegated authority can undermine an assumption that the account holder performed every recorded action. Defense counsel may also challenge incomplete screenshots or summaries when the Commonwealth possesses the original device, a forensic extraction, or the complete account records. The firm’s guide to digital evidence in Massachusetts criminal cases explains the authentication, hearsay, completeness, and best-evidence rules that a judge applies when deciding whether to admit digital evidence. A separate page addresses the Fifth Amendment and compelled phone passcodes.

Restitution and Civil Compromise

Repayment may affect the alleged victim’s position, the prosecutor’s recommendation, or the court’s sentencing decision, but it does not by itself eliminate criminal liability. Counsel should determine the correct amount, document any payment accurately, and avoid making unnecessary factual admissions in connection with the payment.

M.G.L. c. 276, § 55 permits a court, in its discretion, to discharge a defendant from certain misdemeanor complaints or indictments when the injured person appears and acknowledges in writing that the person received satisfaction for the injury. The statute applies only to a misdemeanor for which the injured person has a civil remedy. It excludes several categories, including offenses committed by or against an officer of justice, riotous offenses, offenses committed with intent to commit a felony, specified protective-order violations, M.G.L. c. 265, §§ 13M and 15D, and conduct that would otherwise constitute abuse under Chapter 209A.

Section 55 does not make dismissal automatic. The injured person must complete the required acknowledgment, the defendant must pay any expenses the court orders, and the judge decides whether to discharge the complaint or indictment. In an eligible theft case, counsel can determine whether civil compromise may support discharge and how the proposed payment may affect the remaining defense.

The Clerk-Magistrate Hearing

Some financial crime allegations begin with an application for a criminal complaint instead of an arrest. Under M.G.L. c. 218, § 35A, a person who was not arrested ordinarily has a right to a clerk-magistrate hearing before a criminal complaint issues on a misdemeanor application. The statute also requires a hearing on a felony application when a law enforcement officer requests one. For certain other felony applications, the clerk-magistrate has discretion to grant a hearing. The statute contains exceptions for an imminent threat of bodily injury, commission of a crime, or flight from Massachusetts.

At the private hearing, the clerk-magistrate decides whether to issue a criminal complaint. If the clerk-magistrate denies the application, no complaint issues, no arraignment occurs, and the application does not create a CORI entry. Because a denied application produces no charge or disposition, it can avoid reporting duties triggered by either event. A licensing application may still ask separately about an arrest, investigation, or other event, so counsel must review the exact question.

A defendant who challenges the issuance or validity of a complaint after a clerk-magistrate proceeding must use a motion to dismiss rather than seek a second evidentiary hearing before a judge. Commonwealth v. DiBennadetto, 436 Mass. 310, 313-314 (2002). In a private complaint application where no prosecutor has committed to the prosecution, a clerk-magistrate may also decline to issue a complaint despite probable cause. Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court, 483 Mass. 80, 86 n.10 (2019).

A denial is not a final judgment for collateral-estoppel purposes. In Cabrera v. Commonwealth, 496 Mass. 179 (2025), the Supreme Judicial Court therefore held that collateral estoppel did not bar a later application. The court also rejected a due-process claim based on a delay of two and one-half years where the defendant did not show severe prejudice to the defense. In Attorney Serpa’s experience, a denial is the practical end of nearly every ordinary complaint application, but it does not create a permanent legal bar to later action.

Counsel can use the hearing to address probable cause, intent, valuation, restitution, the defendant’s prior criminal record, employment, and other facts that may support denial of the application. In an appropriate case, Attorney Serpa may also ask the clerk-magistrate to hold the application open while the defendant completes an agreed condition, such as restitution. The firm’s criminal defense results include matters resolved before arraignment.

Professional, Employment, and Immigration Consequences

Professional rules may require disclosure or permit discipline because of alleged fraud, dishonesty, misappropriation, or wrongful taking. Each rule identifies its own trigger, which may be a charge, arraignment, admission to sufficient facts, conviction, or completed diversion program. The firm’s profession-by-profession guide to criminal charges and professional licenses in Massachusetts explains those differences.

• Attorneys. S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 12(8) requires a lawyer to notify bar counsel within ten days after a conviction as § 12(1) defines that term. The definition includes a guilty verdict or finding, an accepted guilty or nolo contendere plea, and an admission to or finding of sufficient facts, whether or not the court has imposed sentence. When a court enters a continuance without a finding after an admission to or finding of sufficient facts, that admission or finding triggers the notice duty. A felony is a serious crime under § 12(3), as is a crime with theft, fraud, deceit, or misappropriation as a necessary element. The rule does not impose a reporting duty merely because the lawyer was charged or arraigned.
• Physicians. Under 243 CMR 2.14 and M.G.L. c. 221, § 26, the clerk of courts reports a physician’s conviction, plea of nolo contendere, or admission to sufficient facts to the Board of Registration in Medicine within one week. The clerk must therefore report a CWOF entered after an admission to sufficient facts. Physicians must also answer the Board’s questions on initial and renewal applications fully and accurately.
• FINRA-registered professionals. Form U4 requires disclosure of every felony charge and specified misdemeanor charges involving fraud, false statements, wrongful taking of property, bribery, perjury, forgery, counterfeiting, extortion, or conspiracy to commit one of those offenses. A firm generally must file an amendment within thirty days after learning of the facts that require it. The fact that a charge later ends in a dismissal does not change the form’s “ever charged” question. Statutory disqualification uses different triggering events. FINRA identifies all felony convictions and certain misdemeanor convictions as disqualifying for ten years, subject to its eligibility procedures. A financial crime charge or CWOF does not automatically impose a lifetime industry bar.
• Bank employees. Federal law can restrict employment at an insured depository institution after a conviction or an agreement to enter a pretrial diversion or similar program connected to a crime involving dishonesty, breach of trust, or money laundering. The offense, disposition, applicable exception, and any required consent determine whether the restriction applies.
• Commercial drivers. A qualifying conviction for using a commercial motor vehicle or another motor vehicle in the commission of a felony triggers a CDL disqualification of at least one year under M.G.L. c. 90F, § 9. Counsel should analyze that consequence separately from the criminal sentence.
• Security clearance holders. Criminal conduct, financial dishonesty, and related reporting duties can affect a clearance. The duty to report and the adjudicative effect depend on the specific form, governing rule, employment status, and event. Counsel should review the exact question rather than assume that every charge, dismissal, or CWOF receives the same treatment.
• Noncitizens. Fraud and theft offenses may qualify as crimes involving moral turpitude under federal immigration law. The result depends on the statutory elements, the record of conviction, the sentence, the person’s immigration history, and any applicable exception. A noncitizen should obtain immigration advice about the proposed disposition before entering a plea or admitting to sufficient facts.

If a complaint issues, counsel should identify the client’s actual disclosure and disciplinary rules before recommending a disposition or deciding whether to proceed to trial. Attorney Serpa handles the criminal case and coordinates with licensing, employment, securities, or immigration counsel when the client retains separate counsel for those issues.

Sealing or Expunging a Financial Crime Record

A dismissal or nolle prosequi disposition may qualify for sealing under M.G.L. c. 276, § 100C. Expungement permanently removes a much narrower category of covered Massachusetts records when the applicant satisfies the statutory requirements. The firm’s page on Massachusetts sealing and expungement standards explains statutory eligibility, waiting periods, and exclusions. The page on sealing or expunging a Massachusetts criminal record explains how the two remedies differ and how each affects access to a CORI.

Sealing generally limits third-party access through ordinary Massachusetts CORI checks. Federal, FINRA, security-clearance, immigration, and professional-licensing forms may still require disclosure after Massachusetts seals a record. Sealing also does not erase records that another agency or private entity maintains independently.

Courts Where Serpa Law Office Handles Financial Crime Cases

The Massachusetts District Courts and the Boston Municipal Court have final jurisdiction over misdemeanors and many felonies. More serious financial cases may proceed by grand jury indictment in Superior Court. Serpa Law Office handles financial crime cases in courts across Eastern and Central Massachusetts.

• In Boston, the firm handles cases in the BMC Central Division.
• In Middlesex County, the firm handles cases in Cambridge District Court, Woburn District Court, Newton District Court, Waltham District Court, and Framingham District Court.
• In Norfolk County, the firm handles cases in Dedham District Court and Quincy District Court.

If the Commonwealth obtains an indictment, the county Superior Court ordinarily handles the prosecution. Suffolk Superior Court hears indicted cases arising in Boston. Middlesex Superior Court hears indicted cases from Cambridge, Somerville, Waltham, Woburn, and other Middlesex County communities. Norfolk Superior Court hears indicted cases from Quincy, Dedham, and other Norfolk County communities.

The parent page on Massachusetts shoplifting and larceny defense addresses lower-value theft, receiving stolen property, shoplifting, and related charges. The CWOF, pretrial probation, and diversion FAQ explains the principal nontrial dispositions.

To discuss a Massachusetts financial crime allegation, call Serpa Law Office at 617.936.0201 or contact the firm online for a free consultation. The Boston office is at 20 Park Plaza, Suite 400A. The Quincy Office is at 500 Victory Road, Suite 400A.